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ABSTRACT 
The Global War on Terror is in its sixth year now, and the battle with the 
Islamist terrorists is being fought both in the physical as well as the informational 
domain. This research examines the relationship between terrorism and 
information operations, keeping in view Martin Libicki’s notion of information 
warfare as a Mosaic of Forms. This research begins with the basics of terrorism 
and information operations, and proceeds to highlight the use of information 
operations by terrorist organizations and, in particular, its use by Al Qaeda. In 
order to compare the complete spectrum of information operations being 
conducted by United States-led forces in this Global War on Terror, this research 
includes two detailed studies on the prosecution of information operations from 
the perspective of both the United States-led coalitions and the anti-coalition 
elements in Afghanistan and Iraq. The study concludes by highlighting the 
relevance of Libicki’s constructs in the context of the Global War on Terror and 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who 
embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and 




A. BACKGROUND  
September 11, 2001, may be regarded as a ‘watershed date’ for the world 
community toward its efforts in fighting the menace of terrorism worldwide. This 
is the date that led the United States and many of the countries of the world to 
launch coordinated and calculated attacks aiming at dismantling the terrorist 
infrastructure and its support elements in all their forms. The worldwide support 
for this Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), led by the United States, was 
overwhelming, initially. Since terrorism is generally seen as an aberration in 
societal conduct and is perceived as against the established ethos of humanity, a 
global alliance for such an endeavor was easy to structure and promulgate. 
Nancy Gibbs, in her article in Time magazine describes the feeling of 
togetherness in the world community immediately after 9/11 as, “Shoulder to 
shoulder, until justice is done.”1 
The most visible responses to the September 11, 2001, attacks are the 
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies. 
The world community in general has been transfixed by these military campaigns 
which are a state-centric2 approach toward fighting global terrorism. Apart from 
the military aspect of the Global War on Terrorism, there is a continuous battle, in 
the information domain, between the terrorist organizations and the United 
States-led forces to prevail in the information spectrum. These battles, though 
                                            
1 Nancy Gibbs, “What We’ve Learned,” Time, Sep 11, 2006, 34. 
2 Jeremy Pressman, “Leaderless Resistance: The Next Threat?” Current History, Dec 2003, 
422. 
2 
not so visible, do have a profound impact on the way military operations are 
prosecuted on the ground. The battle for the information spectrum is now 
ingrained into the various strategic-level doctrines defining the approach to 
defeat terrorism as an ideology, a philosophy and a way of life. It has also 
percolated down to the tactical domain wherein military commanders are 
understanding its importance and trying to utilize it, along with military operations, 
to achieve better results. The hypothesis elucidated in the article Information-Age 
Terrorism3 aptly describes the importance of information and its ability to 
transform conflict between unbalanced adversaries in the present Information 
Age. The strengthening of network organizations and its impact on non-state 
actors, as well as the accessibility of global communication and information 
infrastructure, has truly re-defined the nature of today’s conflict from a mere 
kinetic application of force to a knowledge-intensive show of nearly 
unmanageable permutations.  
Terrorist organizations are perhaps more adaptive and constantly 
absorbing the Information Age paradigms for using the information environment 
to their advantage. This is amply clear with their usage of modern communication 
means, including the Internet and the omnipresent news-hungry media. The 
adaptive nature of Al Qaeda is clearly visible from its dispersed organizational 
structure and the manifestation of its ideology in various parts of the world. Al 
Qaeda has emerged as a decentralized and unstructured ideological movement 
for global Jihad4 capable of carrying out strikes all over the globe with due 
deliberation and a lot of patience. The use of the Information Age paradigms by 
Al Qaeda and other regional terrorist organizations could provide important 
lessons toward fighting their ideology and cutting off their command and control 
infrastructure. The ‘Al Qaeda Syndrome’ that is now visible in various regional 
Islamic terrorist organizations exhibits the subtle linkages between them and 
hence, dealing with such organizations will definitely require a common and  
                                            
3 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, “Information-Age Terrorism.” Current 
History, Apr 2000. 
4 David Ronfeldt, “Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare?” 
First Monday, Vol. 10, No. 3, Mar 7, 2005 [on-line], available from 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_3/ronfeldt/index.html; accessed  Sep 24, 2006. 
3 
shared strategy, especially in the information spectrum. The key point is to 
understand the adaptive nature of terrorist organizations to exploit the 
information environment. 
The prosecution of the GWOT over a period of five years has broken the 
bonds of togetherness between the world communities that it so cherished just 
five years back. “The war on terrorism goes on, but with little discernible 
success.”5 This view of the GWOT is further amplified by the diminishing rating of 
the president of the United States and a growingly divisive coalition of nations 
supporting the GWOT. The phrase “full-spectrum dominance” falls apart with 
respect to the information domain since the macro realities do not correspond to 
any discernible success. Although the recently released document “9/11 Five 
Years Later: Successes and Challenges”6 lucidly brings out the achievements of 
the United States policy in countering global terrorism, it also points subtly toward 
activities in the information domain that have had, and shall continue to have, a 
profound impact on the GWOT. Even though the document points us toward the 
“successes,” that notion fails totally when we see the statistics of terrorist-related 
incidents that show an increase in incidents worldwide from 11,153 in 2005 to 
14,338 in 2006; an increase from 3,468 to 6,630 incidents in Iraq, and an 
increase from 491 to 749 incidents in Afghanistan during the same period. 7 Dr. 
Bruce Hoffman, an eminent scholar and an expert in the field of terrorism, during 
his testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, United States House of 
Representatives, has remarked,  
Four and a half years into the war on terrorism, the United States 
stands at a crossroads. The sustained successes of the war’s early 
phases appear to have been stymied by the protracted insurgency 
                                            
5 “Global Progress Report 2006” Current History, Dec 2005 [journal on-line], available from at 
http://www.currenthistory.com/GlobalProgressReport,2006.pdf, accessed Sep 2006. 
6United States of America, “9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges,” Washington, 
DC, Sep 2006  [on-line], available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/waronterror/2006/waronterror0906.pdf, accessed  Sep 24, 2006. 
7 United States of America, Country Reports on Terrorism – 2006, [on-line], available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/; Internet; accessed 23 May 2007. The statistics of the 
terrorist related incidents are given at the Annex of Statistical Information in the document. 
4 
in Iraq …. More consequential, but less apparent perhaps, has 
been our failure to effectively counter our enemies’ effective use of 
propaganda and related information operations.8 
 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW – PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY 
The area of research covered in this thesis deals primarily with Information 
Operations in the context of the GWOT. The GWOT has compelled all the 
nations of the world, and in particular the United States and its allies, to achieve 
a common perspective with regard to the information spectrum in order to 
combat the terrorist networks worldwide. The thesis will focus on the strategy 
adopted by the United States and its allies in the information domain to deal with 
terrorism, and in particular, Al Qaeda, with examples from Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as dominant case studies. 
The thesis will also dwell on the changes affected in Al Qaeda’s organization and 
structures due to the GWOT, and focus on the adaptability and utilization of the 
paradigms of information operations in order to achieve their aims. Finally, the 
thesis will try to propose a strategy to be adopted in the information domain for 
prosecution of the GWOT. 
 
1. Purpose 
The GWOT has put the world community into a totally different operating 
environment; the paradigm from a war against conventional, well-defined armies 
to well diffused and hidden terrorist networks and organizations requires 
innovative adaptations to conventional strategy, doctrine, tactics, and the overall 
philosophy of warfare. The war against covert, illegal, non-state actors requires a 
different approach to warfare, especially when information emerges as a 
resource that plays an increasingly important role. 
The physical dominance and destruction of terrorist organizations and 
their networks is the major part of the effort on the GWOT, but equally important                                             
8 Bruce Hoffman, RAND Corporation, Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, United States House of 
Representatives, Feb 16, 2006.  
5 
are the operations prosecuted in and through the information domain that provide 
strategic and operational guidance in prosecuting operations on the ground. The 
dominance of information in various forms, as an effective weapon for 
prosecuting actions against terrorists and their organizations, beginning at the 
strategic level and flowing down to the tactical level, requires information to be 
successfully acquired, followed by assimilation, transformation, dissemination 
and exchange. Information as a resource has become prominent in this 
Information Age and the terrorist organizations are exploiting it and adapting it to 
their organization and infrastructure.  
The purpose of the research is to analyze the battles in the information 
environment between Al Qaeda, as the dominant terrorist organization, and the 
United States and its allies post September 11, 2001, with a focus on 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  
This leads us to analyze and compare the efforts of the international 
community in their fight against terrorism vis-à-vis the ability of the terrorist 
organizations to exploit the Information Age paradigms to their advantage. The 
success and the failure of the GWOT is measurable by actions and reactions in 
the information domain, and thus research to assess the information spectrum in 
the GWOT is bound to provide important learning and a way ahead toward 
achieving proportional results in the information domain.  
 
2. Scope 
The purpose of the research is to highlight the various battles in the 
information domain between Al Qaeda, as the vanguard of the global Islamic 
terrorism movement, and the United States and its allies, with a focus on OEF 
and OIF. In order to establish and explore the various battles in the information 
domain, the research will include the following - Firstly, the research covers some 
fundamental issues pertaining to information operations, terrorism, and tries to 
draw out the linkages. Secondly, the research analyzes the approach undertaken 
by Al Qaeda to exploit the information spectrum, by bringing out various 
examples. Thirdly, the research, while trying to analyze OEF and OIF, maintains 
6 
its focus toward analyzing the various sub-domains of Information Operations as 
defined by Martin Libicki in his seminal paper on Information Warfare,9 and thus 
analyze the sub-domains like the Command and Control Warfare (C2W), 
Intelligence based Warfare (IBW), Psychological Warfare (PSYW), Economic 
Information Warfare (EIW), Cyber Warfare (CyW), and Electronic Warfare (EW) 
with a perspective towards GWOT. These aspects are highlighted from the 
strategic and tactical perspectives both for Al Qaeda as a global terrorism 
vanguard, and the United States and its allies participating in the GWOT in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. This has led to a better understanding of the value of each 
of these sub-domains in a non-conventional strategic and tactical environment, 
followed by an approach to enhance their effectiveness, with a bottom line that 
operations in the information domain are essential for successful prosecution of 
the GWOT. Finally, the thesis concludes with a strategy that needs to be pursued 
in order to negate the use of information operations by terrorist organizations, 
and provide a platform for countries around the world to prosecute a successful 
campaign against Islamic fundamentalist terrorism by utilizing information 
operations as a principal tool.  
 
C. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS: A CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This chapter provides a background for undertaking research that 
identifies September 11, 2001, as the tipping point for the world community to 
focus on terrorism as a problem phenomenon and one that justifies the effort put 
in by the world community to find a solution. In the following chapters this data 
will provide a comparative point for judging the information environment both 
prior to and thereafter, and a perspective on how information operations have 
become more entwined into the nature of this conflict. This chapter also defines 
the parameters for this research in terms of its purpose and scope. 
Chapter II focuses on the fundamental issues pertaining to terrorism and 
Information Operations. This chapter explores the different perspectives of 
terrorism, as understood by the world community, that signify the various 
                                            
9 Martin Libicki, “What is Information Warfare,” National Defense University, 1995. 
7 
approaches that are required to fight this menace. The chapter also discusses 
the theoretical aspects of both terrorism and Information Operations that provide 
a base for undertaking further research in the following chapters. The chapter 
concludes with the hypothesis that terrorist organizations need to conduct IO for 
their growth as well as survival in today’s information age. 
Chapter III examines the growth of Al Qaeda, its exploitation of 
Information Age paradigms to propagate its ideology, and its present structure 
and tactics with relation to Afghanistan and Iraq. The chapter will also analyze 
the changing structure of Al Qaeda post 9/11 as well as its capability to conduct 
the various types of information operations.  
Chapter IV entails a detailed case study on how the United States and its 
allies developed the information spectrum in support of OEF, and the manner in 
which they used information as a weapon in war. The various battles in the 
information domain between the United States and its allies and the Taliban/Al 
Qaeda will be identified and analyzed. This will also lead us to identify actions 
that influence the information environment in Afghanistan. 
Chapter V focuses on the battles in the information domain in Iraq. The 
information campaign is analyzed from the perspective of both the United States-
led coalition forces as well as from the perspective of anti-coalition forces 
operating in Iraq. The uniqueness of the operations in Iraq allows a comparative 
assessment of information campaign during the initial phase of operations 
between the United States-led coalition and the Iraqi military, and in the later time 
frame between United States-led forces and the Iraqi insurgents.  The chapter 
also dwells on the issue of public opinion with respect to the operations in Iraq 
and its relationship with the information environment. 
Chapter VI compares the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from the 
prism of Libicki’s Mosaic of Forms. The forms of warfare as elucidated by Libicki 
as well as his capabilities / vulnerabilities with regard the elements of information 
warfare are analyzed from the perspective of the GWOT. The chapter also 
highlights the vulnerabilities of Islamist terrorist organizations and the elements of  
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information operations that may be applied to exploit the vulnerabilities. The 
chapter concludes with the strategic level guidance for information operations in 
pursuit of terrorists. 
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II. TERRORISM AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND LINKAGES 
A. UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM 
All terrorist violence, Islamic or otherwise, is unjustifiable, 
unforgivable, cowardly and contemptible. But just because we 
condemn does not mean we should not strive to comprehend. 
— Last few lines by Jason Burke in his book:  Al Qaeda: Casting the 
Shadow of Terror. 
 
Terrorism is not a modern phenomenon and it has been in existence in its 
different forms of manifestations since the dawn of recorded history.10  The 
debate in the period that such forms manifest themselves, and their analysis 
decades and centuries later, bring out contrasting characteristics, but the 
common thread that binds these together is the notion of the ‘weak against the 
strong’ and the notion of ‘causing harm to unarmed civilians, ’the value system to 
benchmark, ‘who is/was right and who is/was wrong’ changes with time.  The 
perspective on terror as an integral part of state-craft, in a somewhat different 
form, was defined by Kautilya way back in the times of the Mauryan Empire (4th 
century B.C.) in the Indian sub-continent, through his book titled Arthashastra. 
The emphasis of Kautilya, in a number of instances, was to define the ability of 
the weak to cause harm to the strong and that causing harm to civilians to gain 
psychological advantage, the aspects identified in the use of spies and terror 
tactics and strategy in times of war, in terms of today’s discussion of terrorism, 
will identify it as falling into that category.11  A similar manifestation of terrorism is 
                                            
10 Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism – Challenges, Perspectives and Issues (New York: 
Sage, 2003). This initial discussion has been motivated by Martin’s discussion on the history of 
terrorism. 
11 Kautilya, Arthashastra, trans. Project South Asia, Missouri Southern State University [on-
line], available from 
http://www.mssu.edu/projectsouthasia/history/primarydocs/Arthashastra/index.htm, accessed  
Sep 27, 2006. The different books  (chapters) as part of Arthashastra — Book IV, "The Removal 
of Thorns;" Book IX, "The Work of an Invader;" Book X, "Relating to War;" Book XII, "Concerning 
a Powerful Enemy;" Book XIII, "Strategic Means to Capture a Fortress;" and Book XIV, "Secret 
Means"  — are sprinkled with examples that in the world view on terrorism in the present times, 
may relate to tactics adopted by terrorists in today’s age against their powerful adversaries. 
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found in the Roman Era (during the declining years of the 1st century B.C.) that 
includes the brutal suppression of the adversaries and civilians through 
unconventional means and the assassination of political heads. This ancient 
tactic and strategy was used effectively by Genghis Khan12 (12th and 13th century 
A.D.) during his campaigns in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The tactics 
simply advertised brutality towards unarmed civilians to obtain disproportionate 
results. The example of the French Revolution and the régime de la terreur (reign 
of terror) that saw the use of violent and oppressive means by the state, and as 
described by the Anglo-Irish statesman Edmund Burke, gave us the word 
terrorism, as we know it today.13 
Terror tactics have not only been the prerogative of states, they have been 
adopted by non-state players from the time when states began to propagate 
terror’s utility. The terrorist tactic of violence and brutality has various examples 
of achieving tactical and strategic victories, but in the perspective of Caleb Carr, 
the “strategy of using terror has always failed and will fail again.”14 The 
emergence of non-state players as a major force in propagating this philosophy 
can be viewed as modern day terrorism.  The idea of fighting against the state or 
the established principles of governance through the use of terror tactics, by 
individuals or groups, is what we see as the present dominant structure of 
terrorism. According to Brian Michael Jenkins, an established expert on terrorism 
at the RAND Corporation, the term “terrorism”15 came into being in France when 
Napoleon’s chief of police ordered the roundup of terrorists responsible for an 
attempt on the emperor’s life. The word thereafter has been identified with                                             
12 James Chambers, The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe (New York: 
Atheneum, 1985). The book describes in detail the use of tactics propagated by the Mongols that 
can easily be identified as terrorism as we see it in today’s world.  
13 Edmund Burke, “Reflections on the Revolution in France,” 1790  [on-line], available from 
http://www.constitution.org/eb/rev_fran.htm, also available from http://www.bartleby.com/24/3/ 
1001.html. 
14 Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians; Why It Has 
Always Failed and Why It Will Fail Again (New York: Random House, 2002). The point that Carr 
makes is debated by a number of experts. Alex Dershowitz in his book Why Terrorism Works, is 
of the opinion that terrorism does work and it is a phenomenon largely of our own making. 
15 Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening 
Ourselves (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006)  [on-line], available from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG454/, accessed Oct 24, 2006.  
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individuals or groups that use the tactics of terror with intent to bring down 
governments, and the tactics used are assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, 
and hijackings. The covert linkages, or illicit support provided by established 
institutions and states, is what projects such non-state actors―individuals and 
groups―into a different spectrum and category of this syndrome. 
 
1. The Definition Quagmire 
 
Because I do it with one small ship, I am called a terrorist. You do it 
with a whole fleet and are called an emperor. 
— A pirate, from St. Augustine's "City of God" 
I was called a terrorist yesterday, but when I came out of jail, many 
people embraced me, including my enemies, and that is what I 
normally tell other people who say those who are struggling for 
liberation in their country are terrorists. I tell them that I was also a 
terrorist yesterday, but, today, I am admired by the very people who 
said I was one.  
— Nelson Mandela, Larry King Live, May 16, 2000 
" 
The above two quotes reflect the quandary of the contemporary world 
when it comes to defining terrorism. The complex relationships that exist 
between individuals, groups, nations, and societies create a confused state of 
environment and do not allow us to define or identify terrorism in a coherent 
manner. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, in their book titled Political Terrorism, 
have discussed 109 definitions of terrorism wherein twenty-two word categories 
are identified,16 This confusion, or the lack of acceptance in viewing terrorism by 
the world community in general, has led to a non-cohesive approach and varying 
perspectives in the actions required to mitigate this problem. The world 
community, under the aegis of the United Nations, has been trying in vain since 
the time of the establishment of its predecessor, the League of Nations, to come 
to a common definition on terrorism. On September 8, 2006, the 60th session of 
                                            
16 Alex P Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism (New Brunswick: Transaction, 
2005).   
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the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy17 that states its mission as, "Reaffirming that acts, methods 
and practices of terrorism in all its forms  and manifestations are activities aimed 
at the destruction of human rights,  fundamental freedoms and democracy, 
threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately 
constituted Governments, and that the international community should take the 
necessary steps to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism." Even 
with such a proclamation by most of members of the world community, the 
common definition of terrorism remains illusive. And as Cooper rightly has given 
an apt title to his paper, “Terrorism: the Problem of the Problem Definition” back 
in 1978 and states in this paper, “we can agree that terrorism is a problem, but 
we cannot agree on what terrorism is.”18 
Why is a common definition of terrorism important? The answer to this 
question is based on the facts that, firstly, modern terrorism has blown up into a 
global, systematic threat to international security and is justifiably comparable 
with armed conflicts, and that an absence of a common definition seriously 
undermines the efforts of the international community to tackle this grave threat 
to humanity. Secondly, the concept of “one person’s terrorist is another person’s 
freedom fighter,” is an extremely dangerous view of looking at the menace of 
terrorism from a global perspective ― it creates illusion and provides an easy 
way out for states and institutions to provide overt and covert support to the 
entire phenomenon of terrorism. Such statements have become a cliché and an 
obstacle to efforts to successfully deal with terrorism.19 If nothing else, these 
statements lead to the questionable assumption that the ends justify the means. 
Thirdly, terrorism has networked into a worldwide phenomenon with intricate and 
                                            
17 United Nations General Assembly, 60th Session, “Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 
Sep 8, 2006  [on-line], available from http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.html, 
accessed  Oct 27, 2006. 
18 H. H. A.  Cooper, “Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem Definition,” Chitty’s Law 
Journal, 26, 1978, 106. 
19 Mira Banchik, “The International Criminal Court & Terrorism,” Jun 2003  [on-line], available 
from http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/ICC%20and%20Terrorism.PDF, accessed Oct 
27, 2006. 
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invisible linkages that span geopolitical boundaries and societies. There is 
therefore, a need to define a legal connotation to the term so that it is seen 
through a common framework and has a common perspective.  
Terrorism is being debated politically and many nations have created 
special legislative provisions to criminalize terrorist acts in order to provide the 
law enforcement authority with additional powers to deter such acts.20 The 
United States has enacted several acts that are direct fallout from the events of 
9/11―the Patriot Act, the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act―issued several Executive 
Orders, and added/amended several regulations to accommodate actions 
against terrorists. Similarly, the United Kingdom has the Terrorism Act 2000 and 
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. India, too, has recently enacted 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 with the intention of strengthening the legal 
infrastructure deterring and dealing with terrorist activities.21 In order to achieve a 
universally accepted definition, we have to rely on objective and authoritative 
principles.  
These examples demonstrate how terrorism is now pervasive as a legal 
concept in many domestic legal systems. The same provisions are needed at an 
international level that should also include a common definition on terrorism. 
There is a need for moral equivalence toward terrorist acts that involve killing of 
innocent people, their efforts directed against the established laws of 
governance, and their intent to undertake such actions. We need to get away 
from the “double-standards” as perceived by the world community.  The definition 
must be founded on a system of principles and laws of war, legislated and ratified 
in many countries. A well established global definition of terrorism is necessary to 
formulate a common platform and framework in undertaking cooperative, 
cohesive, and focused operations in the information domain against the terrorist 
networks and organizations at the worldwide level. The flux in the information 
                                            
20 Ben Golder and George Williams, “What is Terrorism? Problem of Legal Definition,” 
UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 27/2, 2204, 270. 
21 Ministry of Home Affairs, India, “Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002”  [on-line], available 
from http://mha.nic.in/poto-02.htm, accessed Oct 27, 2006. 
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environment, due to a non-existent, universally acceptable definition, is being 
exploited by terrorist networks all over the world. 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
“it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean 
so many different things.”  
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master —  
that's all.”  
— Lewis Carroll - Through the Looking Glass, c.vi 
 
2. Root Causes of Terrorism  
 
…No one except a dumb thief plays with the security of others and 
then makes himself believe he will be secure whereas thinking 
people when disaster strikes make it their priority to look for its 
causes in order to prevent it happening again. But I am amazed at 
you even though we are in the 4th year after the events of 
September 11th. Bush is still engaged in distortion, deception and 
hiding from you the real causes. And thus the reasons are still there 
for a repeat of what occurred.22 
— Osama Bin Laden 
The focus on understanding the root causes of terrorism is important from 
the point of view of this research, since they are the very raisons d'être and 
motives that drive the various terrorist groups and organizations to shape the 
information environment toward their cause. Many academic scholars and 
terrorism experts have remarked that terrorism cannot be defeated by military or 
law and order means only, and that it requires a multi-pronged and multi-faceted 
approach, which includes strategies to eliminate the roots and causes of 
terrorism.23 A discussion on causes of terrorism is bound to be controversial in 
                                            
22 Osama bin Laden, from the transcript of a video-taped message released and aired in the 
Al Jazeera television network, as reported in the Washington Post on Nov 1, 2004 [on-line], 
available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16990-2004Nov1.html, accessed 
Oct 25, 2006. 
23 Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counter-Ideological Work Against 
Terrorist Ideology,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2006, 531-558. 
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many ways, but it is sure to provide the necessary background and 
understanding, with regards to the driving forces behind terrorism, and to 
formulate a balanced and effective long-term campaign in the information 
domain.24 The same view point is also expressed by the Club de Madrid25 during 
the deliberations that took place as part of the International Summit on 
Democracy, Terrorism and Security held in Madrid from 8 to 11 March 2005 and 
documented in a series of working papers on the subject of the causes of 
terrorism.26 A similar approach is also seen in the National Security Strategy of 
the United States of America wherein the emphasis on defining a long-term 
strategy for fighting terrorism is derived by analyzing the root causes.27 As Kydd 
and Walter mention in concluding remarks in their paper, Strategies of Terrorism, 
information is one of the variables that is central in counterterrorism warfare and 
an accurate assessment of the information environment is essential for a correct 
and commensurate force application: “The struggle against terrorism can more 
usefully be thought of as a struggle to collect and disseminate reliable 
information in environments fraught with uncertainty.”28 The root causes of 
terrorism, are therefore, thought of as a good starting point to understand the 
information environment that surrounds the phenomenon of terrorism, and to 
utilize the tenets of this information within the ambit of a counterterrorism  
 
                                            
24 Brynjar Lia and Katja H- W Skjolberg, “Why Terrorism Occurs: A Survey of Theories and 
Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism”, FFI Research Report No. 02769. Kjeller, Norway:FFI, 
2000 and “Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature,” FFI 
Research Report No. 04307. Kjeller, Norway: FFI, 2004. The discussion on the causes of 
terrorism has been well researched and documented with excellent findings. I have dwelled upon 
their findings quite liberally in this portion of the research. 
25 The Club de Madrid is an independent organization whose purpose and priority is to 
contribute to strengthening democracy in the world.  It stimulates, promotes and conducts 
initiatives and activities and participates in projects seeking this objective.  The Club of Madrid 
acts as a consultative body for governments, democratic leaders, and institutions involved in 
processes of democratic transition. The Club has a very impressive list of members that includes 
former heads of states and leading academic scholars in their respective fields. See 
http://www.clubmadrid.org for more details. 
26 Louise Richardson, ed, The Roots of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006).  
27 United States of America, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America,” Mar 2006. 
28 Andrew H. Kydd, and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International 
Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, Summer 2006, 49-80 
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strategy. The discussion here will limit itself to the study of the causes of 
terrorism in general, and focus specifically on Al Qaeda and its version of Jihadi 
terrorism, in the following chapter. 
 
a. Relative Deprivation and Inequality 
Ted Gurr in his classic book, Why Men Rebel, examines the 
psychological frustration-aggression theory which argues that the primary source 
of the human capacity for violence is the ‘frustration-aggression mechanism.’ 
Gurr explains this hypothesis with his term “relative deprivation,” which is the 
discrepancy between what people think they deserve and what they actually 
think they can get. He comes up with the analysis that just as frustration 
produces aggressive behavior on the part of an individual, so too does relative 
deprivation predict collective violence by social groups.29 On similar lines, the 
research of Brynjar and Skjolberg also explains that the widespread perceptions 
of deprivation and inequality, especially among culturally defined groups, serve 
as the basic condition for participation in collective civil violence, and that 
terrorism may become an integral part of this violence.30  The relative deprivation 
theories dwell on the inequalities that arise from disequilibrium in the social, 
economic, and political status of groups and individuals that manifest themselves 
into aggressive, anti-state and anti-humanity behavior leading toward the 
acceptance of violence as a valid facilitator for voicing their concerns.  
 
b. Diffusion Theory 
Diffusion from the view-point of a physical phenomenon is the 
process that identifies the migration and intermingling of molecules and atoms 
and in a broader perspective may be defined as the process in which there is 
movement of a substance from an area of high concentration of that substance to 
an area of lower concentration. From sociology and an anthropological 
perspective, diffusion may be viewed as the transmission of elements or features 
                                            
29 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
30 Brynjar and Skjolberg, “Causes of Terrorism,” 11, 70. 
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of one culture to another. Everett Rogers seminal study on diffusion of 
innovations elucidates how, why and at what rate ideas and technology spreads 
through cultures31. Rogers defines diffusion as: the process by which innovation 
is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social 
system, and is a special type of communication concerned with the spread of 
messages that are perceived as new ideas. A similar understanding of terrorist 
networks, their tactics and innovations, are seen to diffuse through geographical 
boundaries, regions, cultures and societies. 
The occurrence and prevalence of terrorism in one country often 
leads directly or indirectly to more terrorism in neighboring countries. Terrorists 
have the potential and wherewithal to learn and respond to new counter-terrorism 
strategies and tactics, and to emulate such tactics in geographically adjacent 
areas.32 The diffusion theory is quite evident in today’s world. If we take a sample 
of countries that may be regarded as ‘the hub-centers of terrorism,’ their impact 
is often visible in the neighboring countries of the region. If we take the example 
of Pakistan-Afghanistan, terrorism is found prevalent in Iran, India, Western 
China, etc. Similar is the case, if we take the example of Iraq or Somalia. The 
diffusion theory in respect of terrorism is visible in the tactics and strategies 
adopted by terrorists, decisions to choose the medium of attack and timings, 
ways and means adopted for exploitation of media, and arms and explosives 
used by terrorists. This then provides us with a collaborative and cooperative 
approach that is visible amongst diverse terrorist groups and their trans-national 
linkages. The National Security Advisor of India, during his speech at the 43rd 
Conference on Security Policy in Munich from February 9–11, 2007 brought out 
quite lucidly the trans-national linkages of terrorist networks. 
 
                                            
31 Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations 5th Ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003). 
32 Brynjar and Skjolberg, “Causes of Terrorism,” 17-21, 70. The authors mention this as part 
of Contagion Theory wherein the communication networks may be considered as conduits for 
“infectious” attitudes and behavior. I tend to agree more with Everett Rogers perspective of 
diffusion of innovation to be more relevant, and hence included the Diffusion Theory as one of the 
root causes of terrorism. 
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World-wide, operations of terrorist groups reveal dangerous 
patterns. An entirely new breed of terrorists has emerged. Terrorist 
outfits today have a trans-national reach. New cells and new 
franchises are evolving. New support structures and financing 
mechanisms are being created. Passing of messages is becoming 
more sophisticated. Terrorist outfits are no longer tethered to 
geographical locations, or for that matter, even to political 
ideologies. Captured militants reveal that it has been possible to 
acculturate recruits coming from different climes, backgrounds, 
skills and countries. Such cross-cultural compatibility is paving the 
way for deadly attacks in unexpected locales in the future. 33  
 
A similar concern with respect to terrorism is voiced by terrorism expert Martha 
Crenshaw in a number of her research papers and books, and which could fall 
into the category of diffusion theory. 
 
Terrorist organizations frequently have direct, physical contacts 
with other terrorist groups and with foreign countries. Collaboration 
extends to buying weapons, finding asylum, obtaining passports, 
and false documents, acquiring funds, and sometimes rendering 
assistance in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks.[…] it 
means that transnational links among groups with shared aims 
make terrorism in one state likely to lead to terrorism in nearby 
states.34 
 
The trans-nation linkages and the consequent growth of terrorism have also been 
opined by proponents of terrorism as a ‘networked phenomenon’ in this 
information age.35 The growth of networks in general, is mainly due to their ability 
to inter-connect and emulate and such is the case with terrorist networks that fall 
accurately in the diffusion theory within this perspective. 
 
                                            
33 M. K. Naryanan, National Security Advisor, India, Speech at the 43rd Conference on 
Security Policy, Munich, Feb 9-11, 2007 [on-line], copy of the speech available from 
http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=198&; accessed  Feb 
25, 2007. 
34 Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power (Middletown, Connecticut: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1983). 
35 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age 
Terrorism,” in Countering the New Terrorism, Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David 
Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, Brian Michael Jenkins, RAND publication, 1999 [on-line], available form 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR989/; accessed Dec 28, 2006. 
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c. Globalization, Modernization and Cultural Confusion 
Globalization is most commonly associated with the development of 
global production and markets, and their social, political, and cultural 
consequences. Globalization is characterized by economic integration and 
interdependence, liberalization, and moving away from state control on 
movements of capital, labor, knowledge, and technology.36 Globalization is being 
regarded as a negative force in many of the emerging economies including 
Islamic states, as a potential force moving these states towards capitalism. That 
in turn, is seen as the force behind the cultural upheavals that are prevalent in 
their respective societies, especially to the uneven spread of the benefits from 
globalization. This inequality and deprivation within certain groups is a source of 
unrest and tension that may manifest into aggressive violent expression toward 
the state and society, and may lead to choosing terrorism as an alternative.  
Gotchev argues, in his paper, that globalization does not cause terrorism but 
creates opportunities and facilitates its emergence.37  
Rohan Gunaratna, a renowned academician on terrorism is also of 
the view that ‘forces of globalization have facilitated the rise, growth, mobility and 
access to special weapons/dual technologies of terrorist groups.’38 The rate of 
modernization, in terms of adaptation to modern values of governance and 
economy, is not being absorbed at the same rapid rate by societies that have 
long lived in a closed and confined environment. This has led societies to be 
fragmented with growth in social inequalities, grave damage to the environment, 
and resource wars due to explosive growth in the exports of certain commodities 
such as oil. As Brynjar and Skjolberg point out, the societal changes associated 
with modernization create new and unprecedented conditions for terrorism such 
as a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences.39  
Modernization in many parts of the Islamic world is being seen as the force that                                             
36 Atnas Gotchev, “Terrorism and Globalization,” in The Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise 
Richardson (New York: Routledge, 2006), 103. 
37 Atnas Gotchev, “Terrorism and Globalization.” 
38 Rohan Gunaratna, ed. The Changing Face of Terrorism (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 
2005). 
39 Brynjar and Skjolberg, “Causes of Terrorism.” 
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is propelling the Islamic societies away from their roots, religion, and culture. 
This, in general, is leading them toward a ‘cultural confusion’ that may be seen 
as an environment in which terrorism finds ideal grounds to breed and propagate. 
 
d. Weak and Collapsed States 
Weak and collapsed states are generally the states in transition and 
those that are undergoing a structural transformation, constant leadership 
struggles, those that are trying to emerge from an established tribal and 
fragmented background, or those where all the institutions of governance have 
collapsed. A case in point is Somalia, which is characterized as a state in 
constant transition from tribal leaders and warlords to powerful Islamic clerics. 
The influences of an appealing ideology in such societies lead to many amongst 
the population to adapt to the notion of terrorism as an alternative for wielding 
power and control. These are the very countries that provide a safe haven, an 
extensive training ground, and robust terrorist export machinery for regions all 
over the world.40 As Brynjar and Skjolberg remark, ‘the existence of weak and 
collapsed states are a potential breeding grounds for instability, mass migration, 
and murder.’41 A number of potential candidates are also emerging on the 
horizon like Bangladesh and Pakistan; these are the states that are in the 
turbulent transitory phase of evolution and the government and societies therein 
are influenced by strong radical Islamic fundamentalism.  The associated 
expatriate communities originating from these countries are showing a strain due 
to social alienation in their adopted countries, and are hence vulnerable to radical 
Islamic ideology.  One example of this is the unstable migrant population from 
these countries into Great Britain that has come to light as an aftermath of the 
London train bombings on July 7, 2005, and the consequent crackdown on 
radical Islamic movement in the country.42 Few scholars have given a 
                                            
40 John H Poole, Terrorist Trail (Emerald Isle, NC: Posterity Press, 2006). 
41 Brynjar and Skjolberg, “Causes of Terrorism,” 61-63. 
42 For detailed discussion on the London Train Bombing and the following investigation, the 
website on the subject hosted by the BBC contains important reports and is available  from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk/2005/london_explosions/default.stm 
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perspective of Al Qaeda being a ‘dune type organization,’43 that finds a place for 
itself to establish from time to time. The constant endeavor of the terrorist 
organizations has been to search for greener pastures―from Somalia to 
Afghanistan to Pakistan―to establish a foot-hold, and to reorganize and adapt. 
Weak and collapsed states provide the necessary structure and environment for 
such an effort. 
 
e. Political Alienation 
Political alienation is one of the factors mentioned in the National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America that is responsible for the 
terrorism that we confront today. The groups and individuals who are without any 
rights towards their government tend to feel marginalized and are hence 
vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse vision based on 
violence and destruction.44 A similar view is solicited by Brynjar and Skjolberg, 
wherein they believe that the lack of continuity of the political system and the lack 
of integration of political fringes is a factor for encouraging ideological terrorism.45 
The total disregard of valid grievances of a group of people by the political 
regime creates a vulnerable zone, and provides grounds where these people 
could fall prey to violence and aggressive means to project their issues. 
 
f. Emergence of Mass Media as a Platform for 
Advertisement of Grievances 
Mass media have re-defined the way of life for people all over the 
world and mass media now form an integral part of the world societal system. 
The term mass media has been used here in the context of modern means of 
media including modern methods of communication. Mass media have helped 
shape the nature of modern conflicts and how people view events and 
happenings around them with differing perspectives on the way it is being 
                                            
43 Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal, “Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology 
of Islamic Terrorist Organizations,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, 2005, 275-293. 
44 United States of America. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America.” Mar 2006, 10. 
45 Brynjar and Skjolberg, “Causes of Terrorism.” 
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projected to them. Therefore, public opinion has become an integral part of state 
policies and dictum. There seems to be a constant struggle as to how different 
people perceive the coverage of terrorist acts by the media. The members of the 
media have two competing and contradictory roles: controlling the flow of 
information while, at the same time, making the information ‘saleable.’46  
The ability of terrorists to exploit the media to their benefit, in terms 
of shaping public opinion, and as a platform for advertising their deeds, arises 
from the ability of media to absorb such events. Two recent examples come to 
mind. One is the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 714 from New Delhi to 
Kandahar where the projection of images in the media and a hostile public 
opinion led to the release of the terrorists by the Government of India. The other 
example involves Israel and the United States of America and the hijacking of the 
TWA airliner in Beirut. Some analysts point toward the contagion effect of mass 
media and its ability to spread terrorism.47 A few have totally disregarded such a 
suggestion,48 but most scholars generally agree that mass media is not the 
cause of terrorism per se, but it has a considerable impact on the patterns of 
terrorism.49 The former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher spoke 
eloquently about the dependence of terrorists on media; she called it the ‘oxygen 
of publicity.’ Brynjar and Skjolberg also point out in their report that the symbiotic 
relationship between modern mass media and terrorism is seen as a major force 
behind the rising lethality of international terrorism over the last decades.50 
Brigitte Nacos in her book Mass-Mediated Terrorism mentions that publicity is as 
essential to terrorists as the air they breathe51.  Bruce Hoffman, a noted expert  
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on terrorism, is also of the opinion that the revolution of communication means 
that media is actually transforming the phenomenon of terrorism in different and 
ever-changing dimensions.52 
 
g. Ideology of Terror 
Many analysts feel that one of the root causes of terrorism is the 
ideology that drives and motivates terrorists. Muhammad Hassan of the Institute 
of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, has remarked that terrorism is 
committed when opportunity, motivation, and capability meet and ideology is one 
of many elements that motivates a person to commit terrorism. He also opines 
that the role of ideology is especially significant for Al Qaeda and its 
associates.53 In another article, Dr. Stephen Biddle is of the opinion that the real 
enemy in the war against terrorism is not terrorism itself, but fundamentalist 
ideology. He equates terrorism as a mere tactic, and, identifies the center of 
gravity as what lies in the hearts and minds of politically uncommitted Muslims, 
and the ideology of terror.54 Therefore, countering the ideology must form part of 
the information operations conducted against terrorists. The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America also identifies ‘an ideology that justifies 
murder’ as one of the causes of terrorism and mentions the prevalence of an 
ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents as a 
factor on which terrorism survives.55 
 
h. Religious Intolerance and Terrorism 
In the last three decades, there has been an increase in the acts of 
violence that have religious undertones all across the globe. Mark 
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America.” Mar 2006, 10 
24 
Juergensmeyer feels that each case in which religion has been linked to violence 
is different.56 Magnus Ranstorp observes that the wave linked to religious 
violence is unprecedented in its scope and selection of targets as well as in its 
lethality and indiscriminate character.57 The rhetoric of religious teachings in 
Islam, by Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups, projects how religion and 
terrorism have become intertwined. The message of Osama bin Laden to the 
United States after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 is clearly religious in tone and 
content. 
 
Praise be to God and we beseech him for help and forgiveness. We 
seek refuge with the Lord of our bad and evil doing. He whom God 
guides are rightly guided but he whom God leaves to stray, for him 
wilt thou find no protector to lead him the right way. 
 
I witness that there is no God but God and Muhammad is his slave 
and prophet. 
 
God Almighty hit the United States at its most vulnerable spot. He 
destroyed its greatest buildings. Praise be to God. 
 
Here is the United States, it was filled with terror from its north to its 
south and from its east to its west. Praise be to God.58 
 
Such statements are prevalent in most of the terrorists’ activities 
carried out by Islamist terrorists wherein they try to seek a refuge under religion 
for their violent and barbaric acts. The Islamic terrorists are now adept at 
paraphrasing religious scriptures and texts to justify violence and to project 
themselves as the savior of religion. Bruce Hoffman also notes that the religious 
terrorists view violence as a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct 
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response to some theological demand or imperative.59 Such an understanding 
removes all limits and boundaries for the act of violence perpetrated by such 
terrorists. Rohan Gunaratna claims that terrorist ideologues invest in ideological 
propaganda to indoctrinate the terrorists themselves, as well as to increase their 
support base. He believes that linkages to ideology and the morality of terrorism, 
in the larger perspective, is now quite common, that and by keeping the ideology 
alive, the world is likely to fight a multi-generational jihad campaign.60 Samuel 
Huntington’s theory about the clash of civilization also has religious connotations 
and points toward religious fanaticism as the cause of future global clashes.61 
The religious intolerance issue was also highlighted by widespread 
protests in February 2006 against the publication of cartoons depicting the 
Prophet Mohammed. There were worldwide protests in the Muslim world as well 
as in the Western world. This view is validated by analyzing the polls conducted 
by the organization Terror Free Tomorrow, that observed that two-thirds of those 
surveyed in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, and a little over 50 percent in 
Palestine and United Arab Emirates, believe that the Danish cartoons of the 
Prophet Muhammad reflect Western antagonism against Islam itself.62 These 
events ferment the general antipathy of Muslims towards the Western world and 
are exploited by the Islamist terrorists for radicalization of the ‘fence sitters.’63  
Most recently, David Ronfeldt, a RAND scholar, has provided an interesting 
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perspective wherein he has related the current volatile phenomenon seen in 
militant Islam to tribalization of religion.64 
 
i. Terrorism as a Business Enterprise 
All terrorist groups need a structure and an organization of some 
form to provide them with the financial resources that finally manifests into ‘action 
on the ground.’ Money is required to mount a terrorist campaign. This support 
structure, in most cases, is run as a business enterprise. One example is the 
PLO financial wing, Samed, which uses modern organizational theories, 
providing economic benefits to the terrorists based on the category of operations 
undertaken. Samed is now in the business of building farms and factories and 
intends to become a strong economic force in the Middle East during the twenty-
first century.65 Another case in point is the Abu Nidal Group that functioned on 
the concept of ‘for hire terrorists’ and amassed vast wealth that they 
subsequently invested in commercial and real estate ventures and also in an 
international arms trading company.66 The emphasis of Al Qaeda toward building 
a business infrastructure during its time in Sudan is indicative of the fact that 
terrorist groups require such an infrastructure for their support and growth. A 
business infrastructure also exists in Afghanistan-Pakistan, where terrorism is 
run as a business enterprise that affects the livelihood of many a common man.  
The trade in arms and ammunition, false and forged documents, media and 
publications, drug-peddling, etc, translates into a multi-million dollar industry 
worldwide. Terrorism fund-raising through organized criminal syndicates and 
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linkages are discovered from time to time. The targets of terrorist attacks in 
recent times indicate that the economic impact of such targets is also an 
important consideration.67 
 
j. Covert and Overt State Sponsorship 
Use of terror tactics by the state was quite prevalent in the past (as 
discussed earlier), but in today’s world, support to terrorist groups and networks 
is not acceptable, and is enshrined in a number of declarations to this effect 
through the United Nations.68 Even though such declarations exist, many states 
pursue a policy of covert support and indirect policies. One of the models that 
describes state-level participation makes three distinctions in the form of 
sponsors, enablers and cooperators.69 The state sponsorship is an intricate 
process wherein the state always leaves a fall-back option, in terms of 
‘deniability’ when accused of sponsoring terrorism. The range of policy options 
available to a state that include supporting terrorism in some form are: ideological 
support, financial support, military support, operational support, logistical support, 
initiating terrorist acts, and direct involvement in terrorist attacks.70 Benjamin 
Netanyahu, the former Prime Minister of Israel, in his book on Fighting Terrorism: 
How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist Network, opines that 
‘there is no international terrorism without the support of sovereign states … the 
entire scaffolding of international terrorism will collapse to dust (if this state 
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support is removed).’71 A similar view is expressed by noted Indian scholar, 
Brahma Chellaney: ‘regimes that murder, maim, and menace the innocents are 
employing export of terrorism — like classical national power projection — as an 
indispensable component of state power.’72 Notwithstanding such a viewpoint, 
terrorist organizations are seen to be more autonomous, but in many countries, 
these groups have joined the political mainstream as a policy toward proposed 
amalgamation into the mainstream, but still follow an extremist agenda.  This is a 
dangerous trend and again provides a leeway for the state to covertly support 
terrorism as a policy toward its adversaries. The declining trend of overt and 
covert support of terrorism by states will definitely go a long way in defeating 
terrorism; hence shaping the information environment to achieve this becomes 
an important strategic objective. 
 
k. Weakness of Democracy 
The basic premise of democracy, ‘of the people, by the people and 
for the people,’ along with equality, freedom, justice and a rule of law derives 
immense strength from its founding principles. But these very principles are 
being targeted by terrorists in democracies in their respective period of evolution 
the world over. Democracies are susceptible to terrorism; the examples of the 
oldest and the largest democracies in the world are at the forefront, and many 
transitional democracies are faced with threats as well. There is a growing 
perception that democracy is weak against the threat of terrorism and is not able 
to deal forcibly with such an issue due to the very ideals on which it is based73. 
According to the National Security Strategy of the United States, the promotion of 
democracy is regarded as the end-all long-term solution to the transnational 
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terrorism of today.74 There needs to be a consistent approach by the United 
States in pursuing this goal, which till now, has been quite the opposite in its 
visibility. Establishment of democracy in the Muslim world wherein countries have 
been ruled by feudal lords, families and kings, dictators and despots is going to 
be a challenging task and may initially generate an additional load due to 
incessant attacks by terrorists. 
 
l. Religious Education System in Islamic Nations 
Another major factor that is responsible for the promotion of 
religious intolerance and Islamic terrorism, in particular, is the unbalanced 
education system in most Islamic countries in the form of madrasas. The 
evolution of radical Islam that began in the 1960s has only strengthened due to 
the powerful financial support by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Countries that 
pumped in the large revenues from the petro-industry for creating centers of 
Islamic studies. The idea was to revive Islam and to create a global identity for 
Muslims that was appearing to be diminishing due to the integration of the 
benefits of modernization in Muslim societies. In due course, radical Islam began 
to emerge as the more vocal component through these Islamic centers and 
hence began the growth of Madrasas with the specific intent to teach radical 
Islam. Jason Burke, in his book, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, mentions 
that the focus of the entire education system in the Middle East has a major 
element of religion, and therefore religious study, in all its forms, includes 
fundamentalist as well as liberal teachings. The fundamentalist views that are 
against the establishment and ordained through support in various Islamic 
scriptures, find greater numbers of sympathetic students.75  
The support provided by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in 
establishing thousands of Madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan, has made 
them into schools for radicalization and teaching the explosive interpretation of 
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Islam.76 Although some madrasas teach secular subjects, in general, madrasas 
offer a religious-based curriculum, focusing on the Quran and Islamic texts. 
Some analysts opine that a small group of radicalized madrasas, specifically 
located near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, promote a militant form of Islam 
and teach their Muslim students to fight nonbelievers and infidels.77 Similar 
expressions are found in the book, Three Cups of Tea, which has nothing to do 
with terrorism, but dwells deeply on the real-life experiences of Greg Mortenson 
when he attended religious schools in Pakistan, especially the Wahhabi 
madrasas, and his efforts in starting schools with no religious undertones. This 
book, too, paints a similar picture.78  Mortenson’s remarks in the book, “I don’t 
want to teach Pakistan’s children to think like Americans. I just want them to have 
a balanced, non-extremist education,” say a lot about the distorted education 
system. The unbalanced curriculum in madrasas are bound to produce 
individuals who, in due course, feel alienated and isolated in today’s world due to 
the lack of skills and education required to fit into the global community. Such 
isolation leads to their trying to find refuge in the more fundamentalist forms of 
religious teachings, which may lead to their acceptance of violence. The other 
viewpoint is that all the high-profile terrorists are known to be adequately or 
highly educated,79 but the opposite viewpoint is that these madrasas are 
producing the cannon fodder that is so very essential for the sustenance of the 
jihadi brand of Islamic terrorism.  
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If you are thinking a year ahead, sow seed, If you are thinking ten 
years ahead, plant a tree. If you are thinking one hundred years ahead, educate 
the people.  
  — Kuan Tzu, Chinese Poet, c. 500 B.C. 
 
m. Ongoing Conflicts and Foreign Occupation in the 
Muslim World 
The Muslim world, in general, is antagonized by the policies of the 
Western world toward the resolution of conflicts in the Middle East region and 
elsewhere in the world. The Israeli-Palestine conflict is a sore point, although the 
failure of the Western world to resolve the issue is not the cause of specific 
terrorist attacks, but it is seen as a source of Arab resentment that fuels violent 
passions against the Western world in general, and Western policies in 
particular. The question of morality, justice, respect and double-standards are 
words that invoke emotional violent responses in the Muslim world. It is also the 
source of much Arab resentment and undermines the moral authority of the U.S. 
war on terrorism.80 These unresolved conflicts also provide the theme for 
garnering support in the Muslim world by the Islamist terrorists and assist in their 
recruitment drives. The ‘war zones’ around the world that have Muslims fighting 
against non-Muslims and portrayed as the ‘lands of Jihad,’ provide a steady 
supply of battle hardened fundamentalist veterans, a source of inspiration to 
sympathetic diaspora communities,81 and a sense of adventure amongst the 
minds of young Muslims who may be willing to join the bandwagon. The 
involvement of foreign troops in Muslim lands has been a source of Islamist 
propaganda and provides a valid reason for joining the Jihad―as supporters or 
as active participants. The continuance of long ending regional conflicts and 
unwarranted foreign occupation are major catalysts for the propaganda 
mechanism for Islamist terrorists and a reason for continuance of their cause. 
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3. Analysis of Causes of Terrorism from the Perspective of 
Islamist Terrorism 
The theme behind this analysis is to identify and group the causes of 
terrorism, based on their relative proximity, so that a cohesive information 
strategy can be adopted to invalidate the group, and to further organize these 
groups to the relevancy that they associate with Islamist terrorists. The grouping 
of causes and their associated relevancy will help us in identifying priority areas 
that we need to concentrate on while defining a strategy for the war of ideas and 
for shaping the information environment. The grouping that emerges as most 
relevant, in the context of Islamist terrorists, requires the utilization of information 
operations as the dominant part of the strategy operations against terrorist 
organizations and networks. 
• Relative Deprivation and 
Inequality
• Political Alienation
• Weakness of Democracy
• Globalization, Modernization
And Cultural Confusion
• Weak and Collapsed
States
• Covert and Overt State
Sponsorship
• Religious Intolerance 
And Terrorism
• Terrorism as a Business
Enterprise
• Religious Education System
In Islamic Nations • Diffusion Theory
• Emergence of Mass Media
As a Platform for Advertisement
of Grievances
• Ideology of Terror
• Ongoing Conflicts and Foreign
Occupation in the Muslim World
Relevance to Islamists Terrorists  
Figure 1. Grouping and Relevance of Causes of Terrorism. 
 
Another means of analyzing the causes of terrorism is to view them in the 
context of Afghanistan and Iraq to see whether the causes, as highlighted, 
actually fit into the present ground conditions. Table 1 highlight that most of the 
root causes of terrorism do exist in both Afghanistan and Iraq, although in 
Afghanistan the conditions of the roots causes of terrorism are seen to exist more 
dominantly. In the case of Iraq, the causes seem to manifest after the invasion of 




Causes of Terrorism Afghanistan 
(Prior to OEF) 
Iraq 
(Prior to OIF) 
Relative Deprivation and Inequality ++ + 
Diffusion Theory +++ + 
Globalization, Modernization and Cultural 
Confusion 
++ + 
Weak and Collapsed States ++ + 
Political Alienation ++ + 
Emergence of Mass Media as a Platform for 
Advertisement of Grievances 
++ + 
Ideology of Terror ++ + 
Terrorism as a Business Enterprise ++ - 
Religious Intolerance and Terrorism ++ + 
Covert and Overt State Sponsorship +++ + 
Weakness of Democracy + + 
Religious Education System in Islamic 
Nations 
++ - 
Ongoing Conflicts and Foreign Occupation in 
the Muslim World 
++ + 
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(Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idea) 
 
It would be easier to subjugate the entire Universe through force 
than the minds of a single village. 
— Voltaire 
The French author, Victor Hugo, gave us the following very expressive 
quote: ‘Ideas are more powerful than all the armies of the world.’ Ideas are seen 
as the instigators that invoke strong passions and spark revolutions. The Cold 
War in the last century is supposedly the longest war in recent times, whereas 
the ideas of communism and totalitarianism, established by Karl Marx, collapsed 
at the hands of a more powerful idea that offered a better alternative, one based 
on political and personal freedom combined with economic prosperity. Hence, as 
Lawrence Reed, an economist, in his paper titled “The Importance of Ideas,” 
observes that, ‘Change ideas, and you can change the course of history’ and he 
further states that, ‘Investing in ideas – the right ones, not just any ideas – is a 
long-term investment, but one that has a return every bit as tangible as the 
purchase of stock.’83 The importance of ideas in the ‘war of terror’ is highlighted 
in the collection of essays by Robert Satloff titled ‘The Battle of Ideas in the War 
on Terror.’84 The ‘war of ideas,’ as it relates to the jihadi fundamentalism that we 
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intellect. Ideas give rise to concepts, which are the basis for any kind of 
knowledge whether science or philosophy. 
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are facing today, is a constant struggle at the ideological level between the 
jihadis on one side and the United States-led forces on the other. It is now 
perceived more and more as a debate that pits extremist ideology in the Muslim 
world against the values of freedom and tolerance,85 and could be viewed as a 
constant effort to ‘shape the information environment to gain an information 
advantage.’  The United States and its allies have a number of terms that have 
been defined in the past to support such a conflict, but all those terms ― political 
warfare, strategic influence, propaganda and psychological operations ― fall 
short in the context of the war of ideas that we are facing today. As William 
Rosenau, a political scientist at RAND Corporation remarks, “… what we are left 
with, then, is a variety of words and phrases, no one of which is sufficient for 
capturing the essence of our objective, that is, - prevailing in the longer term over 
the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.”86  
Another interesting concept signifying the powerful nature of ‘ideas’ is from 
the field of economics wherein a number of growth models based on ideas have 
been promulgated. In economic terms, ‘ideas’ are considered as non-rivalrous, 
implying that one person’s use of the good (idea in this case) does not diminish 
another’s use. As an example, once a computer chip has been designed and a 
facility established, the same facility can be replicated in different parts of the 
world with less effort and without any change of idea (in this case the design of 
the computer chip). As a case, we consider a production function of the form 
Y = F (A, X) 
where Y is the output, A is an index of the amount of knowledge that has been 
discovered, and X is the remaining input into production. Now, in case the 
production needs to be doubled, then without changing A and by merely                                             
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increasing X, we can obtain the desired result.87 Hence, non-rivalry of ideas or 
knowledge derives increasing return. Analogous to this concept, the ideology that 
drives terrorism, and in particular Islamist terrorism, has the ability and power of 
replication merely by changing inputs such as suitability of environment, 
availability of recruits, etc. the inputs that are derived from the root causes of 
terrorism. The ideology in this case remains a constant and as appealing as ever. 
The output (in this case Islamist terrorism) is therefore able to increase until the 
time there does not exist a more powerful or rival idea that dominates over its 
knowledge base, and in my opinion, that’s the crux of the ‘war of ideas’ that we 
need to focus on. What we then need is ‘idea practitioners,’88  people who can 
scan and identify the correct idea, package the idea, advocate the idea, take the 
idea outside and make things happen. The ‘war of ideas’ is also intricately related 
to the surrounding environment, which implies that the actions in the physical 
domain, including military actions, also have their hit in the ideological domain. 
For this reason,, the concept of the ‘war of ideas’ needs to be amalgamated in 
the overall sense, and actions undertaken in the physical domain need to be 
valued by their impact in the information domain. 
David Frum and Richard Perle, in their bestselling book, An End to Evil, 
remark, “The war against extremist Islam is as much an ideological war as the 
Cold War ever was…terrorists, in other words, are motivated by ideology. 
Discredit the ideology and you defeat the terrorists.”89 The converse of this 
statement could also be regarded as true―if our own ideals are discredited or 
dishonored by our own behavior, the repercussions are likely to damage our 
efforts toward the war on terror. Hence, there needs to be an equal effort toward 
discrediting the ideology of terror, while at the same time, avoiding actions that 
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would lead to discrediting our own ideas. In order to understand the very nature 
of the war of ideas, we need to characterize the ideas in the context of terrorism 
and view the battle of ideas from the perspective of both―the Jihadi terrorists as 
well as the global coalition that is fighting the war on terror. 
What we are confronting here is an evil ideology. It is not a clash of 
civilizations - all civilized people, Muslim or other, feel revulsion at 
it. But it is a global struggle and it is a battle of ideas, hearts and 
minds, both within Islam and outside it. This is the battle that must 
be won, a battle not just about the terrorist methods, but their 
views. Not just about their barbaric acts, but their barbaric ideas. 
Not only what they do, but what they think and the thinking they 
would impose on others. 
— Tony Blair, Former Prime Minister, United Kingdom 
 
a. ‘Ideas’ from the Terrorist’s Perspective 
Terrorist organizations worldwide have their specific motivations, 
political objectives, and ideology, based on which they commit violent actions. 
This section deals with the very ideas behind the Islamist terrorist organizations 
in general, and will focus especially on Al Qaida and its ideology. The answer 
that we seek is: what are the ideas or the ideology that propels these groups to 
resort to violent acts? And what are these ‘saleable’ ideas based on, from which 
they are deriving their strength and support? This will define the information 
environment that the United States and its allies are facing and in which they will 
have to operate in the foreseeable future. 
Since 9/11, many of the Islamist terrorist groups have been drawn 
to Al Qaeda’s ideology, and now they have two distinct characters, a local 
character based on their original ideology, motivations, and political ambitions, 
and a global character that aligns with the ideology of Al Qaeda, which includes 
opposition to the United States and its allies.90 Hence, the phenomenon of 
Islamist terrorism will be difficult to view from an isolationist standpoint, a case 
                                            
90 Rohan Gunaratna, “The New Face of Al Qaeda:  Understanding the Generational Gradient 
in Local and Global Jihad Campaigns,” International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism 
Research, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore [on-line], available from 
http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Multi-generational.pdf 
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where the United States and its allies can focus on the Islamist terrorist groups 
affecting only them will be hard to fathom and understand by nations dealing with 
a similar menace, and in my view, will be a short-term and myopic approach. The 
major ideas that are governing the global Islamist terrorist movements are: 
 
• Creation of a Muslim Umma91 
A worldwide Islamic nation and brotherhood that propels the Muslims 
against the rest of the world, in simplistic forms, pits the believers (in 
Islam) against the non-believers. The creation of a Muslim Caliphate 
to attain glory for all Muslims and Islam is an important self-belief in 
these terrorists. The establishment of a theocratic Muslim world that 
will have solidarity based on religion is the main idea. This 
interpretation of the Islamist terrorists coincides with the Huntington 
theory based on his famous article, “The Clash of Civilizations,” 
wherein future large scale clashes are forecast between civilizations 
and not between states in particular.92 The target in this case is the 
Western civilization, which has the United States of America at the 
forefront.  
 
Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, 
but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between 
nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of 
civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between 
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. 
 
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 1993 
 
                                            
91 Umma (Arabic: ةمأ ) is an Arabic word meaning community or nation. It is commonly used 
to mean either the collective nation of Islamic states or (in the context of pan-arabism) the whole 
Arab nation. In the context of Islam, the word umma (often spelled ummah) is used to mean the 
diaspora or community of the believers (ummat al-mu'minin), and thus the whole Islamic world. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ummah 
92 Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, 72(3), Summer 1993, 22-24. 
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• Jihad93 based on Violent Means 
The idea of Jihad motivates the Islamist terrorists to perpetrate 
violence on civilians as a means for establishing Muslim rights and 
glory. The term Jihad is applicable to both non-violent and violent 
struggles for oneself and for Islam. The identification of the term, by 
the terrorists, to profess non-violent action, is likely to have an 
adverse effect on the general Islamic public that could, in due course, 
relegate Jihad to only non-violent action. Such is the case with the 
Western public wherein Jihad is now being identified with Islamist 
terrorism. Sayid Qutb describes Jihad as a generational campaign: 
“The scope of this struggle is not limited to this earth or to this life. 
The observers of this struggle are not merely a generation of men.’”94 
This connotation of Jihad projects Islamist terrorism into an ever-
lasting and an ever-growing conflict. Rohan Gunaratna argues that, 
“As long as the terrorist ideology that ‘it is the duty of every good 
Muslim to wage Jihad’ has validity, Islamist terrorist groups will 
appear and disappear.”95 A similar view is visible from the 
perspective of American public opinion wherein 58 percent of 
respondents to a survey held in March 2006, indicate that Islam has 
more violent extremists than other religions.96 
 
                                            
93 Jihad (Arabic: داهج ǧihād) is an Islamic term, literally meaning struggle in the way of God.  
Within the realms of Islamic jurisprudence, jihad usually refers to military exertion against non-
Muslim combatants. In broader usage and interpretation, the term has accrued both violent and 
non-violent meanings. It can refer to striving to live a moral and virtuous life, to spreading and 
defending Islam, and to fighting injustice and oppression, among other usages. Jihad is also used 
to the mean the struggle for or defense of Islam. The primary aim of jihad is not the conversion of 
non-Muslims to Islam by force, but rather the expansion and defense of the Islamic state. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jihad 
94 Sayyid Qutb, “Jihad in the Cause of God,” as part of collection of essay by Andrew  G. 
Boston, ed., in “The legacy of Jihad: The Islamic Holy-War and the Fate of Non-Muslims,” New 
York: Prometheus Books, 2005. 
95 Rohan Gunaratna, “The New Face of Al Qaeda:  Understanding the Generational Gradient 
in Local and Global Jihad Campaigns.” 
96 Claudia Deane and Darryl Fears, “Negative Perception of Islam Increasing,” Washington 
Post, Mar 9, 2006, A01 [on-line], available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/08/AR2006030802221.html. 
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• Religion as the Basis of Human Existence and Islam as the Only 
Acceptable Religion 
All the major Islamic terrorist groups and their leaders advocate the 
importance of their religion and insist on the idea of following the true 
Islam. In every statement coming out of these terrorists groups, as 
well as Al Qaeda, verses of the Quran, quotes from the Prophet’s 
tradition (hadits), and opinions of classical Muslim scholars are 
twisted and turned to justify their cause as well as to commit violent 
activities.97 As Bruce Hoffaman observes, most of the terrorist groups 
have a strong religious component and that ‘the religious imperative 
for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist 
activity today.98’ In terms of the major terrorist acts in the past 
decade, most can be attributed to terrorist groups with strong 
religious motivations. 
 
We seek His help and ask for His pardon. We take refuge in Allah 
from our wrongs and bad deeds…. I bear witness that there is no 
God except Allah, no associates with Him and I bear witness that 
Muhammad is His slave and messenger… 
— Osama bin Laden 
 
.. has become obligatory upon each and every Muslim … The time 
has come when all the Muslims of the World, especially the youth, 
should unite and soar against kufr [non-believer] and continue 
Jihad till these forces are crushed to naught, all anti-Islamic forces 
and wiped out off the face of the earth and Islam takes over the 
whole world and all other false religions. 
— Osama bin Laden 
 
Islam as the only acceptable religion is an extremely popular idea 
that is propagated by the likes of Osama bin Laden, Maulana  
 
                                            
97 Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counter-Ideological Work Against 
Terrorist Ideology” 
98 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 82.  
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Massod Azhar, Hafeez Mohammad Hafiz Saeed, Ayman Al Zawahiri 
and many others – from big time Islamist terrorists to small time 
operatives. 
 
• United States of America as the Biggest Enemy of Islam and 
Muslims in the World 
 
I say to you the American people, according to the Koran ... your 
lives are lost, you will collapse, and America will collapse.  
— Friday sermon at Tehran University titled "America will 
Collapse.” 
 
Allah has told us to make atom bombs. America is telling us not to. 
Who should we listen to O Muslims, Allah or America? Jihad, jihad, 
jihad is the answer. 
— Mohammed Ishaq, one of the leaders of MMA99 
 
I have come here because my duty is to tell you that Muslims 
should not rest in peace until we have destroyed America and 
India.  
— Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, chief of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, at 
Jamia Ghousia mosque, Rawalpindi, Pakistan 
 
The above quotes have been taken from an article written by Arnaud 
de Borchgrave titled “Oozing Venom and Jihad,”100 that was in the 
Washington Times on August 25, 2004, and depicts the range of anti-
                                            
99 Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the United Action Front, is an alliance initially headed by 
Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan. Its leaders are strongly 
opposed to the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign in neighboring Afghanistan that ousted the 
Taliban from power. The group believed Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had become a tool 
of U.S. foreign policy. The MMA campaigned on promises to enforce Sharia law and in support of 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces based in Pakistan in the campaign against international terrorism. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/mma.htm. In the Pakistani parliament, the 
MMA, is a coalition opposition, formed after Pakistan became an ally of the United States of 
America in the "Global War on Terror." The coalition is united against the current government of 
President Pervez Musharraf because of his support for the United States' fight against what they 
consider to be global terrorism and allegedly putting the demands of the United States above the 
demands of his own people. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muttahida_Majlis-e-Amal 
100 Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Oozing Venom and Jihad,” Washington Times, Aug 25. 2004 
[on-line], available from http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/6811. 
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U.S. sentiments that are so well established in the Islamic world. The 
tapes of Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahari are one part, but 
such anti-U.S. sermons are now being heard all over the world, 
especially in the Muslim world, but also in many Western nations that 
have a considerable Muslim population. As Rohan Gunaratna 
remarks, “After 9/11, especially after U.S. intervention in Iraq, hating 
and resenting the United States itself has become an ideology that 
has significant appeal throughout the Muslim world.”101 The idea of 
fighting the most powerful nation has definite appeal for the Islamist 
terrorists. 
 
• Modernization and Globalization – Not Good to Islamic Society 
and Culture 
Islamist terrorists advocate anti-modernization, anti-globalization and 
anti-Westernization sentiments. The concepts of globalization and 
modernization are a new phenomenon in Islamic societies that are 
closed and regressive, and perceived as alien. Counter response by 
Islamist terrorists include the issuance of warnings and religion-
based dictums for the Muslim population in an effort to discourage 
adopting such measures. Cultural clashes between the values 
cherished by Islam and those between the modern Western societies 
are on the rise. This is evident from the societal upheavals that are 
emerging in the United Kingdom and in other European nations that 
have a considerable Muslim population.  
 
• Exploitation of Natural Resources of Islamic Nations 
Another idea that finds great support with the Islamist terrorists is the 
notion that the United States and its allies are waging war on the 
Muslims in order to exploit the natural wealth of their countries, such 
as oil, and this idea is being used to gain support in the Muslim world. 
                                            
101 Rohan Gunaratna, “The New Face of Al Qaeda.” 
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The importance of oil to the world, its need by all countries, and the 
availability of the resource in the Muslim world plays well to this idea. 
. 
 
We pray Iraqis will continue to resist American tyranny and terror 
and we believe victory will come to them. ... The invasion was 
motivated by U.S. designs to grab the oil of the Iraqi people and 
enslave them.  
— Masood Azhar, chief of Jaish-e-Mohammad 
 
b. ‘Ideas’ from the U.S. Perspective 
 
In the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the battle 
of ideas. 
 
— The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, Mar 2006 
 
In the National Security Strategy of the United States, President 
George Bush remarks that ‘America is at war’ against terrorism.102 The 
document provides the stated ideas that the United States is following in the war 
on terror, the successes, challenges, and opportunities toward a future world with 
peace and prosperity. The overall approach in the document has been defined as 
pro-active and pre-emptive, in terms of foreign policy and military operations, but 
in terms of the war of ideas, the approach is seen as reactive, and not meeting 
the laid-down goals. Also, the term pre-emptive means attacking in the face of 
imminent enemy strike. But the policy falls short of this goal, and the laid out 
strategy is more preventive and less pre-emptive. The same is highlighted by 





                                            
102 George W. Bush Jr, President of the United States of America, “The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America,” Mar 16, 2006. 
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If I were grading I would say we probably deserve a 'D' or a 'D-plus' 
as a country as to how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's 
taking place in the world today….I am not going to suggest that it's 
easy, but we have not found the formula as a country" for 
countering the extremists' message 
 
— Donald H. Rumsfeld, Former Secretary of Defense, Army 
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Mar 27, 2006. 
 
A similar result was obtained during a survey conducted by the 
journal Foreign Policy in 2006 wherein they mapped a ‘Terrorism Index’ by taking 
the views of 117 of the United States’ prominent foreign policy experts. The 
experts are almost unanimous in their opinion that the War on Terror is going to 
be a long war and that the United States must win the ‘war of ideas’ by laying 
more emphasis on non-military tools.103 An interesting finding of the survey is 
that 82 percent of experts feel that ending America’s dependence on foreign oil 
may be the U.S. government’s single most pressing priority in winning the war on 
terror. The 2007 Terrorism Index survey also follows a similar trend, wherein 82 
percent of the experts agree that the United States has not shown any progress 
disseminating its message to the international public.104  
The question now is what are these ideas that the United States is 
following in the global war on terror and why are they failing? The major ideas 





                                            
103 “Terrorism Index – 2006,” Foreign Policy, Jul / Aug 2006 [on-line], available from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_julyaug_2006/TI-index/index.html. 
104 “Terrorism Index – 2007,” Center for American Progress, Feb 2007 [on-line], available 
from http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/02/terrorism_index.html. The particular 
question (“Define the U.S. message to international publics”) to the experts was in relation to the 
progress achieved on the implementation of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission since 
Jul 2004 [on-line], available from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3700&page=2. The complete report is 
available from http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/02/pdf/terrorism_index.pdf. 
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• Advocacy of Democracy 
Democratization through military occupation has been a 
consistent policy of the United States.105 Promotion of democracy 
is also described as the ‘second pillar of confronting the challenges 
of our times’106 by President George Bush in the National Security 
Strategy, 2006. There is a growing debate on the efficacy of 
democracy as a viable political system within the Muslim world, and 
its being a parallel to the growing dissent in the Muslim world that is 
influenced by the calls of the Islamic terrorists about the Muslim 
umma. Democracy as the idea in the war of ideas is an acceptable 
concept, but non-existence of a successful secular model in the 
Muslim world makes it weak. The idea of democracy and freedom 
is being rejected by the Muslim world: ‘more and more Muslims – 
and not just terrorists – believe that they will be looked down on in a 
U.S.-led world order.’107 A flexible democratic vision, modified and 
tailor-made for the Muslim world, that has its origin in the Muslim 
world, may be the flag-bearer of a democratic revolution that the 
United States so fervently exhorts. As David Lazarus highlights in 
his paper titled From a War on Terror to a War of Ideas: ‘any 
process of Middle East democratization carries with it undeniable 
risks of radical Islamic regimes on the Iranian model emerging,’ but 
the author also expresses that democracy is important in the long-
term fight against terrorism.108 Thomas Carothers argues that there 
are four major obstacles in the establishment of democracy in the 
                                            
105 James Kurth, “Ignoring History: U.S. Democratization in the Muslim World,” Foreign 
Policy Research Institute, Spring 2005 [on-line], available from 
http://www.fpri.org/orbis/4902/kurth.ignoringhistoryusmuslim.pdf. 
106 George W. Bush Jr., President of the United States of America, “The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America,” Mar 16, 2006 
107 Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, Nov / Dec 2005, 
72. 
108 David Lazarus, “From a War on Terror to a War of Ideas,” Australian Army Journal, Vol. 




Islamic states in Middle East. Firstly, there is no guarantee that 
democracy is the correct antidote to terrorism; secondly, opening 
up closed political systems in the region may fuel greater 
extremism in the short and medium term; thirdly, no discernible 
democratic strength in the region is visible; and fourthly, the United 
States does not sound credible propagating democracy when in the 
past, and even now, it actively supports authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian regimes around the world.109 Democracy takes time to 
establish and does have its tumultuous ways; the United States has 
taken almost 250 years to reach where it is today and to expect the 
Muslim world to accept such a system in quick-time may not be 
realistic. What needs to be kept in mind is that the process of 
creating a democracy does not involve major upheavals and pain. 
 
Liberty and democracy become unholy when their hands are dyed 
red with innocent blood. 
— Mahatma Gandhi 
• Freedom, Justice and Human Dignity 
The idea of promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity is defined 
as the ‘first pillar’ of the National Security Strategy and is related to 
the end of tyranny through free governments, free and fair trade, and 
wise development policies.110 The emphasis on this idea is 
justifiable, but falls apart with the comity of nations due to   the United 
States support of military dictators and tyrant leaders111 from time to 
time. The idea of justice and dignity are more powerful than 
                                            
109 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy: Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,” Current History, Dec 
2003, 403-406. 
110 George W. Bush Jr., President of the United States of America, “The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America,” Mar 16, 2006 
111 The United States supported Saddam Hussein in the late 80s and early 90s, and then 
later did a volte-face. Similarly, the tacit and unflinching support to Pervez Musharaf draws 
contradictions to its stated policy. 
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democracy and freedom in the Muslim world,112 but the prosecution 
of same lacks vision and an impartial approach. The events at Abu 
Gharib and the killing of innocent people in Iraq do not assist in any 
way the promotion of this Idea. 
 
• Multi-National Approach for Eradicating Terrorism 
The event of 9/11 galvanized a global response against terrorism; 
this was evident in the way member countries of the United Nations 
joined hands in condemning the ghastly attacks. The killing of 
innocents by terrorists always evokes negative responses worldwide, 
and may be taken as an opportunity to strengthen global alliance 
against terrorism. With each and every attack worldwide, the alliance 
needs to grow stronger.  Events like the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and 
its aftermath have not only made the alliance weaker, but have also 
given the Islamic terrorist an excellent opportunity to cement their 
viewpoints against the Western world.  Many analysts subscribe to 
the idea that the War on Terror and the constituent war of ideas need 
to include a multi-national approach. The tentacles of Islamist 
terrorists have grown so wide, and the networks are so linked, that an 
individualistic approach may not bear expected results. 
 
We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a 
safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can 
multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States 
is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the 
World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, 
and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of 
the willing can augment these permanent institutions. 
 
— President George W. Bush, The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America, 2002  
(opening letter). 
 
• Humanitarian Assistance 
                                            
112 Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas.” 
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The idea of providing humanitarian assistance and relief to Muslim 
countries in their times of crisis is an important idea. Public opinion 
surveys carried out by Terror Free Tomorrow in Indonesia, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, indicate that American aid is the single most 
important action that the people of the three Muslim countries want 
from the United States.113 The Tsunami Relief operations and the 
Earthquake Relief operations conducted by the United States in 
Indonesia and Pakistan, respectively, has had a profound impact on 
the public perception in those countries with respect to the United 
States of America. 
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Table 2.   Scorecard of Ideas.114 
                                            
113 Survey conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow in 2006 in Indonesia, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. Complete details available from 
http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Indonesia%20Bangladesh%20TFT%20Final%20P
oll%20Report.pdf 
114 The + / - signs indicates positive and negative attributes of the perceived impact on the 
Muslim population and the number indicates the efficacy of the idea with ‘1’ being the highest 
value and ‘6’ being the lowest value. The question marks in the column of the United States and 
Allies indicate that it actually appears that there is a dearth of ideas and hence there is a need to 
focus effort towards identifying and propagating ideas that will find credibility and acceptance. 
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There are a number of ideas that need to be included in the war of 
ideas and given adequate coverage, namely economic prosperity, mutual 
respect, peaceful coexistence, religious tolerance and understanding, cherishing 
non-violent values, targeted humanitarian assistance, and a focused education 
reform program. These cannot be seen in isolation, but need to be amalgamated 
into foreign policy, military operations, and overall strategic philosophy. 
Replacing ‘non-violence’ and ‘violence’ for ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ in the quote 
below provides a powerful idea. 
 
Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the 
worse in a free and open encounter? 
— John Milton, Areopagitica 
 
 
B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
 
The battlefield is a scene of constant chaos. The winner will be the 
one that best controls that chaos, both his and that of his enemy. 
— Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769-1821 
The value of information operations has emerged at the forefront of 
national strategic policy in the last decade. Information has always been 
regarded with knowledge and knowledge in turn associated with power. The 
power of information and the consequences it affords has demanded a greater 
prudence in associating information as an important resource at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of a nation’s policy architecture. The relevancy of 
information has always been there, from time immemorial, but the delivery 
methods that now exist in this Information Age have transformed the way 
decisions are taken at all levels. The information in a tactical environment has its 
impact at the strategic level; an ‘Information Episode’ that takes place at a 
tactical level, transcends into a strategic domain within a very short period of 
time. An example in this regard is how the dragging of a U.S. soldier in the 
streets of Mogadishu in Somalia in 1993 immediately had a strategic 
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consequence that prompted the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Somalia. 
Similar is the case with the live images of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, beamed across the world, and the immediate bonding that it created 
amongst the nations of the world to focus their efforts on terrorism as a threat to 
humanity. Another example is how a fragile political situation and equally 
turbulent information environment in Spain, coupled with adequate use of media, 
was exploited by terrorists to launch an attack on trains in Madrid exactly two 
years and six months after 9/11, on March 11, 2004, that had as its consequence 
a regime change in Spain and the subsequent withdrawal of Spanish forces from 
Iraq.115 The battle of the information environment has now become extremely 
important in the prosecution of national policy decisions as well as in military 
operations.  
Information operations, as an institutional concept, began in the early 
1990s and were accompanied by the rapid advancement of technology. 
Information Operations came into focus through the seminal paper titled “What is 
Information Warfare?” by Martin C. Libicki at the National Defense University.116 
The paper considered the utilization of information from a military perspective, 
and hence the word ‘warfare’ was associated. Gradually, and in due course, the 
ambit of information as a resource, and its impact, was understood as being not 
restricted to military operations and a wider term, ‘Information Operations,’ came 
into being, which actually encompassed ‘Information Warfare’ as elucidated by 
Libicki. A similar view is expressed by Leigh Armistead in his book titled 
Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power wherein he 
mentions that the primary doctrinal difference between Information Warfare and 
Information Operations is that information warfare comprises six elements that 
are essentially involved in the conduct of combat operations, and that information 
                                            
115 Jonathan B. Smith, “The Madrid Train Bombing and the Emergence of Al Qaeda 2.0: A 
Case of Politics, Force Multiplier Effects and Engaging the Far Enemy,” Michigan State 
University, Feb 25, 2005. 
116 Martin Libicki, “What is Information Warfare?” Center for Advanced Concepts and 
Technology Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Aug 1995. 
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operations encompasses information warfare.117 Presently, the majority of the 
United States doctrines on the subject use the term ‘Information Operation,’ and 
the same will be used in this research as well.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Information Operation Vs Information Warfare Spheres.118 
 
This section commences with the study of the vision and characteristics of 
information operations as defined by Libicki, identifies the various constituents of 
information operations as they are known to us today, and thereafter dwells on 
the phenomenon of a constantly changing ‘Information Environment.’ The study 
of the terms and the concepts of information operations in this section facilitate 






                                            
117 Leigh Armistead, ed., Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft 
Power (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2004). 
118 Leigh Armistead, ed., Information Operations, 20. 
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1. Libicki’s Mosaic of Forms119 
The concept of information warfare established by Libicki was based on 
the premise that information as a resource is important to national security, and 
that the control and dominance of information over a potential adversary will be 
advantageous. The concept also takes into account the phenomenal growth of 
information systems in the military, as well as the society on a whole, and an 
implicit dependence on them. The argument that information warfare does not 
imply a different form of warfare, but actually needs to be considered as a 
‘mosaic of forms,’ is an important idea in understanding the dynamics.  
Libicki described seven forms of information warfare, the first being 
Command and Control warfare (C2W), that he termed  “anti-head” and “anti-
neck.” C2W has always played an important role in warfare, but in today’s 
scenario, needs a fresh look due to the lethality and accuracy of weapon 
systems, an ever increasing battle space, and the increase in the capabilities of 
smaller groups. The anti-head is related to nodes, and anti-neck to the links in 
today’s context.  
The second form Libicki described is Intelligence-Based Warfare (IBW), 
wherein intelligence was set to be applied directly to operations like targeting and 
battle damage assessment, and not to overall command and control. In today’s 
context, IBW propels us from an estimate-based to a knowledge-based warfare. 
There exists a threshold beyond which there is an exponential increase in 
outcomes with the addition of knowledge, and it reaches a stabilization phase 
that implies a steady state result even with further increase in knowledge This 
form of information warfare is mainly due to escalation in the ‘sensory systems’ 
and the reach they provide. 
 
                                            
119 This section uses the above referenced paper by Martin Libicki, to understand how the 
concept of information operations came into being and professes its importance in today’s world. 
It also allows us to understand its transformation in the form that it is today in the following 
sections. In addition, a number of points from class discussions during the course “SO3101 – 
Conflict in the Information Age,” conducted by Prof. John Arquilla at the Naval Postgraduate 


















Figure 3. Intelligence Based Warfare – Knowledge vs Outcome. 
 
Electronic warfare (EW) is the third form of information warfare described 
by Libicki. EW is described as anti-radar, anti-communication, and includes the 
use of cryptography. In today’s context, the impact of EW is diminishing due to 
emitters becoming more complex and their signals more difficult to decipher. 
Passive EW is moving more toward traffic and parametric analysis, but active 
EW, or jamming, is becoming more complicated, and its utilization in a sensor- 
rich environment will be immense. The potential of EW in today’s context is being 
exploited for jamming missiles, for detonating radio controlled Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs), and for utilization of controlled Electro Magnetic Pulse. 
Cryptography is fast becoming the ‘code breaker’s’ nightmare with new digital 
techniques, complicated algorithms, and inadequate time-lines for decoding due 
to computational complexity. A process of re-defining the role of EW is in order to 
explore new horizons.  
Psychological warfare (PSYWAR) is the fourth form, and is divided into 
four categories: against the national will, against the opposing commanders, 
against the troops, and cultural conflict. The exploitation of the tenets of 
PSYWAR, along with the present culture of mass media in the form of the omni-
present television camera and the Internet, has become a potent tool in today’s 
war-fighting scenario. Genghis Khan was a great exponent of PSYWAR as he 
used every form of violence, deceit, and barbaric act to intimidate his enemies― 
nations, commanders and people, by utilizing the ‘hording technique,’ rumors, 
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catapulting severed heads of enemy soldiers inside enemy forts, and large scale 
massacres.120 Libicki also dwells on Cultural Warfare, more on the lines of 
Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations,’  and the present day export of the 
United State’s cultural influence in traditional Islamic societies  being considered  
a major cause of the upheavals witnessed in those societies. 
Libicki described the fifth form as ‘hacker warfare,’ which specifically 
targets computer systems and is confined to attacks on civilian targets, with 
attacks directed towards military computer systems being in the realm of C2W. 
Today, hacker warfare is becoming a complex and specialized issue due to 
robust defensive measures and stringent quality control procedures being 
enforced for both hardware and software products, but the potential for damage 
caused by determined hackers, to the information infrastructure of a nation has 
become immense. The ‘condition of proportionality’ comes into play when a 
hacker attack is visualized on a developed/advanced nation and a developing 
nation ― in terms of $100 billion in damages to a United States vis-à-vis a $10 
million or less to a third world country. With the explosive growth of the Internet, 
the medium of a hacker attack has projected terms like ‘cyber defense,’ ‘cyber 
deterrence,’ and ‘open source intelligence,’ are highlighted in today’s context. 
Further, the barriers of entry into this form of warfare, both from the operational 
and structural perspectives, remain undefined, whereas for nuclear warfare, we 
have operational barriers like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and structural barriers in the form of the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. This is due to the 
incalculable and indiscernible nature of the potency of hacker warfare up till now. 
Economic information warfare is described as the sixth form and is divided 
into two parts: information blockade and information imperialism. This form is 
based on the premise that information is an important resource. Information 
blockade restricts the amount of real-time information flow of a nation, and  can 
take the form of physical severance of bulk communication cables, blanking of 
                                            
120 James Chambers, The Devil’s Horsemen.  
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satellite and Global Positioning System signals, etc. Information imperialism is 
more to do with the availability of knowledge-intensive infrastructure, owning 
information technology and communication lines, and denying the same to other 
nations, which may result in overall growth retardation. 
The last form that Libicki describes is Cyber warfare and includes 
information terrorism, semantic attacks, simula warfare, and Gibson warfare. 
Information terrorism relates to unauthorized access and planned theft of the 
large amount of personal data that is now stored on various computer storage 
systems around the world. This amount of data is increasing day by day and the 
potential impact of its being available to unauthorized persons is also on the rise. 
The recent financial scam in the United Nations-led ‘Oil for Food Program’ and 
the implication of Kojo Annan, the son of the former Secretary General of the 
United Nations, is believed to have been unearthed using information terrorism 
constructs. Semantic attacks relate to the insertion/modification to data without 
the knowledge of the user who owns it. It has more to do with the integrity of 
data.  
The collapse of the Abu Nidal group was brought about through covert 
semantic attacks on the financial transactions of the group. False financial 
transactions were made to appear in the bank accounts of many of the Abu Nidal 
operatives that resulted in Abu Nidal believing that his operatives were stealing 
money from the organization, and this ultimately led to intra-group conflicts and 
its demise.121 This example can be categorized under semantic warfare. Simula 
warfare is a form of virtual or simulated conflict fought between two rival nations 
without the use of actual combat weaponry; the conflict is simulated and the 
result is accepted by both parties. This is a complex concept not applicable in the 
battlefield of today, but could be used in the financial domain to simulate a 
‘hostile take-over.’ One sided simulation and one sided simulated war games are 
gaining complexity and being used to assess future battle situations. Gibson 
warfare consists of virtual duels that are undertaken between adversaries over a 
                                            
121 John Arquilla, The Reagan Imprint (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 184-185. 
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medium like the Internet. The examples of the ‘Eligible Receiver’ exercise held in 
1997, wherein a National Security Agency Red Team was tasked to penetrate 
the Pentagon’s internal systems, and the incident of ‘Moonlight Maze’ that took 
place between 1998 and beyond, both took the form of an intense battle between 
Russian hackers, but they could have been between hackers from anywhere 
around the world using Russian sites, and United States intelligence officials on 
the Internet.122 
The only thing Libicki missed, in his paper, which is an essential 
constituent of the information warfare domain is deception123. The importance of 
deception in military campaigns, and its utilization with the manipulation of 
information to take the form of void (null-information), overload, and tailored, 
necessitate deception to be earmarked as a form of information operations. A 
summary of what exactly is information warfare is clarified by a paragraph from a 
paper written by Dorothy Denning. 
Information warfare is about the exercise of power on the 
information front. It is about exploiting and controlling the 
information environment in ways that advance your objectives while 
thwarting those of your adversaries. It is about promulgating and 
acquiring desired information, while denying your enemy the same. 
It is about maintaining secure and reliable communications, while 
monitoring and disrupting those of your enemy. It is about using 
information to influence others in ways that serve your mission.124 
 
2. Libicki’s Mosaic of Forms in the Context of Global War on 
Terrroism 
Information Warfare as revealed by Libicki was more in terms of its 
applicability between conventional nation states, but in today’s scenario, where 
conflicts are turning more irregular and asymmetric, and the adversary becoming 
                                            
122 Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), “Cyberwar,” Frontline. Documentary Consortium, 
program aired on Apr 24, 2003 [on-line], full video available from 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/. 
123 Libicki touches on the issue of deception only briefly, and implicitly, in his discussions of 
how some may learn to conceal themselves from those using offensive IBW. 
124 Dorothy Denning, “Power Over the Information Front,” Conference Paper, Global Flow of 
Information, Yale Information Society Project (2005) [on-line], available from 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/GlobalFlow/paper/Denning.pdf. 
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equally irregular and invisible, there is a need to undertake an assessment of 
how these concepts play out. In the context of the two adversaries―the Islamic 
terrorists on one side and the United States and its allies on the other as part of 
the global war on terror―do Libicki’s ‘mosaic of forms’ bear any relevance and 
do they sufficiently influence operations? Below, in a tabulated form, is an 






















These are the very activities that are 
directed against the terrorist network’s 
identified nodes and links. Nodes in terms 
of High Value Targets (individuals, 
sanctuaries, training centers, media hubs, 
etc). Links in terms of multi-region and 
organizational linkages through front 
forums, utilization of specific websites for 
communication and control, etc. This has 
its advantages while targeting a 
hierarchical organization, but loses its 
impact due to terrorist being more 
networked and distributed. 
 
From the terrorists’ perspectives, the 




This is utilized by U.S. and its allies for 
targeting specific individuals and specific 
physical targets; e.g., targeting terrorists 
using armed Predator UAVs. 
 
Terrorist use of open source intelligence 
for targeting and real-real time damage 






Not too much of relevance in the context of 
operations against the terrorists and 




This is used by U.S. and allies for targeting 








From the perspective of U.S. and allies not 
much of relevance. But in case of 
terrorists, cryptography in different forms – 
from simple codes and ciphers to 
specialized techniques like steganograhy, 




• Anti-Will + ++ 
• Anti-Troops + ++ 
• Anti- -
Commander + ++ 
• Cultural 
Conflict - ++ 
This is the form of information warfare that 
is being used by terrorists in a big way and 
have a definite upper hand. The impact on 
terrorists by PSYWAR conducted by U.S 




Hacker warfare in the classical sense is 
not of much of relevance from the U.S. 
viewpoint due to lack of dedicated 
information systems available with the 
terrorists. But in case of terrorist this is a 
potential field that they could exploit in the 
future. 
 
Economic Information Warfare 
• Information 




Information blockade is a good option for 
U.S. and allies but the only problem is that 
terrorists use technologies and systems 
that exist in the environment and hence 
‘blocking’ is difficult. Information 















This is the form wherein the U.S. and its 
allies have a considerable advantage – the 
use of deliberate and critical information, 
terrorism and semantic attacks are likely to 
pay considerable dividends. Simula warfare 
is not relevant in the context of war on 
terror. Gibson warfare may be used in the 
future when terrorists actually start 
penetrating information systems to create 
disruptive and destructive activities. 
 
 
Table 3.   Libicki’s – ‘Mosaic of Forms’ – An Assessment of Utilization in the Global 
War on Terror. 
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3. Elements of Information Operations125 
Information Operations is a much used term in defense establishments 
and is applicable to almost everything and to nothing at the same time. This 
confusion stems from the fact that information operations and its constituents are 
considered an aggregated whole of the constituents that were hither-to-fore well 
established and were previously treated as largely independent. The necessity of 
integration of the constituents is largely derived from the fact that information is 
all-pervasive and needs to be managed in a cohesive manner.  
Joint Publication 3–13 defines Core, Supporting and Related capabilities 
of information operations. The five core capabilities are Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), Operational Security (OPSEC), 
Electronic Warfare (EW), and Computer Network Operations (CNO). The first 
three core capabilities have existed as part of military operations and the latter 
two have now been integrated as a corollary to the present information age. The 
capabilities supporting information operations include information assurance (IA), 
physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence (CI), and combat camera 
(COMCAM), and are seen as directly or indirectly involved in shaping the 
information environment. The related capabilities constitute public affairs (PA), 
civil military operations (CMO), and defense support for public diplomacy 
(DSPD). The core capabilities are applicable at all levels of warfare – tactical, 
operational and strategic; the supporting capabilities dominate the operational 
and the tactical levels and the related capabilities dominate the strategic and the 
operational levels. A brief discussion on the various elements of information 





                                            
125 United States of America, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, Feb 13, 2006. 
This document is taken as the base for defining the constituents of information operations and a 
discussion on the subject in this part of the research. All the definitions for the elements of 
information operations are taken from this document for subsequent discussion. 
61 
a. Psychological Operations 
PSYOP are defined as ‘Planned operations to convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOPS is to induce or 
reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objective.’ 
The PSYOP objectives are met through the use of radio, print, and other 
electronic media. The cross-cultural and regional understanding for conducting 
successful PSYOP against target audiences is an essential element. 
 
b. Military Deception 
MILDEC is defined as ‘Actions executed to deliberately mislead 
adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, 
and operations, and thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or 
inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of friendly forces mission.’ 
MILDEC in the information domain is quite different from the traditional or 
conventional MILDEC that involved the fusing of deception with physical 
tangibles on the ground; in the information age, MILDEC may achieve success 
by shaping the information without too much reliance on commensurate actions 
in the physical domain. This ability to move away from traditional employment of 
MILDEC will truly allow MILDEC to be integrated in information operation 
campaigns against terrorist organizations and networks. The importance of 
understanding the adversary’s ‘collection systems and sensors,’ to absorb 
deception, and to correctly assess their attitudes and reactions, is an essential 
ingredient for a successful MILDEC operation. 
 
c. Operational Security 
OPSEC is defined as ‘A process of identifying critical information 
and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and 
other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary 
intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems 
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might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical 
information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute 
measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of 
friendly actions to adversary exploitation.’ The classic OPSEC against a 
conventional adversary involves a number of related security aspects in terms of 
physical security, IA programs, computer network defense, and personnel 
authorization domains. But in the case of a terrorist organization or network as an 
adversary, OPSEC has little value, since the adversary in this case has a number 
of avenues for collecting the information required to undertake its actions and the 
essentially large target space earmarked by the adversary are usually not 
governed by OPSEC values.  In other words, the open source information 
available to terrorists is not regulated through the parameters of conventional 
OPSEC benchmarks. This is in the case of both a strategic strike like the 9/11 
incident, or a tactical strike in terms of planting improvised explosive devices 
(IED) to attack a convoy of vehicles in Iraq. 
 
d. Electronic Warfare 
EW is defined as – ‘Any military action involving the use of 
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or 
to attack the enemy.’ EW includes three major sub-divisions: electronic attack 
(EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). In terms of 
terrorists as adversaries, ES is utilized to monitor, identify, locate, and derive 
actionable intelligence about terrorist networks through the use of 
electromagnetic sensors, both in the communication and non-communication 
bands. EA is more is terms of denying the use of the electromagnetic spectrum 
to terrorists for their communication and control, as well as, in recent times, to 
nullify the effect of remotely controlled IED. This constituent of information 





e. Computer Network Operations 
CNOs are described as operations to attack, deceive, degrade, 
disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure. CNO 
is divided into three major constituents: computer network attack (CNA), 
computer network defense (CND), and computer network exploitation (CNE).  
CNA is comprised of all destructive and disruptive actions; CND involves 
protection, monitoring, analysis, detection and response, while CNE involves 
enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities through the use of 
networks and information systems. The information in today’s information age 
resides on information systems and flows on the information networks. The ability 
to regulate information on closed systems is still an achievable action, but 
regulation of the same on global open systems like the Internet is almost 
impossible in the present context. In terms of operations against terrorist 
networks that use the open networks and open channels of communication, CNA 
is a difficult proposition, but in certain cases can achieve extraordinary results in 
terms of disruption of terrorist communication linkages, financial infrastructure, 
and informational hub-centers. CNE also forms an important subset of CNO due 
to the ability to collect intelligence on terrorist networks through active monitoring 
of their communication channels, and may provide advance warning to 
impending actions planned by terrorist organizations.  A military information 
infrastructure is vulnerable to actions by terrorists largely due to the target size 
involved, as well as a triggering-effect that may be caused by an action and its 
flow on interconnected global networks; CND, therefore, assumes considerable 
significance.   
 
f. Information Assurance 
IA is defined as ‘Measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 




information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities.’ IA is part of the defensive mechanism necessary for protection of 
information systems. 
 
g. Physical Security 
Physical security is defined as ‘That part of security concerned with 
physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized 
access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard 
them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.’ Physical security 
contributes towards OPSEC and MILDEC. It also forms part of the antiterrorism 
profile in terms of force protection and consists of defensive measures taken to 
reduce the vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.126 
 
h. Physical Attack 
Physical attack disrupts, damages, or destroys adversary targets 
through the use of destructive power, and is fundamental to all military 
operations. It may lead to create or alter adversary perceptions or to facilitate an 
adversary to use certain exploitable information systems. In terms of a supporting 
element of information operations, it needs to be integrated with PSYOP to 
achieve the required influence over a target audience and coordinated to destroy 
specific command and control nodes of the adversary. This facet allows 
synchronization between the physical objectives and the informational objectives 
in a battlefield. In the context of terrorism, physical attacks form part of the 
counterterrorism response and plays an important role in the destruction of 
terrorist bases and support infrastructure. 
 
i. Counterintelligence 
CI is defined as ‘Information gathered and activities conducted to 
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 
                                            
126 United States of America – Department of Defense, Antiterrorism, Joint Publication, JP 3-
07.2, Mar 17, 1998. 
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assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements 
thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist 
activities.’ CI is an essential element of antiterrorism and counterterrorism 
procedures and forms part of both defensive and offensive measures against 
terrorist organizations and networks. 
 
j. Combat Camera 
COMCAM is defined as ‘The acquisition and utilization of still and 
motion imagery in support of combat, information, humanitarian, special force, 
intelligence, reconnaissance, engineering, legal, public affairs, and other 
operations involving the Military Services.’ COMCAM is effectively used for the 
battle of ideas and provides the imagery requirement for PSYOP, MILDEC, PA 
and CMO. COMCAM products can also be disseminated to regional media 
organizations to achieve wider publicity and for use in subtle influence operations 
toward a wider public audience. The dissemination of such products may also be 
conducted through the Internet so as to exploit the reach of the Internet in news 
or imagery propagation. 
 
k. Public Affairs 
PA is defined as ‘Those public information, command information, 
and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal 
publics with interest in the Department of Defense.’ PA forms an important part in 
the dissemination of truthful information to both internal and external audiences 
so that a correct perspective of combat operations is projected. A more 
coordinated and deliberate approach is required to match the actions on the 
ground with what is projected through PA outlets. It is also utilized to counter 
terrorist organizations’ misinformation and disinformation campaign through 
publication of accurate information. In many cases there is a good chance of 
conflicts between PA objectives and the overall information operations objective 
that may under-scribe the authenticity of the PA outlet or information source. 
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l. Civil Military Operations 
CMOs are defined as ‘The activities of a commander that establish, 
maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental 
and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian 
populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate 
military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational objectives.’ CMOs are 
conducted across the range of military operations over all phases - starting from 
the preparatory phase, through to the stabilization and reconstruction phase. 
With respect to terrorism, the effectiveness of CMOs is determined by the 
inability of terrorist organizations to achieve the support base in the general 
populace of the region. 
 
m. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy 
DSPD is defined by the United States military as ‘Those activities 
and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and 
facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government.’ This activity 
is conducted at the strategic and operational level and attempts to mesh the 
foreign policy objectives with much broader goals including specific military 
information operations objectives. The operations conducted by the military in the 
field also fall into this category since they can either support the overall public 
diplomacy effort or cause an adverse impact. The treatment of Iraqi prisoners at 
Abu Ghraib127 and the incident involving the killing of innocent Iraqi civilians at 
Haditha,128 are two examples of how incorrect military actions in the field can 
cause an adverse impact on the overall public diplomacy effort. Therefore, the 
vulnerability of military field operations to cause an adverse impact on the 
information environment needs to be adequately factored and duly understood by 
military commanders at all levels. 
                                            
127 Seymour M. Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” The New Yorker, May 10, 2004  [on-line], 
available from http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact; accessed May 28, 
2007. 
128 Josh White and Sonya Geis, “4 Marines Charged in Haditha Killings,” Washington Post, 
Dec 22, 2006 [on-line], available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/12/21/AR2006122100124.html; accessed May 28, 2007. 
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4. Constantly Changing Information Environment 
JP 3-13 defines the information environment as ‘The aggregate of 
individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act 
on information.’ The document further defines three dimensions of the 
information environment: physical, informational and cognitive. The physical 
dimension is comprised of the command and control systems and supporting 
organizations that allow prosecution of operations. The informational dimension 
is where operations are actually executed with information as the main resource. 
This is the domain that is seen as the information warehouse whether stored or 
flowing on a network. The cognitive dimension includes the decision making 
process and relates to thoughts, perceptions, and influences. 
Information is everywhere and hence the information environment 
surrounds us whether we are performing combat duties or away from it. 
Information operations in military terms have not been fully integrated with the 
erstwhile battle concepts of fire power and maneuver, and it has become more of 
a reactive measure to mitigate a consequence rather than a deliberate process to 
shape the information environment.129 The major problem is how to visualize the 
information environment? This problem is further aggravated in the war on terror, 
due to the fact that the information environment is constantly changing and any 
minor event in the physical domain has a major impact in the informational and 
cognitive domains. Two examples that come to the mind are: the pictures of U.S. 
soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu that suddenly saw a 
complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia, and the attack on the Indian 
parliament by five terrorists on December 13, 2001 that led to the mobilization of 
the entire military of about 1.3 million, an unimaginable scale. A Few recent 
examples include the torture perpetrated by military personnel in the Abu Ghraib 
prison and the killing of innocent Iraqi civilians by the U.S. marines in Haditha. 
The information environment at the time of these events became very active in 
terms of news flowing across the world through television, radio and Internet. It 
                                            
129 Erin A. McDaniel and Julio A. Perez, “How to Visualize and Shape the Information 
Environment,” Field Artillery, Nov-Dec 2006 [on-line], available from  http://sill-
www.army.mil/famag/2006/NOV_DEC_2006/NOV_DEC_06_PAGES_26_33.pdf 
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included the print media coming out with their analysis, nations and entire polity 
transfixed by the events, people of the concerned nation states discussing the 
events in normal conversations, and in due course, a detailed analysis of the 
events and their consequences appeared in research institutions around the 
world.  
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Figure 4. Reactive Information Operations. 
 
Conducting military operations as a consequence of such events, 
therefore, becomes a major challenge, and shaping the information environment 
to facilitate military operations, an even greater challenge. Such events being 
random and their consequences unpredictable, information operations are hence 
applied only as an aftermath to either change the information environment 
already created, or to force an information environment to undertake the 
consequent operations. An example of the latter form is how the information 
environment was shaped by the United States government prior to undertaking 
the operations in Iraq, with the issues pertaining to the weapons of mass 
destruction, and the presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq. It is not enough to plan for 
such a reactive form of information operations against terrorist organizations and 
networks that have no boundaries, either geographically or functionally, to the 
amount of damage they could cause; there is a necessity to take information 
operations from a supporting domain in the war on terror to a more vigorous  and 
proactive domain. The other point is that directions pertaining to the conduct of 
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information operations are flowing from the top down and hence the objectives 
become too far apart, too big, too optimistic, and almost unmanageable. There is 
a need to distribute information objectives into smaller domains that are 
manageable in the vast information environment and that are therefore 
achievable, building on success one step at a time may be a more productive 
and effective strategy. 
The information environment has engulfed everything and is omnipresent. 
It is derived from events happening all over the world and all the time — from the 
villages in Afghanistan and the streets of Baghdad, in the chat-rooms and blogs 
on the Internet, in the media centers of TV networks, through the political 
meetings and debates amongst world leaders, to the operations centers of 
military planners ― the information environment is constantly being shaped. A 
similar sentiment was expressed by the former Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld when he urged the military and the government to launch a 
nontraditional information campaign against terrorist groups in world media: “Our 
enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today's media age, but for the 
most part we, our country, our government, has not. …Our enemies are 
operating 24/7 across every time zone [and we are not]. That is an unacceptably 
dangerous deficiency.”130 
 
5. Elements of Information Operations and their Applicability at 
Levels of Warfare in the Context of Terrorism 
JP 3-13 defines information operations as ‘The integrated employment of 
the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, 
psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert 
with specified supporting or related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or 
usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our 
own.’ This definition validates the importance of information and the integration of 
information operations into execution of military operations at all levels. The 
                                            
130 Ann Scott Tyson, “Rumsfeld Urges Using Media to Fight Terror,” The Washington Post, 
Feb 18, 2006, A07 [on-line], available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021701980.html. 
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impact and effectiveness of information is not well understood by monolithic 
hierarchical militaries that are tailored to meet conventional threats, and trained 
to meet physical and visible threats. The military leaders have a cultural bias 
towards a kinetic solution of war131 and this mindset adds to the deficiencies of  
the utilization of  information operations on equal footing. The seamless flow of 
information from tactical to strategic levels also leads to a major conflict toward 
the successful prosecution of information operations. The implications of tactical 
levels actions in the information domain and their impact in the strategic level, 
and vice versa, create confusion in the execution of information operations.  
The United States JP 3-13 offers a conventional viewpoint of operations in 
the information domain in the traditional World War II vintage form of warfare, 
wherein the physical domain is the most important aspect. The document fails 
miserably to address information operations issues in the context of a global war 
on terror wherein a traditional nation–state adversary has been replaced by 
amorphous, invisible and non-state actors, and the informational and cognitive 
domain has emerged in the forefront. These non-state actors possess an 
informational advantage due to their being invisible and elusive.132 
The inclusion of related elements in the overall conduct of information 
operations by the military, and the inability of military commanders to influence or 
seek control over those activities, tend to produce conflicting ideas and direction 
toward the overall objectives. This, then, is easily exploited by terrorist 
organizations to instill a sense of under-achievement both in the minds of military 
adversaries, as well as the general public, that may lead to unsympathetic 
reactions. This phenomenon may be mitigated if the military commanders at all 
levels can establish the applicability of these diverse information operations 
elements to their own domain of influence, while participating in the global war on 
terror. This is, in any case, a difficult proposition since boundaries of the 
                                            
131 Dennis Murphy, “Information Operations and Winning the Peace: Wielding the 
Information Element of Power in the Global War on Terrorism,” CSL Issue Paper, Center for 
Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Vol. 14-05, Dec 2005. 
132 Majors’ Norman Emery, Jason Werchan and Donald G. Mowles Jr., “Fighting Terrorism 
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information environment between military commanders at different levels cannot 
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Figure 5. Elements of Information Operations and their Applicability to Levels 
of Military Operations. 
 
Figure 5 shows a triangle that is divided into three parts depicting the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations and the flow of information 
between the levels. The core elements of information operations are present, or 
find utility, in all three levels albeit with differing expectations.  EW is a potent 
weapon at tactical and operational levels, but returns from it diminish at the 
strategic level; CNO, on the other hand, has less utility at the tactical level but the 
returns are magnified at the strategic and operational levels. Similarly, the 
appropriate levels for utilization are depicted for supporting and related elements 
of information operations. The objective of undertaking such segregation is the 
fact that there appears to be a fair amount of confusion with commanders and 
troops in the actual utility and execution of information operations, since 
boundaries between many of those elements obliterates in different situations 
and different levels. Further, the boundaries between the information 
environments, in most cases, do not exist. The situation gets further complicated 
when military commanders start pondering the issue of information operations 
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requirements within their domain and those seen as strategic national level 
requirements. For this reason, there is a need to somehow limit the domain of 
information operations more from the functional perspective and in terms of 
relevance within existing levels of war, so that a more focused effort is visible.  
 
C. TERRORISM AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Information has always been an important parameter in conflicts from time 
immemorial and has always been associated with power. The power of 
information is derived from its utility in knowing more than your adversary, 
denying knowledge to your adversary, its constructive efficacy in making 
informed decisions, and its ability to influence your adversary through information 
alone. These very facets have been ingrained in terrorist organizations worldwide 
with the intention of achieving their stated objectives. This phenomenon has 
been magnified, and the abilities of the terrorists enhanced, due to their 
adaptation both structurally and functionally to exploit the information 
environment in this information age. The paradigms of information operations in 
today’s world that have been defined, and that are constantly being refined by 
nations and their militaries throughout the world, have been successfully fused by 
the terrorists, and are clearly seen in their operational characteristics. 
 
1. Importance of Information in Terrorists’ Activities 
The terrorists have understood the value of information in the entire 
spectrum of their activities. These activities range from propagation of their 
ideology to managing covert finances for their organization, from target profiling 
to influencing people of different categories around the world,  and from instilling 
a sense of insecurity in their adversaries to winning support amongst people to 
ensure  a steady stream of recruits for their cause. It appears that the terrorists 
have the initiative in modulating the information environment to their advantage. 
An example of dominating the information environment is evident from the 
speech of Osama bin Laden broadcast in 2004: “All that we have to do is to send 
two Mujahideen to the farthest point East to raise a piece of cloth on which is 
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written Al Qaeda in order to make the generals race there to cause America to 
suffer human, economic and political losses without their achieving for it anything 
of note …..”133  
Emphasis on information by Al Qaeda is apparent by going through its 
manual, Declaration of Jihad Against the Country’s Tyrants.134 The document 
mentions ‘information’ as one of the requirements of a military organization to 
assist in ‘confrontation and endurance.’ Further, the document defines various 
missions for its followers that have information as a major constituent, such as: 
gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations and the 
neighbors; spreading rumors, and writing statements that instigate people 
against the enemy; kidnapping enemy personnel, documents, secrets and arms; 
blasting and destroying the embassies, and attacking vital economic centers.  
These missions define the importance that an organization like Al Qaeda places 
on information as an asset and a tool for the conduct of its operations. The Jihad 
Manual also mentions that it is important to nullify the viewpoint of intellectuals 
and thinkers who oppose its view toward Jihad and the establishment of an 
Islamic state. The emphasis on secrecy of information is validated from the 
paragraph in the book below: 
Keeping Secrets and Concealing Information 
 [This secrecy should be used] even with the closest people, for 
deceiving the enemies is not easy. Allah says, "Even though their 
plots were such that as to shake the hills! [Koranic verse]." Allah's 
messenger – God bless and keep him – says, "Seek Allah's help in 
doing your affairs in secrecy.” It was said in the proverbs, "The 
hearts of freemen are the tombs of secrets" and "Moslems' secrecy 
is faithfulness, and talking about it is faithlessness." [Mohammed] - 
God bless and keep him -used to keep work secrets from the 
closest people, even from his wife A'isha – may Allah's grace be on 
her. 
 
                                            
133 Osama bin Laden, from the transcript of a video taped message released and aired in the 
Al Jazeera television network, as reported in the Washington Post on Nov 1, 2004 [on-line], 
available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16990-2004Nov1.html. 
134 Al Qaeda Manual, “Declaration of Jihad Against the Tyrants” [on-line], available from 
http://www.disastercenter.com/terror/. 
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The mention of the Colonel John Boyd’s OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide 
and Act) loop is also seen in the Jihad Manual but from a different perspective 
wherein it mentions that the members of the terrorist organization should have 
‘necessary qualifications’ that include: intelligence and insight, ability to observe 
and analyze and an ability to act; this along with qualifications like keeping 
secrets and concealing information confirms beyond doubt that information and 
the processes involved in exploiting information have been adequately ingrained 
in the Al Qaeda operating philosophy. Importance placed on the information 
environment by Al Qaeda could be gauged from the quote by their second-in-
command, Ayman al-Zawahiri: “I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that 
more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And 
that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”135. 
The physical environment in which the terrorists operate is carefully 
crafted with the information environment always in perspective; some cases, 
where the physical events are seemingly random, also tend to create a positive 
impact for the terrorists in the information environment. The adaptability of using 
information as an important resource, and the information environment as the 
dominant battleground, has created a virtual balance between conventional 
forces in the world and a comparatively small number of terrorists around the 
world. This ability of the terrorists to adapt in the information age is predominantly 
due to opportunities that they have accepted in using modern information 
technologies. Arquilla and Ronfeldt have also remarked, in their paper, that the 
information revolution and the enabling information technologies, along with the 
adaptability of terrorist organizations to mesh into a networked force, are 
themselves among the primary enabling mechanisms for the emergence and 
subsequent growth of such non-state actors, with a considerable impact on 
global security.136 The importance of information is also felt by nation states 
                                            
135 Ayman Al Zawahiri, “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” Jul 9, 2005 [on-line], available 
from http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english.pdf. 
136 David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, “What Next for Networks and Netwars,” in Networks 
and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds 
(Santa Monica: RAND,  2001) [on-line], available from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/ 
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around the world and is clearly evident from the thoughts expressed by former 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, before the United States embarked 
on the Global War on Terror: “There will be, undoubtedly, some things that our 
military forces and the military forces of others can do. But this is also a war of 
will and mind, it is a war in which information may be the most important asset 
that we have. And so we're asking a lot of countries to help us with 
information.”137 There is a need to fully exploit the information domain in a 
proactive manner rather than through an information protective syndrome to 
achieve success in the war on terror. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter gave an overview of terrorism and dwelled on its root causes. 
The analysis of the root causes, in terms of their grouping and relevancy, helps 
us in identifying priority areas in the war of ideas and for shaping the information 
environment.  The ‘war of ideas,’ that is such a dominant part of the Global War 
on Terror, is examined from the perspective of both the Islamist terrorist and the 
United States and its allies. This chapter also introduced the basics of 
information operations as originated by Libicki and their contextual relevance to 
the Global War on Terrorism. The chapter contained various elements of 
information operations as promulgated through the United States Joint Doctrine 
on the subject, and analyzed their applicability in different levels of military 
operations. The chapter further deliberated on the use of information operations 
by terrorist organizations and concludes with the premise that terrorist 
organizations need to conduct information operations for their growth as well as 
survival in today’s information age. 
                                            
137 Condoleezza Rice, from the transcript of the press briefing of Sep 19, 2001 in the 
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III. AL QAEDA AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS: 
COEXISTENCE AND ADAPTATION 
…. It is important to hit the economy (of the United States), which is 
the base of its military power …. If the economy is hit they will 
become preoccupied.138 
— Osama bin Laden  
… we realized from our defense and fighting against the American 
enemy that, in combat, they mainly depend on psychological 
warfare.139 
— Osama bin Laden 
… So we are continuing this policy of bleeding America to the point 
of bankruptcy. Allah willing and nothing is too great for Allah. …. Al 
Qaeda spent $500,000 on the event[9/11], while America, in the 
incident and the aftermath, lost according to the lowest estimate – 
more that $500 billion. Meaning that every dollar of Al Qaeda 
defeated a million dollars by the permission of Allah ….140 
— Osama bin Laden 
The above quotes reflect the tone of a terrorist who is conscious of the 
Information Revolution. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda have skillfully adapted 
to the new paradigms of Information Operations that are still being unraveled by 
modern states and societies. The ability to focus on modern technologies as a 
means to pursue its ideology, has made Al Qaeda into a global syndrome that 
has generated sufficient appeal in the Muslim community especially in many of 
the Middle East states. It is also influencing Muslims all over the developed world 
through sermons on the Internet given out by radical Muslim clerical preachers 
holding allegiance to Al Qaeda, and a ‘mass advertisement campaign’ that is 
timed to perfection with corresponding physical events. The globalization of 
                                            
138 Statement of Osama Bin Laden, Dec 27, 2001 [on-line], available from 
http://www.doublestandards.org/alqa.html#alqa5. 
139 Audio message purported to be by al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, broadcast on 
Arab television station Al Jazeera on Feb 11, 2003 [on-line], available from 
http://www.doublestandards.org/alqa.html#alqa7. 
140 English transcript of Osma bin Laden's speech in a videotape sent to television station Al 
Jazeera on Oct 30, 2004 [on-line], available from 
http://www.doublestandards.org/alqa.html#alqa8. 
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terrorism, for which Al Qaeda may purely be blamed, has been possible due to 
the global reach of information, its proficient use by Al Qaeda, and its near real-
time assimilation by the public at large. The importance of information as an 
essential tool to achieve its strategic objectives, and the visibility of various forms 
of information operations in planning, training, philosophy, and the conduct of its 
operations has noticeably defined the interest of Al Qaeda to absorb the 
Information Age to its advantage. The ever-increasing reliance on information in 
all domains, by all the countries in the world, presents a unique opportunity for Al 
Qaeda to specifically target and exploit this resource to its advantage.  
This chapter analyzes the evolution of Al Qaeda into an organization that 
has adopted the paradigms of the Information Age and through which it has 
turned into a force to be reckoned with on the world stage. The evolution of Al 
Qaeda is also closely correlated with the growing influence of their leader, 
Osama Bin Laden. This organization professes the establishment of a rule that 
dates back centuries, which is seen as an aberration in modern societies, but is 
in no way averse to the utilization of the modern day technologies that are so 
very important for it to sustain and grow. The ‘means to an end,’ even though 
contradictory, has been absorbed by the organization in all its operations. 
Information operations is a concept that was developed by the Western world for 
modern militaries, but is being exploited by Al Qaeda to ‘turn the tables’ and fight 
the war on terror with no comparative physical standing. This chapter, therefore, 
undertakes answering questions like: How has Al Qaeda evolved into such a 
threat? How is it exploiting the domain of information operations and modulating 
the information environment? The chapter also provides a comparative 
assessment of changes in Al Qaeda’s methodology for exploiting Information 
Age paradigms after 9/11.  
 
A. AL QAEDA – EVOLUTION INTO AN INFORMATION AGE THREAT 
Terrorism blended with Jihad is a potent mix that has been propagated by 
Al Qaeda and is rightly regarded as a major security concern around the world. 
Islamist terrorism in general, and Al Qaeda in particular, has grown into a trans-
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national network with footprints all over the globe and has been a classic case of 
a ‘blow-back’ that has hit back at the United States and its allies with a 
vengeance such as has never been seen before.141  
You talk about al-Qaeda. Have you forgotten who has bred al-
Qaeda?..It's the illegitimate child of America and Israel, but you 
name it Islam. This savagery is not Islam. It is coming from inside of 
you and it is now punching you. 142 
— Ayatollah Mohammed Emami-Kashani, prominent Iranian cleric 
 
Al Qaeda has definitely taken substantial losses since 9/11 but is seen as 
‘on the march’ at present and has regrouped and reorganized to emerge as a 
source of inspiration and emulation to many of the Islamist fundamentalist 
movements around the world.143 
 
                                            
141 John Arquilla, The Reagan Imprint, 43. Arquilla argues that the tacit support that was part 
of the ‘Reagan Doctrine’―of helping others to fight for their freedom, and funding of the 
Mujahideens in Afghanistan during the Cold War, may have been the impetus responsible for 
propelling a world-wide Islamist terrorism movement to germinate and gain center stage, as well 
as the inability to take decisive action almost two decades back to nip it in the bud. Also see the 
article, “Terrorism: Theirs and Ours,” by Eqbal Ahmad as part of his presentation at the University 
of Colorado in 1998. It talks about the whole-hearted assistance provided by the United States to 
the Afghan Mujahideens in the Reagan Era. The article is available at 
http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Ahmad.htm. The photograph of Former President Ronald 
Reagan hosting Afghan Mujahideen leaders at the White House in 1982 is available from 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/ photographs/large/c12820-32.jpg. There are a number of 
interesting articles on the Internet and a few books that provides such a view-point: “Al Qaeda: A 
CIA Protégé,” by Franklin Freeman (http://www.geocities.com/libertystrikesback/afghan.html), 
“How the CIA Created Osama Bin Laden,” by Norm Dixon 
(http://www.greenleft.org.au/2001/465/25199), “Who is Osama Bin Laden?” by Michel 
Chossudovsky (http://globalreseacrh.ca/articles/CHO109C.html), Ghost Wars: The Secret History 
of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, by 
Steve Coll (New York, 2004), “How Jimmy Carter and I Started the Mujahideen,” a report of 
interview with former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to Le Nouvel Observateur, 
Jan 15-21, 1998 (http://www.counterpunch.org/brzezinski.html). It is also mentioned that there is 
actually a dearth of research on this aspect by many of the eminent Islamist terrorism experts 
around the world, especially from the Western countries, and in many instances it appears to be 
an accepted inference or has been conveniently brushed under the carpet. 
142 BBC News, “UK invited attacks — Iran Cleric,” Ayatollah Mohammed Emami-Kashani 
while condemning the London blasts on Jul 7, 2005 [on-line], available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4665133.stm 
143 Bruce Hoffman, “What Went Wrong,” Washington Post, Aug 27, 2006, BW 06 [on-line], 
available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/24/AR2006082401147_pf.html – while reviewing two books The 
Looming Tower―Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 by Lawrence Wright and Without Precedent― 
The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission by Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton. 
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1. Tracing the Evolution 
Al Qaeda evolved not as the brain-child of its leader Osama Bin Laden, 
but as an organization that had its foundations derived from the philosophy of 
various radical Islamist scholars, battle-hardened cadres from the Soviet-
Mujahideen era in Afghanistan, and through the support of hundreds of Muslim 
people who believed in an organization that would fight for the rights of Muslims. 
The early days of the evolution of terror began in 1984 in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan when Osama Bin Laden provided construction machinery and 
established hospitals and guest houses in Peshawar and adjoining areas with the 
intention of providing logistics and infrastructure support to the Mujahideens 
fighting the Soviets.144 Bin Laden also funded the establishment of training 
camps in Afghanistan to train Afghans and non-Afghan volunteers. The first 
camp was established at Jaji in Afghanistan for the main purpose of providing 
military training with teachings in Islamic theology and history.145 This is the time 
when Osama Bin Laden came across his mentor and a radical Islamist scholar, 
Adbullah Azzam who established the Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK) or Services 
Office in Peshawar, Pakistan, that was a place where radical Islamists 
congregated from all over the world to join the Islamist movement being evolved 
to fight the Soviets. This had the implicit backing of the Pakistan government and 
active support from the United States of America, since at that time the ‘bigger 
                                            
144 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: 
The Free Press, 2001), 51. 
145 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the 
Future of America (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), 98. 
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evil,’ in the eyes of Western world, was communism.146 MAK became the central 
office of a network that spanned many countries, including the United States, that 
was responsible for propaganda, media-related activities, fundraising, and the 
recruitment of new members.147 Over time, MAK and the camps that it 
established served Arab volunteers only, since Osama Bin Laden was of the 
opinion that, conceptually, the idea of organizing separate Arab and Afghan 
militant groups would bear better results.148  
Al Qaeda derived its ideology from Azzam’s teachings that had Islam as 
the only acceptable way of life as the central theme, and that the glory of the 
Muslim world could be achieved once again when all individual Muslims focused 
on Jihad as an obligation and as the sacred duty of a Muslim. Azzam talked 
about a model, a philosophy, or an ideology and not a structured organization.149 
Osama Bin Laden, during that time of evolution, was more of a logistics operator 
                                            
146 Peter Bergen in his book Holy War, Inc. devotes a complete chapter titled “Blowback: 
The CIA and the Afghan War,” wherein he argues that the United States did make some tactical 
errors during the war while arming the Afghans, that there was an active modulation of the 
scenario undertaken by the United States using its money power, and that Pakistan’s Inter 
Services Intelligence (ISI) was given a free hand to prosecute the entire operation. The ISI 
became the all-powerful organization funding Islamist militants from all over the world that 
included mostly the militants who had deep anti-Western sentiments. This in many ways could be 
considered the birth of the global Islamist terrorist threat that we are facing today. Also see 
Kenneth Katzman, “Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment,” CRS Report for Congress, Aug 
17, 2005―wherein he illustrates the support of the United States for the Mujahideens to fight the 
holy war against the Soviets. Also see Robin Cook, “The Struggle Against Terrorism Cannot be 
Won by Military Means,” The Guardian, Jul 8, 2005, wherein he states: “Bin Laden was, though, a 
product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he 
was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of 
Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, literally ‘the database,’ was originally the computer file of the thousands of 
mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians. 
Inexplicably, and with disastrous consequences, it never appears to have occurred to Washington 
that once Russia was out of the way, Bin Laden's organization would turn its attention to the 
West.” [On-line], available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/ 0,12780 
,1523838,00.html. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central 
Asia, (Waterville, Maine: Thorndike Press, 2002). The author has described how millions of 
dollars flowed from the United States intelligence agencies and other Islamic states for the 
Afghan Mujahideens that helped create the problem of terrorism in the areas of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan that we are facing today. 
147 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 4. 
148 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 101. 
149 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 6. 
Abdullah Azzam is the author of two papers: “Join the Caravan” and “Defense of Muslim Land,” 
the teachings therein are quite similar to the ethos and ideology that are seen in Al Qaeda. The 
English translation of the papers are available from 
http://www.islamistwatch.org/texts/azzam/azzam.html 
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and a financier responsible for setting up logistics bases and traveling around the 
Arab world to seek donations for sustaining the Jihad in Afghanistan. This is the 
very reason why Al Qaeda always derived its strength and support from like- 
minded people in different countries and regions around the world, and 
consequently, was able to establish itself as the vanguard of global 
fundamentalist Islamist revolution and why it always nurtured a macro world view 
from its inception to what it is at present. The key foundation and a rallying theme 
at that time was the “defense of Islam,” which even now continues to be effective. 
By the end of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and their subsequent retreat, 
the various camps established to support the Afghan mujahideens and the Arab 
volunteers began to send war veterans back to their native countries. This in turn 
started creating problems within their respective societies and countries, and 
hence the camps came under covert scrutiny from various Arab governments. 
This led to the formation of Al Qaeda in 1989, which was modeled as more 
secretive and detached, with a separate infrastructure and a more hardened 
Islamist ideology.150.  
Al Qaeda remains a kind of virtual organization that denies its own 
existence in order to remain in the shadows and is thereby able to hide its true 
intentions, motives, and future courses of actions.151 Azzam further laid out 
guidelines for Al Qaeda operatives that demanded acceptance of the toughest 
tests — abstinence and frugality, unflinching belief in ideology, determination and 
insistence, patience and prayer, and loyalty and devotion — as the binding 
virtues.152 The gains to Al Qaeda and Islamist terrorism until 1989 were 
immense, from combat experience, self-confidence, increased religious faith, 
ambitions for a borderless Islamic world, leadership skills, hatred toward the 
                                            
150 Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 59. 
151 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 3. He furthers depicts Al Qaeda as an enigma, a 
shadowy body that many Islamist terrorists aspired to join, and also mentions that Al Qaeda 
rarely assumed responsibility for a terror act and that Osama Bin Laden himself had never used 
the term ‘Al Qaeda’ until the 9/11. Different authors have a different dateline associated with the 
formation of Al Qaeda as an organization but most of them believe that it was during 1988 and 
1989 when the birth of Al Qaeda officially took place. 
152 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. 
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Western countries, especially the United States, and above all, the networking 
necessary to create a truly international radical Islamic movement.153 The 
country hopping of Osama Bin Laden after 1989 from Afghanistan-Pakistan to 
Saudi Arabia and then to Sudan, and finally back to Afghanistan, further 
strengthened the global outlook of the organization and thus began its evolution 
into the ‘network of networks.’ 
In the beginning of 1989, Osama Bin Laden moved to Saudi Arabia for a 
period of two years. These two years were tumultuous due to the strained 
relationship between Osama Bin Laden and the Saudi royal family, especially on 
issues pertaining to the support of the Saudis by the United States-led offensive 
against Iraq in 1991, and the stationing of thousands of United States troops in 
the land of the two holy places. These two years may be regarded as a 
consolidation phase both for Al Qaeda and their leader; the stature and the 
influence of Osama Bin Laden grew due to his exploits in Afghanistan, his open 
opposition to the ruling elite in Saudi Arabia, his inflammatory speeches in 
several mosques and religious academic institutions, and his opposition to the 
presence of United States troops in Saudi Arabia.154 This was also the period 
wherein Al Qaeda established its tentacles through settlement of the 
fundamentalist war veterans of Afghanistan in other societies in different parts of 
the world. 
The years 1991 to 1996 were the years when Osama Bin Laden found 
refuge in Sudan, which was ruled by Hassan al–Turabi, the leader of the 
country’s National Islamic Front, and who aimed to create a pure Islamic state in 
Sudan. Osama Bin Laden’s exile to Sudan could be defined as the turning point 
for the establishment of Al Qaeda on a global front and for moving away from the 
initial objectives that focused more on Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula in 
general, toward, a more global venture.155 The relationship between Osama Bin 
                                            
153 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 105-108. 
154 See Jason Burke, Al Qaeda, Peter Bergen Holy War, Inc., Anonymous Through Our 
Enemies’ Eyes, Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. 
155 Jane Corbin, Al Qaeda: In Search of the Terror Network that Threatens the World (New 
York: Thunder’s Mouth Press / Nation Books, 2003). 
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Laden and the Sudanese regime was totally symbiotic, with Bin Laden helping to 
create the country’s infrastructure by investing his money, and the Sudanese 
government giving a free hand to him for establishing his training camps.156 This 
was also a time when radical Islamist ideology saw its roots becoming 
entrenched in Africa and began the export of Al Qaeda fighters to various 
conflicts that were going on at that time in Africa. Al Qaeda actively supported the 
Somali militia against the United States-led United Nations peacekeeping force 
and was involved in the training of militia, the downing of the United States 
helicopter, and dragging and killing United States soldiers in the streets of 
Mogadishu.157  
This was the period when the Al Qaeda network grew from Africa to 
Bosnia to the Philippines to Yemen and other countries; emissaries and soldiers 
of Osama Bin Laden were sent to different corners to garner support, to profess 
the ideology, and also to actively participate in conflicts going on in those 
countries. The important event that happened during this time was the setting up 
of the Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC) under Khaled al-Fawwaz in 
London. This became the de facto and legitimate mouth-piece of Al Qaeda. ARC 
directed its voice mainly towards Saudi Arabia in order to project the regime’s 
inadequacy towards Islam and its unacceptable bias toward the United States 
and Western values.158 Even though Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were 
based in Sudan, the camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan continued to operate.  
Once again, the time in Sudan was spent in consolidation of the Al Qaeda 
network, making contacts with more terrorists groups, and spreading its ideology 
around the world. Al Qaeda and Bin Laden grew in stature as global financiers of 
terrorist activities and as motivational factors. Finally, in mid-1996, Osama Bin 
Laden moved from Sudan to Afghanistan mainly due to the tremendous pressure 
exercised by the United States and Saudi Arabia on the Sudanese regime and a 
failed assassination attempt on Bin Laden, but also because Afghanistan was a 
                                            
156 Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 76-82. 
157 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 134-137. 
158 Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 88. 
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known territory from where he could again re-establish himself in no time and 
provide a more secure geographical base for Al Qaeda.159  
From Sudan to the mountains of Hindu Kush the journey of Osama Bin 
Laden and his band of followers in the middle of 1996 is regarded as a home-
coming, and his actual whereabouts have been hidden from the world ever since.  
Bin Laden was accepted by the Taliban with full support due to his stature and 
exploits during his earlier times in Afghanistan, the economic wealth that 
accompanies Bin Laden, an unflinching support for Mullah Omar―the supreme 
leader of the Taliban―and a growing optimism in Afghanistan that he could 
secure the integration of diverse factions in the war-torn country. This was when 
Osama Bin Laden and his network came out with the declaration of Jihad on the 
Americans Occupying the Country of the Two Sacred Places on August 23, 
1996. The declaration created a formal alliance of like-minded terrorist 
organizations with the aim of fighting against the United States and its allies in 
the form of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders 
on February 22, 1998.  For the first time, they used the media proactively to 
establish themselves as the pre-eminent terrorist network in the world, and made 
their global intentions clear.  
 
2. Al Qaeda Organizational Structure – Always Focused toward a 
Global Center-Stage 
The name ‘Al Qaeda’ was never used by Osama Bin Laden for his 
organization or network from the time of its existence to the year 2001. Even 
after the attack on the United States embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, 
President Clinton acknowledged the fact that Osama Bin Laden was involved in 
the incidents, but he was treated more as a financier and ideologue; Al Qaeda as 
an organization was never highlighted. A similar view was expressed by George 
Tenet, the former director of the CIA, during his testimony to the Senate 
Intelligence Committee in February 2001.160 Osama Bin Laden himself used the 
                                            
159 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 143-147. 
160 Jane Corbin, Al Qaeda, 83. 
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term Al Qaeda and described how the name was coined in an interview with an 
Al Jazeera correspondent in October 2001.161 The meaning of the term Al Qaeda 
as ‘the base’ or ‘foundation’ aptly describes it as the vanguard of global 
fundamentalist Islamic movement. As Bruce Hoffman points out in his paper 
almost four years back, there are various perceptions on what Al Qaeda is: a 
monolithic, international terrorist organization with a well-defined command and 
control structure, a broader, more amorphous transnational network, an army or 
an ideology, an international criminal enterprise, or a kind of franchise 
organization.162  Several analysts have also pointed out that Al Qaeda has 
adapted from a somewhat hierarchical organization from pre 9/11 days to a more 
networked organization post 9/11. John Arquilla is of the opinion that Al Qaeda 
was a hub-oriented network before 9/11 and shifted to something much more 
dispersed and distributed after OEF.163 In my view, Al Qaeda was created as a 
globally networked organization, and as all networks have a hierarchical 
structure, so does Al Qaeda.164 The emphasis on small cells, sufficiently 
independent and capable of executing catastrophic attacks, has always been the 
hallmark of Al Qaeda. The networked structure implies that the nodes and the 
links between the nodes are vulnerable entities as is Al Qaeda in that regard.  
What needs to be analyzed by counter-terrorism experts is what are the 
important nodes and links that need to be targeted in order to have a more 
definite impact. Focus on the organizational structure limits us toward taking 
more physical steps and achieving our objectives, but what also needs to be co-
opted are the informational targets that have an impact on the physical aspects 
                                            
161 Transcript of the interview by Al Jazeera correspondent Tayseer Alouni and Osama Bin 
Laden that took place in Oct 2001 [on-line], available from 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html 
162 Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An 
Assessment,” RAND, 2003. 
163 Discussion with Prof. John Arquilla at Naval Postgraduate School, May 2007. 
164 See also Kenneth Katzman’s “Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment,” wherein he 
writes:‘Al Qaeda has always been more a coalition of different groups than a unified structure, 
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broader network linking various Islamist groups and causes.” 
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that tend to promote the informational environment that we desire. Further, due 
to the transnational bindings in Al Qaeda, many regional Islamist terrorist 
organizations have remodeled their approach to include the broader objectives of 
Al Qaeda. What this has led to is the global connectivity that Al Qaeda always 
desired and it has thus established itself as the overall umbrella organization. 
The implications of such an understanding between Islamist terrorist 
organizations implies that a more formal global intelligence sharing mechanism is 
in order to counter the threat, and that each country needs to identify its domain 
of influence for exclusively targeting Islamist terrorist organizations within that 
domain, and with a global intelligence network as the supporting infrastructure. 
The present organizational structure of Al Qaeda is under a lot of debate, 
but it is believed that prior to 9/11 the Al Qaeda core structure had a Consultative 
Committee, or the Shura Council, consisting of senior Al Qaeda members; a 
Military or Operations Committee, for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and 
planning attacks; a Business Committee to oversee front-end organizations, 
donation collections, and fund-raising; a Religious Committee, to hold 
discussions on various issues pertaining to religion and the issuance of fatwas; a 
Law Committee to review Islamic law and decide if particular courses of action 
conform to the law; and a Media Committee to handle all the propaganda activity 
and the release of various speeches by the senior leadership from time to time. 
The overall organization was headed by Osama Bin Laden as the leader and 
Ayman Al Zawahri as his second-in-command.165 The directions emerging from 
these committees generally have global ramifications. The existence of such a 
formalized structure may not be a valid assumption at this stage, but it is 
necessary to understand that Al Qaeda is a methodical organization, and as time 
goes by in the War on Terror, some variant of such a structure, with a different 
and newer breed of leaders is likely to emerge again. The new leadership of Al 
Qaeda may not be as charismatic as the ones at present, but may be as 
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dangerous. Nevertheless, personalities are important in this war and the 
organization is bound to take a hit once the present leadership is eliminated,166    
When this is achieved, the information environment needs to be duly modulated 
to actually achieve the desired result of weakening the organization and not 
make it into an event that will propel Islamist terrorism into a new dimension.   
Al Qaeda, from its inception, always had eyes on the world center stage 
and the success achieved by the band of mujahideens in Afghanistan provided 
the necessary boost to Al Qaeda leadership to project their intentions and 
objectives on a global scale. It is amply clear that there were two major 
objectives that Al Qaeda laid out for itself: 
• The establishment of a global Islamic caliphate or the global Muslim 
Umma, which is highlighted in all the addresses by Osama Bin Laden: the 
entire Muslim community is addressed as a common entity and as a 
global community.167 
• Taking on the United States of America, the only superpower, and 
its allies, as enemies of Islam and the Muslim community worldwide due to  
reasons that include the unacceptable presence of United States troops in 
Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, its unflinching support of Israel, its 
support of a number of corrupt regimes in the Middle East, and the death 
of thousands of Muslim civilians due to wars undertaken by the United 
States.168 The concept of an organization taking on a superpower has a 
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B. AL QAEDA AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
 
1. Organizational Adaptation in the Information Age 
The disruption and damage to Al Qaeda that has occurred post 9/11 due 
to the ongoing Global War on Terror has led to a significant reorganization that is 
evident in the Al Qaeda hierarchy and its global network. There is a need to 
understand that carrying out high-profile attacks is not the only purpose of Al 
Qaeda, and that the organization is perceived as some sort of loose network that 
synergizes its global Islamic fundamentalist perspective through influencing 
diverse and disparate terrorist organizations around the world. Benjamin and 
Simon have termed Al Qaeda the “quartermaster of Jihad”169  that provides 
moral, financial, and material support to Islamic terrorist organizations worldwide. 
Others, like Paul Pillar, have equated Al Qaeda to the Internet due to its 
transnational reach, its global connectivity, and its control and coordination 
elements as invisible.170 Analysts like Arquilla and Ronfeldt feel that the Al 
Qaeda network has moved toward shaping into a multi-hub “spider’s web” 
design171 with dispersed, isolated, and small cells capable of planning 
independent missions to achieve relatively small-scale but significant events, and 
awaiting subtle directions from the top hierarchy for any major initiative. The 
dispersed nature of these small units thus compels them to adopt and embrace 
basic network forms and modern information warfare paradigms with an aim to 
profess their ideology, bring about efficiency in their operations, and remain 
somewhat imperceptible. 
It is fairly clear that organizational adaptation is necessary to survive in 
this Information Age and Al Qaeda clearly demonstrates that quality. From an 
organization that was constantly in search of a physical base, it has turned into a 
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‘base-less’ organization that has increasingly become harder to define in the 
physical domain and is predominantly using the informational domain to profess 
its ideology and influence the worldwide Islamic fundamentalist movement. As is 
seen today, almost all the Islamic fundamentalist organizations in different parts 
of the world have their specific agendas and priorities but show some form of 
linkage to Al Qaeda, and this linkage is seen more and more at the ideological 
level. Al Qaeda has been able to build this network through an informational  
campaign that recognizes the individual causes of these diverse groups and 
provides logistical support in terms of training, finances, and the vision to create 
an Islamic umma.  
 
2. Al Qaeda’s Forte―Psychological Operations, Propaganda and 
Combat Camera  
Al Qaeda has been using psychological operations (PSYOP) as part of its 
arsenal with the issue of statements from the top hierarchy, in the form of video 
tapes, voice recorded speeches, and CD ROMs that are meant for particular 
audiences at a certain point of time.172 The use of Al Jazeera, other Arabic print 
media, and the Internet to broadcast their ideology and influence people around 
the world implies an intricate understanding of this tool of strategic importance 
(PSYOP and propaganda) by a terrorist conglomerate like Al Qaeda. The choice 
of physical targets like the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and their 
significance to the world in general and the United States in particular, has 
transformed the way nation states acknowledge terrorism as a threat to normal 
societal values. It has also defined a template for response toward such acts, 
generated a rather long-term involvement of the world with terrorism as the core 
issue, and has also been able to thrust Al Qaeda to the center stage of world 
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affairs.173 This may have been the ultimate agenda of Al Qaeda while 
undertaking such a watershed event. The influence of such events on the Islamic 
diaspora in modern societies like Spain and the United Kingdom have had a 
profound impact that led to terrorist attacks in both of those countries in recent 
times. Al Qaeda appears to carry out well planned and methodical PSYOP that 
are directed toward specific audiences to elicit specific responses. The post 9/11 
statements from Al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri address various audiences 
with messages designed exclusively for them. The major target audiences are 
the United States―the government and the people, people of Western world, 
Islamist terrorists worldwide, Islamic people in the Middle East, and the Islamic 
diaspora as part of Western societies. The use of an American recruit, Adam 
Gadahn or ‘Azzam the American,’ a California-born man, to address the people 
of the United States that included an appeal to convert to Islam and a threat to 
undertake attacks in the United States with a promise that it will make the streets 
of America "run red with blood"174  signifies two important strategies from the Al 
Qaeda perspective. Firstly, it understands the fact that the messenger is as 
important as the message that he delivers, and secondly, it wants to be 
perceived as an organization that has established deep roots within Western 
societies. The Al Qaeda propaganda machinery is well established at places 
where there is support for Islamist terrorists as well as on the Internet. Al Qaeda 
is also not averse to using technology to propagate their ideology. This is evident 
from the fact that there are a number of websites on the Internet that support 
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Islamist terrorists and Al Qaeda in particular;175 these are the tools that Al Qaeda 
uses in carrying out its propaganda campaign on a world stage. Similarly, large a 
number of CDs, tapes, and print-related propaganda material are distributed to 
the various audiences to achieve PSYOP and propaganda objectives. These 
activities may not be directly controlled by Al Qaeda but have now grown into a 
business enterprise in areas like Iraq, Palestine, and Pakistan, and are more or 
less in ‘auto mode’ of production and delivery. 
The Libicki version of PSYWAR that categorizes it into four parts: against 
the national will, against enemy commanders, cultural conflict, and against the 
troops, has been adopted and understood by Al Qaeda as well. There seems to 
be well directed PSYWAR themes emanating from Al Qaeda against all four of 
these targets. 
The concept of the Combat Camera, as defined in the Information 
Operations doctrine of the United States,176 is actually being used profusely by Al 
Qaeda and its affiliate groups in a perfect manner. Al Qaeda now has a self-
proclaimed media production company by the name of Al Sahab; the literal 
meaning of the word is ‘cloud’ in Arabic. Al Sahab releases videos through the 
medium of the Internet from time to time, from taped suicide messages by the 
9/11 hijackers to images of gun battles and bombings spearheaded by Al 
Qaeda.177 The timing of the release of the videos is synchronized with dates 
pertaining to important events. For instance, a few days before the fifth 
anniversary of 9/11, Al Sahab released a number of videos reviewing that event 
and hence keeping the memory alive in the eyes of Islamist terrorists and of the 
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world in general.178 The quality of Al Sahab's videos indicates that they are 
produced with modern equipment, possibly low-end professional hardware but by 
competent technicians. The quality of the video productions has increased 
tremendously; the videos now display many of the features common in 
professional media productions such as standardized logos, digitally inserted 
backgrounds, and subtitles, often in English.179 Al Qaeda, since 2005, has 
switched the method of their video releases from a tape given to media channels 
like Al Jazeera to the recent method of distributing it on the Internet.  
A video carries enormous propaganda value for Al Qaeda in Iraq and its 
supporters. In 2005, a 16-minute videotape was released by Abu Musab Al 
Zarqawi and was available on various Jihadi websites on the Internet almost 
instantaneously, which confirms the sophisticated media efforts that Al Qaeda 
relies on and their understanding of media as a powerful weapon in modern 
wars.180 The videotape titled “Top 10” depicts critical operations undertaken by 
the Zarqawi group against the United States-led forces. On September 21, 2005, 
Al Qaeda made an inroad into the world of television broadcasting by launching 
its first edition of Sawt al Khilafa (Caliphate Voice Channel) in the form of a 
videotape, which was widely available on the Internet.181 The third edition of 
Sawt al Khilafa was posted on October 10, 2005 across Islamist message boards 
by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), an Al Qaeda mouthpiece believed to 
be in Europe or the Middle East, that projects headlines on the Jihadi front.182 
Sawat al Khilafa’s recent broadcast was posted on January 20, 2007 in which it 
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also gave out its future program schedules.183 Such media production and 
distribution companies are now seen as active in many regions around the world 
and there could be an effort in the Jihadi circles to amalgamate such 
organizations under the banner of the Global Islamic Media Front, which appears 
to be the authentic Al Qaeda mouth-piece, so as to achieve better coordination 
and synchronization. 
 
3. Al Qaeda Perspective on Electronic Warfare and Operational 
Security 
The lessons in the Al Qaeda manual, Military Studies in the Jihad Against 
the Tyrants, highlight the use of anti-surveillance and counter-measures to 
adversary electronic warfare capability.184 The ability to use radio-controlled 
improvised explosive devices by Al Qaeda and many of its associates against 
security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in Jammu and Kashmir (India), 
implies stress on such concepts during training in many of the Jihadi camps, as 
well as the ability to adopt to modern means to attack their target. The Electronic 
Warfare aspects of Al Qaeda are highlighted by the counter-measures that it 
takes to thwart attempts to monitor its communications, its ability to hide itself 
from the direction-finding methods of various intelligence agencies around the 
world, and the development of various counter counter-measures for detonating 
explosives remotely through the use of cell-phones and other wireless 
technology.185  
The Jihad Manual also points toward the emphasis and appreciation of 
maintaining secrecy in the planning and conduct of operations in its ninth lesson 
titled ‘Security Plan,’ and projects it as a major factor that will ensure success in 
any action. Daniel Byman feels that the inner core of Al Qaeda is extremely 
sensitive to operational security and terms it an important reason why this 
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organization has not yet collapsed.186 The aspects of operational security are 
closely integrated into all activities associated with Al Qaeda, from successfully 
keeping the locations of their leaders secret to leaving no traces on the Internet 
about the uploading of their videos, from keeping their future operations secret, 
to their ability to encrypt their communications for command and control. 
Although the 9/11 Commission Report says that ‘the 9/11 attacks were a shock, 
but they should not have come as a surprise,’ and acknowledges the fact that a 
number of warnings of the attack were discounted by the intelligence 
agencies,187  the OPSEC aspects undertaken by the members of Al Qaeda to 
prosecute such an attack were still quite significant as was its blending of 
counter-intelligence measures.188 Similar measures are bound to be taken by the 
organization in conducting future such attacks. The easier way of blaming the 
intelligence agencies as an after-thought and pondering missed opportunities 
does have its benefits, but to understand and counter the OPSEC measures of 
an efficient adversary like Al Qaeda is equally important toward a successful 
counter-terrorism strategy.    
 
4. Al Qaeda’s Use of Deception 
In May 2001, bin Laden deceived U.S. technical collection systems by 
allowing a major attack plan to be monitored189 and was thus able to generate a 
specific response. The setting up of deadlines to carry out an attack and then 
actually carrying out the attack much after the projected deadline, is a form of 
deception that Al Qaeda may have adopted to actually bring about a sense of 
complacency in its target to achieve the desired success. Authors Shultz and 
Beitler feel that the use of denial and deception by Al Qaeda is shaped by the 
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concepts of taqiyya and kitman found in Islam.190 The case studies undertaken 
by the two authors, with regard to the East African bombings of 1998 and the 
attack on 9/11, point to deception measures used by Al Qaeda. The deceptions 
include the use of false identities and documents, the use of deceptive front 
organizations, using deception to gain entry into the United States, and to appear 
and behave as an ordinary American. The most formidable deception achieved 
by Al Qaeda in the attacks of 9/11 was the method used to carry out such an 
attack. The use of hijacked planes as the ideal bombs was never acknowledged 
by intelligence agencies until 9/11. Another example of an apparently successful 
deception undertaken by Al Qaeda was during the siege of Tora Bora wherein 
Osama Bin Laden’s Moroccan body guard, Abdallah Tabarak, used Bin Laden’s 
satellite phone in order to divert the U.S. forces closing in on Bin Laden and 
hence allowing him to escape.191   
 
5. Physical Attack – Shaping the Information Environment 
The synchronization of physical targets and their positive impact on the 
information environment has been a challenging task for militaries around the 
world, but in the case of Al Qaeda, it seems that it has been able to fuse physical 
attacks and the related information environment to its advantage. The attack of 
9/11 by Al Qaeda in the continental United States had an impact on multiple 
audiences.192 The selection of targets and their impact resonated globally due to 
the live images that flowed through media channels instantaneously, which made 
it into a world event having global consequences. A similar event that may not be 
blamed solely on Al Qaeda, but may be attributed to the information environment 
that Al Qaeda created, is the attacks on the trains in Spain in 2004. The 
exploitation of a fragile political situation in Spain, coupled with adequate use of 
the media, and finally culminating with the attack in Madrid exactly two years and 
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six months after 9/11 on March 11, 2004, led to the subsequent regime change in 
Spain through elections held sixty hours after the attack.193 This may have been 
the catalyst that provided an exit option for the Spanish troops from Iraq. 
Although Al Qaeda may not have been involved directly in the Madrid bombings, 
the group of people involved was definitely inspired by Al Qaeda. The group was 
motivated by Osama Bin Laden’s address in 2003 in which he threatened prompt 
and severe actions against the countries that participated in the war in Iraq, 
including Spain and Britain.194 The fact that a document written in Arabic, on the 
Internet, some five months before the Madrid bombing that spelled out exactly 
the same options and correctly assessed the subsequent events, establishes the 
planning and foresight that Al Qaeda undertakes to carry out an attack, and the 
impact that the information environment has on diverse but motivated groups of 
terrorists.195 The London subway bombing of July 7, 2005, also follows similar 
patterns; the bombers were resident Muslims duly indoctrinated by Islamist 
fundamentalist teachings, and claims for the attacks were made by two groups 
presumably affiliated to Al Qaeda that were duly discounted by intelligence 
agencies. Nevertheless, the point to note is that the bombers were definitely 
inspired by Al Qaeda.196 Since the London bombings, the British government is 
under intense pressure regarding its policies and support for the invasion of Iraq. 
The ‘filtering and fusing’197 of information and its accurate judgment may 
be seen as an example of a successful physical attack campaign by Al Qaeda 
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using the Information Age paradigms. The ability to inspire and incite such 
physical attacks that change the information environment dramatically, is the 
unique strategy of Al Qaeda that is visible, accompanied by the show of 
acceptance and bravado that Al Qaeda leaders accord to such events.198 
 
6. Public Diplomacy and Support to Civilian Structures – The Al 
Qaeda Way 
The building of global Islamist terrorist networks has been facilitated by 
the policies of the Western world toward the problems of the Middle East and the 
Islamic world in general. This has been successfully integrated by Al Qaeda in its 
Public Diplomacy campaign that highlights the apathy of the Western world 
toward the Muslim population, provides the Muslim world with an ideology that 
has the ability to take on the Western world, and which is duly coupled with 
efforts to provide support to the civilian structures in the Muslim world. The public 
diplomacy campaign can be seen through the statements of the Al Qaeda 
leaders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, which are released from time 
to time. The support of civilian structures is more in terms of words, not deeds, 
but an understanding of the problems being faced by common Muslim people in 
Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, etc., is still evident through the statements of Al 
Qaeda leaders, and provides the required psychological impact to different 
audiences in the Islamic world. In addition, various Islamist organizations 
affiliated with Al Qaeda do provide physical support to the people in their region, 
like the support provided by Lashkar-e Taiba after the devastating earthquake in 
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 2005.199 This is supported by the report by the 
United States of America State Department’s annual Country Reports on 
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Terrorism 2005: “The October 8 earthquake that devastated Pakistan, killing 
more than 80,000, created an opportunity for al-Qaida-linked relief organizations 
to provide aid to survivors in the affected areas. The Government of Pakistan 
provided its own relief operations, facilitated international relief operations, and 
promised to shut down known terrorist relief camps, but nonetheless several 
such groups were able to raise funds and reap public relations benefits.”200 
Efforts like this to support the public structures and social institutions, both in 
normal times as well as during calamities, are encouraged by Al Qaeda and thus 
are a major source of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the local community. 
 
7. Economic Information Warfare from Al Qaeda’s Viewpoint 
The statements of Osama bin Laden exonerating his followers to attack 
targets that are symbols of the United States economy, and his understanding of 
the economics of war, which are evident from his reported speeches broadcast 
beginning the year 2001,201 clearly indicate an acknowledgment of future attacks 
with an intention to disrupt the economic infrastructure, as well as a prolonged 
engagement with a view to target the economy.202 The timings of such 
statements from the Al Qaeda leadership are also worth considering. In October 
2004, on the eve of the United States’ presidential election, Bin Laden’s 
statement urged Americans to reevaluate their policies toward the Islamic world 
and threatened to bleed and bankrupt the United States. The economic impact 
and the dependence of the United States’ economy on Middle East oil has been 
highlighted b both Bin Laden and Zawahiri. Bin Laden has called for Muslim 
societies to become more self-reliant economically and has described economic 
boycotts as an effective strategy. Zawahiri has urged the Islamist terrorists to 
attack the oil infrastructure in the Middle East so that it indirectly affects the 
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Western world:203 “to focus their attacks on the oil wells stolen from the Muslims, 
because most of the revenues of this oil go to the enemies of Islam.”  
The economic warfare professed by Al Qaeda not only includes attacking 
the economic targets of the Western world, but also the necessity of building its 
own financial backbone through front organizations, illegitimate charity 
foundations, and the investment of its own funds in legitimate activities along with 
its efforts to make this network invisible to the intelligence agencies.  This has 
been quite evident in its efforts toward developing its own financial infrastructure 
during its evolution phase, prior to 9/11, and the same still continues.     
 
8. Al Qaeda Moving Towards Cyberterrorism 
Cyberterrorism is an attractive option for modern terrorists who value its 
anonymity, its potential to inflict massive damage, its psychological impact, and 
its media appeal.204  Al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates have been indulging in 
capability-enhancement in this new form of terror through concentrated efforts in 
the form of the introduction of science and computer-related curricula in the 
various Jihadi madrassas and training camps, as well as efforts to achieve higher 
education in computer sciences through covert and overt means.  The examples 
of L’Houssaine Kherchtou and Ziyad Khalil205 and Adnan El'Shukrijumah206 who 
all majored in computer sciences from a college in Florida, are prominent. Al 
Qaeda also lays emphasis toward motivating the educated class to join their 
ranks; this is evident from the fact that the top leadership members of Al Qaeda 
who have been captured show that these individuals are highly educated in their 
respective fields.   
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The transformation of modern economies into adopting networked 
architecture to fit into the Globalization phenomena, their dependence on modern 
means of communication, especially the Internet, for their efficiency and 
commercial growth, has projected a vast number of potentially vulnerable targets 
that are open for cyber attacks. This scenario, coupled with the driving factors 
behind Al Qaeda’s operations of “intent, resources and opportunity,”207 is bound 
to be exploited by Al Qaeda in times to come and may well be the coup de grâce. 
The capture of computers and laptops in Afghanistan has established 
beyond doubt the use of information technology and the design of Al Qaeda’s 
global network208 and also provides sufficient evidence toward its effort to collect 
target data of the United States’ critical infrastructure.209  A cyber attack intended 
to harm the United States economy will target the computers and systems of 
critical civilian infrastructure, wherein the existence of innumerable vulnerabilities 
have been acknowledged.210 The Nimda worm that rode the Internet immediately 
after 9/11, caused damage worldwide, and was of significant nuisance value 
especially to the United States’ economy in proportionate terms, but the question 
still comes to mind―was it a coincidence? So far, the relationship between the 
9/11 attacks and the virus in cyberspace has not been established, but it is highly 
possible that the next major strike by Al Qaeda may coincide with an increased 
activity in the cyber domain. An interview by Dan Verton of Omar Bakri 
Muhammad, the leader of Al Muhajirun, a London based organization and a self-
styled spokesman for Bin Laden, clearly indicates the interest of Al Qaeda in 
cyberterrorism and its future exploitation by Al Qaeda and affiliate groups.211 In 
recent times, a new website has been launched that incites ‘Electronic Jihad’ and 
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aims to target websites that insult Islam and Islamic sacred figures. The website 
offers software to undertake cyber attacks and it also provides the Internet 
address of the target website to attack.212 These websites, though nascent in 
their format, definitely provide an avenue that could be exploited by both script-
kiddies and hardcore, technically savvy terrorists to exploit the commercial 
infrastructure that is so very dependent on the Internet. The same apprehension 
was also expressed by the present secretary of state in her remark on March 22, 
2001, “Today, the cyber economy is the economy. Corrupt those networks and 
you disrupt this nation.” There is the possibility that Al Qaeda and its affiliates find 
cyberspace an easy avenue to launch their Jihadi attacks to destabilize and 
disrupt commerce. 
 
9. Internet as Al Qaeda’s Battleground 
Timothy L. Thomas has indicated that evidence of Al Qaeda using the 
Internet to plan the 9/11 attack does exist and that the Internet is being used as a 
“cyberplanning” tool by terrorists.213 The former chairman of the Critical 
Infrastructure Board, Richard Clarke, remarked in February 2002: 
Al Qaeda was using the Internet to do at least reconnaissance of 
American utilities and American facilities. If you pull up all the 
unclassified information together, sometimes it adds up to 
something that ought to be classified. 
 
The Internet has been used by Al Qaeda and its affiliates for propaganda, 
communication, training, recruitment, fund raising and transfer (through Hawala 
channels), target profiling, and to a lesser extent, until now, for cyber attacks. 
The number of websites that are linked to Al Qaeda, as mentioned by 
Thomas,214 is increasing; the Jihadi ideology of Al Qaeda is also apparent in 
scores of other websites, even those credited to specific individuals. Al Qaeda’s 
Al Neda website publishes summaries of international news coverage of Al-
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Qaeda and its own reporting of fighting in Afghanistan along with many other 
articles, fatwas, and teachings of Muslim radical scholars. Recent Jihadi 
propaganda outlets on the Internet include the Global Islamic Media Front that 
has now published its 14th issue. The issue is 60 pages long and covers topics 
varying from religious discourses, the importance of pursuing Jihad, and the 
necessity of security in Jihadi operations. The same media outlet also releases 
other Internet publications like the Sada al-Jihad (The Echo of Jihad), Sada al-
Rafidain (The Mesopotamian Echo), Sawt al-Khilafa (The Voice of Caliphate), 
and other similar communiqués.215  Such Jihadi teachings on the Internet are 
available for scores of moderate, educated, and yet-to-be terrorist Muslim youths 
in Western countries for leading them toward their gradual indoctrination. 
The use of the Internet by Al Qaeda for nefarious means is alien to 
societies advocating freedom and basic human rights. The Internet now provides 
an affordable and straight-forward avenue to other smaller non-state actors and 
terrorists groups for their interaction and affiliation with Al Qaeda. This is likely to 
actually influence the operations and actions undertaken by these groups in their 
regional domains and may also lead to Al Qaeda’s role being taken over by a 
regional terrorist group, once the top hierarchy of Al Qaeda is captured or 
destroyed.  
With the loss of Afghani training camps, Al Qaeda has adapted by 
increasing its use of the Internet for propaganda, recruiting, and training 
purposes in addition to its continuous reliance on madarssas.216  The Internet 
has been transformed into a virtual training ground for the terrorists with the 
availability of Jihadi manuals containing lessons on everything from propaganda 
to making specialized explosives. Some experts also declare that the Internet is 
one of Al Qaeda's key survival tools,217 through which it is waging a relentless 
propaganda campaign to incite war against the West. The emphasis on the 
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exploitation of the Internet and other technology-intensive equipment for Jihadi 
operations is also on the increase.  It was  evident from the first publication of a 
64-page periodic magazine named ‘Technical Mujahid’ (Al-Mujahid al-Teqany) on 
November 28, 2006 that includes articles on computer and Internet security, 
explanation of the Global Positioning System satellites and video types, and 
editing and encoding in different formats.218 The recent issue of the same 
magazine published in February 2007 covers technical topics like covert 
communications and hiding secrets inside images, designing Jihad websites, 
video technology, and subtitling video clips.219 The use of solid encryption 
technologies and specialized techniques like steganography for passing 
command and control messages amply displays the path of constant learning 
and improvement adopted by Al Qaeda in this fast-changing field.  
The maze of interconnectivity that is inherent in the Internet, the 
availability of web-based technologies, Jihadi websites, and chat rooms have in 
fact created an almost invisible global communication infrastructure for Al Qaeda 
and various other affiliated groups. The Internet is now the ultimate weapon in 
the hand of Al Qaeda and is being utilized to serve the next generation of 
Jihadists.220 The Al Qaeda of the future may have dedicated cyber-terrorists in its 
rank and file, like the G-Force Pakistan that has founded the Al Qaeda Alliance 
Online.221 The future terrorists are now growing up in the Information Age of 
Internet and cyberspace and a hacker community of the same religious bearing, 
duly indoctrinated, may undertake to carry out cyber attacks on behalf of Al 
Qaeda. The transformation from “cyberplanning” to “cyberattack” may not be too 
far in the future. 
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C. AL QAEDA―AMORPHOUS, INVISIBLE, AND ADAPTIVE 
Al Qaeda may not have correctly assessed the swift, measured and 
doctrinally diverse response to 9/11 in the form of innovative operations launched 
by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan that led to the fall of the Taliban 
regime and the collapse of an established base of Al Qaeda.222 Nevertheless, in 
spite of losing Afghanistan, many of its operatives killed or captured, several of 
its financial front organizations fractured, several terrorist plots unearthed, and a 
manifold increase in defensive measures around the globe, Al Qaeda still 
remains a major threat to the United States and its allies.223 Similar sentiments 
are echoed in the latest Country Report on Terrorism released on 30 April 2007; 
‘Overall, AQ and its loose confederation of affiliated movements remain the most 
immediate national security threat to the United States and a significant security 
challenge to the international community.’224 The intervention in Iraq by the 
United States-led forces has once again allowed Al Qaeda to emerge ahead in 
the domain of information operations. The “provoke and bait” and “bleeding wars” 
approach225 adopted by Al Qaeda is appearing to be a success with each 
passing day along with the diminishing rating of the president of United States 
due to the war in Iraq. A comparison of Al Qaeda from the lenses of information 
operations, with 9/11 as the defining time-line, provides us with ample proof that 
there may be a need to suitably change the strategy adopted by us in pursuit of 
such an adaptive enemy. 
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 Al Qaeda Prior to 9/11 Al Qaeda – Post 9/11 
Organization • Somewhat 
hierarchical, well structured 
and closely administered. 
One major hub evident.  
• Emphasis on 
establishment of Islamist 
terrorist networks around the 
world. 
• Trying to establish 
itself as the vanguard of 
Islamist militancy around the 
world. 
• Activities visible in its 
base in Afghanistan. 
• Leadership is 
accessible and more visible. 
Greater command and control 
directives. 
 
• Loosely structured, 
distributed, autonomous mode of 
operation – emphasis on 
independently undertaken but 
ideologically commensurate 
operations. Multi-hub structure now 
evident. 
• Dispersed, isolated with 
small cells capable of planning and 
executing independent missions. 
• Network established – formal 
affiliations, loose bonding, and 
ideologically similar nodes around 
the world. Greater emphasis and 
motivations to ideologically similar 
groups around the world. 
• Islamist terrorism and Al 
Qaeda are synonymous. Identified as 
an able adversary to the super 
powers of the world. 
• Al Qaeda base now re-
located in and around Quetta and 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border 
region.226 
• Leadership is invisible and 
elusive. Emphasis on strategic 
guidance and tactical advice to 
affiliate organizations. Core 
leadership of Al Qaeda still 
exists.227 Al Qaeda and Bin Laden 
at the center stage – acceptable 
leader and chief mentor for radical 
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• Loosely planned 
psychological operations – 
greater emphasis on near 
(Islamic audience – terrorists, 
leaders and people) 
audiences.  
• Western media was 
considered to have a greater 
reach and appeal hence, 
interviews and audiences to 
western journalists 
considered important. 
• Media organization 
was in the development 
phase and was not 
adequately integrated with the 
Internet. 
• Propaganda was not 
too planned and based on 
more words and less deeds.  
• Video messages not 
seen as too relevant towards 
the happenings around the 
world, unprofessional 
production ability and 
emphasis toward TV type 
broadcasts. 
 
• Well planned psychological 
operations – equal emphasis on near 
and far (world leadership, people and 
Islamic diaspora around the world) 
audiences. 
• Al Jazeera’s emergence on 
the world stage and the proliferation 
of Internet world-wide has changed 
Al Qaeda’s effort toward approaching 
Western media to project its voice 
globally – the media now runs 
towards Al Qaeda.  
• Well synchronized media 
outlets – Global Islamic Media Front, 
Al Sahab, Sawt al Khilafa, etc as 
production and distribution agencies. 
• Constant and continuous 
media wars between Al Qaeda and 
the United States and its allies. 
• Video production – slick and 
professional – world-wide distribution 
is achieved instantaneously through 
the Internet. Propaganda is directed 
towards the national will of the 
adversary, the commanders and the 
troops in field, as well as projecting 
the issue of a cultural conflict on the 
wide front. This seems to be similar 
to what Libicki described as different 






• Al Qaeda leaders not 
averse to using cell phones 
and satellite phones and did 
not perceive it as a threat. 
The use of encrypted radio 
sets in tactical situations was 
limited. 
• Use of cell phones 
and similar wireless devices 
for triggering remote bombs 
not dominant. 
• Operational security 
in all matters important. 
 
• Improvised Explosive 
Devices modified to be remotely 
controlled through electromagnetic 
signals. Use of cell phones and hand 
held radios to detonate bombs is on 
the increase. 
• Greater emphasis on 
electronic counter-counter measures 
in training and tactics – use of 
encrypted radio sets on the increase. 
Al Qaeda leaders wary of using cell / 
satellite phones. 
• Greater emphasis on 




Deception • Deception 
meticulously planned during 
operations on focused 
targets. 
 
• Deception more due to 
increase in number of diverse and 
unrelated terrorists around the world, 
and due to greater number of targets 
available. Event prediction and 
intelligence gathering more difficult. 




• Well planned physical 
attacks – targets of 
significance.  
• Unusually patient in 
planning and execution of 
attacks.228 
 
• Attacks on United States and 
allies interests around the world have 
been successfully prosecuted and 
this will remain the principal strategy. 
Al Qaeda has made a decision to 
engage fully in Iraq. Targeting 
continental United States may not be 
in the scheme of things in the near 
future – since Al Qaeda would like to 
go further or to at least emulate the 
attack of 9/11. 
• Ideological motivation to 
affiliate organizations and 
independent operatives to launch 
attacks – the quality of patience with 
Al Qaeda seems to be fast eroding. 
• Major and minor attacks are 
always accompanied by statements 
commenting on the success of 
attacks from top leadership. Attacks 
in Iraq usually accompanied by video 
release of the event over the 
Internet. 
• Attacks against United 
States and allies ground forces in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq on the 
increase.229 
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Cyberterrorism • No confirmed reports 
of any attacks and no 
perceived threat.  
 
• Threats in this domain on the 
horizon – with independent groups 
forming alliances on-line – moving 
from ‘cyberplanning’ to ‘cyber 
attacks.’ 
Greater emphasis on technological 
training to exploit this domain – 
release of on-line journals like 
Technical Mujahid, as well as basic 
training in the Jihadi curriculum.   
 
Internet as a 
Tool for Jihad 
• Utilization limited due 
to less proliferation and the 
ability to use other means. 
• Exploitation of 
Internet as an important tool 
only just commenced prior to 
9/11. 
 
• Increased number of web-
sites, larger number of operatives 
comfortable using the Internet due to 
its relative invisibility and its 
extensive proliferation world-wide 
provides the necessary connectivity. 
• Important medium for 
propaganda, recruitment and 
training. 
• Global communication and 
command and control infrastructure 
for Al Qaeda and its affiliates. 
 





This chapter gave an overview of Al Qaeda — from its evolution to its 
present form, and how it has emerged as a globally networked threat that not 
only confronts directly the United States and its allies, but also is a major threat 
to other countries of the world through its affiliate organizations. The chapter also 
covers Al Qaeda’s adaptation in the Information Age to the paradigms of 
information operations and its proactive use of the constructs thereof to shape 
the information environment, to sustain its momentum and provide an impetus for 
its growth. The chapter also draws a comparative perspective on the utilization of 
information operations archetypes by Al Qaeda, prior to 9/11 and post 9/11, that 
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provides us with an understanding that the information domain is the dominant 
battleground of Al Qaeda. 
 
Psychological Operations and Propaganda for Growth
Physical Attacks to Shape the Information Environment
Operational Security for Survival
Deception and Electronic Warfare for Planning and Execution
Cyberterrorism – Domain of the Future  
Figure 6. Al Qaeda Utilization of Elements of Information Operations. 
 
Al Qaeda has adapted to using available technology and its existing social 
structure in an effort to be defined and acknowledged as a worldwide threat. The 
research in this chapter has enabled me to assess the elements of information 
operations that Al Qaeda utilizes to remain a force to be reckoned with, as well 
as to continuously progress on the path of growth, which is depicted in Figure 6 
in decreasing order of its utility and strength. Psychological Operations and 
Propaganda in all its forms is the element that Al Qaeda utilizes the most, and is 
its strength.  This is followed by deliberate physical attacks around the world on 
hapless civilians as well as pointed attacks on the United States and its allies’ 
military infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to keep the fire burning and 
to shape the overall information environment to its advantage. The use of 
Operational Security comes next.  This is what enables it to stay invisible as well 
as enable it to undertake attacks that are difficult to predict and prevent. 
Deception and Electronic Warfare, although important to Al Qaeda for the 
planning and execution of its operations, do not constitute its major effort. 
Cyberterrorism may not be regarded as Al Qaeda’s strength, but it definitely 
seems to be an area wherein efforts are being made to gain expertise. Finally, 
the Internet has become the greatest tool for Al Qaeda as it enables it to exploit 
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all the elements of information operations. There may be a case to carry out 
‘Blanking Out’230 operations on the Internet to actually view the effect that its 
unavailability might have on Al Qaeda and other Islamist organizations in their 
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nevertheless a simulated experimental environment could be set up to predict the effect on 
terrorist organizations that increasingly use the Internet for their propaganda and command and 
communication needs. Blanking Out operations in the larger context could also apply to 
Information Blockade and Information Imperialism as described by Libicki, but tailored to impact 
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IV. BATTLE IN THE INFORMATION DOMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan has a unique history and geographical location; it is the 
confluence of three different cultures that are manifestations of the three ancient 
civilizations of Mesopotamia, the Chinese, and the Indus Valley. Since it has 
been a land between these three diverse civilizations and an important junction 
point, it has from time immemorial been in a constant state of flux and this has 
given rise to regular foreign interventions and its diverse tribal culture. What has 
stayed constant is a distinct Islamic culture. Afghanistan has always been a 
country ravaged by war and, simply stated, war is seen as an acceptable way of 
life.231  
The events of 9/11 propelled Afghanistan into yet another conflict and with 
that came yet another foreign power. The reasons for the various foreign 
interventions have been quite diverse, but this time the United States and its 
allies launched military operations in Afghanistan as the opening shots in the 
Global War on Terror with objectives that focused on the destruction of the Al 
Qaeda infrastructure, the removal of the Taliban regime that supported Al Qaeda, 
and to provide stability to Afghanistan and its people.232 With these objectives, 
the United States and its allies began the somewhat ‘different kind of war’ as 
promised by President George Bush in his address to the Joint Session of 
Congress on September 20, 2001.233 The collective effort and resolve to embark 
on the Global War on Terror becomes amply clear from this statement of 
President Bush: “We will direct every resource at our command -- every means 
of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, 
every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption 
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and defeat of the global terror network.” Six years hence, the political resolve and 
military operations do not appear too successful, the coalition looks increasingly 
scattered, doubts about the destruction of terror network(s) in the foreseeable 
future have become stronger, the Taliban and Al Qaeda seem to be slowly but 
surely re-grouping, much of the top Al Qaeda leadership is still at large, the war 
appears to be unending, the stability in Afghanistan still looks distant, and the 
justification to embark on this all-encompassing war on terror is falling apart. The 
successes as elucidated in the document 9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and 
Challenges are creditable, but the challenges mentioned appear formidable, 
too.234 The successes in the physical domain have not been matched in the 
information domain and the mastery of the information domain still appears to be 
eluding the United States and its allies.  
This chapter analyzes the operations undertaken in Afghanistan by 
comparing the actions taken by the United States and its allies in the spectrum of 
information operations, with that of their adversary, using Libicki’s Mosaic of 
Forms concept, and thereafter describing macro level actions that influence the 
information environment.  
 
A. UTILIZATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS BY THE UNITED 
STATES AND ITS ALLIES 
The initial support for the United States undertaking operations against the 
perpetrators of 9/11 was overwhelming, both in terms of public support in the 
United States as well as the world community in general, yet few of the Muslim 
nations were skeptical about the way United States would undertake its 
retaliation. The activity in the information environment saw a tremendous 
increase, with the attacks of 9/11 and its aftermath as they were beamed across 
the world through the media as well as through the Internet. Leaders all over the 
world were trying to gauge the response of the United States and defining their 
options to either support the intended initiative or to stay away. The Islamist 
terrorist organizations, too, were wary of the fury and the scale of response.  
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People all over the world, especially in Muslim nations, drew varied reactions. 
The United States leadership started mobilizing its efforts on all fronts ― political, 
diplomatic, and military ― to launch their offensive against the perpetrators of the 
9/11 attacks. In a very short time, Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan were identified as the targets, and a massive diplomatic and political 
effort was begun in order to undertake military operations in Afghanistan.  
The United States and its allies commenced Operation Enduring Freedom 
on October 7, 2001, with air strikes in Afghanistan, duly modulated by the Central 
Intelligence Agency teams on the ground, and in due course, the Special 
Operations Forces, too. In an extremely short span of time — with a few special 
operations teams and the support of anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan, and with 
well orchestrated precision aerial strikes — the Taliban was routed, the Al Qaeda 
infrastructure in Afghanistan destroyed, Al Qaeda members scattered, and a 
provisional government established in Kabul. The initial response of the United 
States and its allies to the 9/11 attacks was fairly impressive, but almost six years 
down the line, the initial successes are long forgotten and the visible successes 
in the physical domain are accompanied by an adverse picture in the information 
domain. The environment on the ground for the United States and its allies also 
changed considerably from ‘the hunter to they became the hunted.’ The support 
that the United States had on the eve of 9/11 began to dwindle. The rhetoric 
heard from the president of the United States, in many a forum, started to seem 
presumptuous:  
When I committed U.S. forces to this battle, I had every confidence 
that they would be up to the task.  And they have proven me 
right.  The Taliban and the terrorists set out to dominate a country 
and intimidate the world.  Today, from their caves, it's all looking a 
little different. And no cave is deep enough to escape the patient 
justice of the United States of America….. Our military has a new 
and essential mission.  For states that support terror, it's not 
enough that the consequences be costly — they must be 
devastating.235  
                                            
235 George W. Bush, Jr., President of the United States of America, “President Speaks on 
War Effort to Citadel Cadets,” Dec 11, 2001  [on-line], available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html, accessed May 26, 2007. 
116 
Thus began a change in the strategic information environment and the 
initial success in the information domain slowly turned around.  In the succeeding 
paragraphs, the operations in the information domain are highlighted through the 
prism of Libicki’s notion that information warfare consists of many varied 
dimensions ― that it is a Mosaic of Forms. 
 
1. Organizational Infrastructure in Support of OEF 
The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) responsible for South 
Asia and the Middle East regions became the nominated headquarters to plan 
and execute the military operations in Afghanistan.236 The operations in 
Afghanistan were deemed to be unconventional and different.  The CIA, too, 
played its part in formulating a plan to insert its teams into Afghanistan and build 
up the indigenous anti-Taliban forces and use their local expertise with due 
incentives in terms of military hardware, close air support, and requisite financial 
support to begin operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.237 The equally 
important effort of building coalition support from countries around the world, and 
in particular countries surrounding Afghanistan, began in coordination with 
CENTCOM.238 The unconventionality in planning the initial phase of operations 
stems from the fact that there was an overarching necessity to undertake 
operations quickly, and hence the cumbersome support structure and command 
and control hierarchy associated with operations undertaken by the United States 
in the past, had to be done away with.  In addition, there was a  lack of any 
significant military targets, in terms of military infrastructure in Afghanistan and 
hence the classical United States air pounding was negated. Although, Hy 
Rothstein describes the initial phase of operations as, “Up to this point 
[December 2001] for the U.S military, the war was appropriately conventional. 
Attrition warfare, capitalizing on superior firepower, was used against an enemy 
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that presented lucrative array of targets….. Special operations forces were used, 
but the military war plan remained firmly planted at the attrition end of the 
spectrum.”239 Similar views are forthcoming from Stephen Biddle; “The Afghan 
campaign of last fall and winter [2001-02] was actually much closer to a typical 
20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support 
from one side.”240  
In due course, the defensive lines adopted by the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
gave way to a more dispersed and invisible force structure, and their operations 
turned increasingly irregular. For the United States and its allies, whatever 
unconventionality was utilized in the conduct of initial operations soon gave way 
to larger, heavier, and concentrated forces, establishment of a rigid hierarchy,  
explicit command and control directives, and a requirement for special 
authorization for conduct of operations. The corresponding decision loop 
increased with a tightening of the command and control setup; operations began 
to be conducted more in the open and in the glare of the adversary, with the lack 
of appropriate human intelligence and under observation of the adversary, the 
operations became more predictable and reactive, and the momentum shifted 
from an offensive mode to a defensive mode.241  
The anti-head and anti-neck operations described by Libicki as part of the 
Command and Control warfare became more and more difficult as the adversary 
adapted from a conventional hierarchical organizational structure with little 
emphasis on a networked force, into a more networked and distributed form. The 
necessary adaptation of the United States and its allied forces to deal with this 
change is not visible. The command and control structure changed from loosely 
controlled to one that involved tight controls.242 Benjamin Lambeth of the RAND 
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Corporation also mentions that OEF saw not only centralized planning, but also 
centralized execution, starting from the highest levels of the government to the 
engaged combatants at the point of contact with the enemy.  This he attributes to 
the greatly expanded global Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
and communications connectivity that increase the situational awareness 
manifold, but also enable the ‘command at a distance’ syndrome.243 The idea of 
small, well trained and motivated teams, with advanced technology and fire 
power as a backup, that are sufficiently autonomous in nature, may be the 
correct combination to apply in this changed scenario in order to conduct the 
war-fighting aspect. 
By 2006, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) began replacing the United States troops in 
Afghanistan. ISAF is mandated under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) 
Charter (Peace Enforcing) by UN Security Resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 
1563, 1623, 1659 and 1707, and has the responsibility for the whole of 
Afghanistan, with its primary role being assisting the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan to provide a safe and secure environment within Kabul and its 
surrounding areas, which will assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.244 The 
formation of a coalition force of this kind, though quite creditable, the exclusivity 
of only NATO member nations being part of this coalition gives it less credibility 
in the eyes of other countries. Along with the problems associated with a 
cumbersome conventional force as part of ISAF, the capability of such a coalition 
of nations, wherein many of the nations that are part of this coalition have never 
been exposed to such an irregular adversary, and are seen as so far away from 
the culture and the people of Afghanistan, is a bit circumspect. Anthony 
Cordesman rightly remarked in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
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Committee that “There is no alternative to Internationalism.”245 This may be the 
right time to give way to a United Nations-mandated force, and with troops under 
the aegis of the United Nations, to assist and enlarge the existing coalition to 
bring about peace and stability in Afghanistan with an emphasis on nation 
building. RAND Corporation has also conducted a number of studies on nation 
building and counterinsurgencies, and among the principal conclusions that can 
be drawn from these historical surveys are, the extreme difficulty of putting 
together broken societies without the support of neighboring states, and the near 
impossibility of suppressing well established insurgencies that enjoy external 
support and neighboring sanctuary.246 These conditions exist in Afghanistan; 
neighbors like Iran, India and the central Asian republics, are not involved with 
nation building in any significant way and Pakistan provides the necessary 
external support to fuel the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan. 
 
Afghanistan's future depends heavily on the international 
community's willingness to continue delivering concrete resources 
to the Afghan Government. It depends equally on international 
willingness to help protect the Afghan Government against the 
Taliban and other extremists who are waging a bloody insurgency 
in the south and east of the country. 
— General Michael V. Hayden, Director, CIA. Statement for 
the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
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2. Impact of Intelligence on Operations 
Fusing the ability to see and strike through interconnected systems, 
while at the same time reducing the vulnerability of operators, 
portends momentous changes in the nature of warfare.  On the 
other hand, the complex task of extracting the Taliban and al-Qa'ida 
forces from difficult terrain and cave hideouts illustrates how much 
farther we need to progress in our ability to fuse knowledge, 
decisions, and action into a seamless combat process. 
 
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 2001-02 
 
Intelligence is by far one of the more important aspects of the war on 
terror. The technical intelligence capability of the United States is undisputed, but 
what it seems to be lacking is the ‘up close actionable intelligence’ that is 
obtained through human intelligence channels. In the early days of OEF, the 
United States and its allies had the technical intelligence infrastructure in place to 
support the operations in Afghanistan, but there was a dearth of human 
intelligence operators on the ground to undertake close surveillance. The initial 
group of CIA operators and SOF teams that infiltrated into Afghanistan in 
September-October 2001 was a step toward overcoming this deficiency. One of 
the important steps was the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Cell by the CIA 
teams in September 2001. This cell collated all the information coming from 
direct observation of enemy activities at the Northern Alliance front lines, or 
intercepted enemy radio communications, and then all the information was 
analyzed and shared with other CIA teams and, within a period of one month, 
generated some 400 intelligence reports.247 This flow of intelligence and its direct 
application on operations like targeting Al Qaeda and the Taliban resulted initially 
in an exponential increase in positive outcomes. This is a classic example of the 
growth curve of Intelligence Based Warfare as described in Chapter II.248 The 
stagnation of the outcomes, even with increased intelligence capability, as shown 
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in Figure 3, could also be attributed to an increase in the distributed and 
networked nature of the adversary that emerged over the course of time.  
The intelligence reports generated during Operation Anaconda during 
February-March 2002 were also widely off the mark. At one time, the estimated 
numbers of Al Qaeda and Taliban in the Shah-i-Kot valley was 200, but the 
estimated numbers gradually increased to around 1000 enemy fighters at the 
launch of the operation, and for this reason, the necessary intelligence to support 
operations against a committed adversary was found deficient.249 The 
intelligence and planning for the operation was also not able to really visualize 
the resilience and fighting skills of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Their ‘defense in 
depth’ along with the motivation of the terrorists to fight till the end was also not 
assessed correctly by the intelligence or planning communities. This 
phenomenon must be kept in mind in the wider context of the global war on 
terror. 
The use of technically superior intelligence gathering apparatus like the 
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to undertake surveillance as well as 
strike targeting missions has been well demonstrated, but the importance of 
human intelligence in the layers of people amongst whom terrorists hide in 
situations like this cannot be over-emphasized.250 The Jigsaw Puzzle Paradigm, 
as introduced by David Sloggett, also has human intelligence as an enabling 
component.251 Initiatives like the setting up of a Joint Intelligence Operations 
Center by the ISAF with the integration of local and regional component players 
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is timely  to  bring about a collaborative effort in intelligence collection and direct 
actions against the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan.252 
 
3. Electronic Warfare  
Neil Munro describes EW as that form of warfare which is intended to shut 
the ears, stop the voice, close the eyes and freeze the nervous system of enemy 
soldiers. Deaf, dumb, blind, and paralyzed soldiers do not live long in battle253. 
EW has been seen as a force multiplier in conventional war fighting wherein a 
greater emphasis is placed on airborne EW assets that accompany strike aircraft 
missions by carrying out the suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) 
operations. The fact that the United States and its allies have not been 
appropriately tested against a formidable adversary for a long time has led to a 
shifting of priorities away from the EW aspect in times of conflict.254  The case in 
OEF was similar in that there was hardly any worthwhile air defense 
infrastructure of the Taliban that could be targeted through these assets. SEAD 
missions, although important for achieving air superiority, were not necessary 
during OEF. The EW aspect in OEF was highlighted more in ground operations 
and the resource crunch in ground-based EW assets was evident.255 In the initial 
phase of OEF, EW operations were conducted against the limited Taliban air 
defense assets as well as a depleted command and control infrastructure by 
using the EC-130H Compass Call aircraft. These aircraft conducted barrage 
jamming of Afghan command and control frequencies and EA-6B Prowlers were 
used to take out the air defense radars by accompanying the strike aircrafts.256  
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The major utilization of ground-based EW assets in Afghanistan is for anti-
IED operations and other asymmetric threats. The core aspects of EW have 
been neglected by the U.S. Army, and in an environment that has terrorists using 
such novel measures for attacking coalition forces, they warrant a re-look into all 
aspects of EW including adopting new technologies and training.257 The EW 
assets were also used during the presidential elections in October 2004 and the 
National Assembly and Provincial Council elections held in September 2005, for 
jamming communications and remotely controlled IEDs and thereby providing a 
secure environment.258  
Electronic Search measures, in terms of tactical signal intelligence 
(SIGINT) missions, is an important aspect wherein electronic signatures of 
adversary communications are acquired and contribute to overall situational 
awareness through their ability to detect, identify, locate, and track selected 
emitters259. The Prophet land-based system is being extensively used in OEF.260 
The importance of the deployment of these systems at the tactical level allows 
commanders to monitor the communications between the insurgents; the only  
problem foreseen is the availability of an adequate number of linguists for the 
Dari and Pashto languages, without which, time may be lost due to analysis by 
out of area experts. There will always be a debate on whether to keep the 
insurgent emitter active to obtain continuous flow of SIGINT or to target it 
electronically or through physical means to undertake its destruction; this 
decision may be taken by the commander in the field. A grid-type deployment of 
these assets in the entire battlefield, with communication links to operational                                             
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centers as well as to supporting commanders, may provide the timely intelligence 
to bring about fire power or the employment of dedicated small teams on 
opportunistic targets that come up in a counter-insurgency scenario. 
 
4. Psychological Operations 
The coordination of the PSYOP effort as part of the OEF began with the 
establishment of the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) located 
at the U.S. CENTCOM under the theatre commander’s operational control.261 
The initial emphasis was on the production of anti-Taliban and anti-Al Qaeda 
material that would persuade the Afghan people to reject their legitimacy. In due 
course, a PSYOPS plan was formulated with three important objectives. The first 
was targeted at the Taliban and Al Qaeda and amplified the capability of the 
coalition forces and the futility of a continued struggle, given that the leadership 
of the Taliban and Al Qaeda deserted their cadres and went into hiding. The 
second was targeted at the Afghan populace to provide assistance to overthrow 
the Taliban regimes and information that would lead to the capture of the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda leaders. The third was also targeted at the Afghan populace and 
gave out information regarding the impending humanitarian effort. Specific 
themes were formulated after due diligence and guidance from experts in the 
field in the continental United States, and in the later part, through the academic 
faculty at the University of Kabul. 
In spite of the JPOTF being under the theatre commander’s operational 
control, there was a ‘long’ chain of approval processes for executing PSYOPS 
tasks that involved the military officials in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the Office of Secretary of Defense. The entire PSYOPS plan required policy-
level approval from the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
(USD-P). Once the plan was approved―each product prototype had to be 
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approved by commander CENTCOM―then the specific product was again sent 
to ASD-SO/LIC for policy review and approval of the product for dissemination. 
This process appears to be too bureaucratic, cumbersome, and would surely 
imply associated delays in dissemination. The fast changing nature of the 
information environment would imply that from the time the product was 
conceived and finally approved for dissemination, it is highly likely that it could 
lose its informational impact. According to Rothstein, the overall approach to 
PSYOPS lacked cohesiveness and did not consider the changing nature of the 
information environment.262 The other version could be that there are some 
themes that would have a universal appeal and an infinite time-line, hence, for 
those to be planned and executed from the JPOTF at Tampa, Florida makes 
sense. But more operational and tactical PSYOPS programs need to have a 
bottom-up approach from conceptualization to dissemination. 
The PSYOPS resources included the EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft for 
broadcasting audio and video messages, aircrafts for dropping leaflets and other 
material, static printing presses as part of the Psychological Operations Groups, 
a Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC), and a Modular Print System 
(MPS). At the organizational level there was the JPOTF, POGs, Psychological 
Operations Battalions (POBs), Product Development Detachments (PDDs), 
Tactical PSYOP Detachments, and Special Operations Media Systems― 
Broadcast (SOMS-B) Teams. In the present composition of the ISAF along with 
the United States PSYOPS troops, there are the troops from the United 
Kingdom’s 15 (UK) POG for assisting the Afghan government in security and 
reconstruction activities and for training the personnel of the Afghan security 
forces.263 
From Libicki’s perspective, the four categories of PSYWAR―against the 
national will, against the opposing commanders, against the troops and cultural 
conflict―has an interesting connotation with regards to the PSYOPS during 
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OEF. Firstly, PSYWAR against the national will does not exist in this scenario 
where the Taliban regime was in many ways not considered a popular choice 
amongst the people of Afghanistan, and so there was no major support to the 
regime from the people. The resentment of the Taliban by the general populace 
meant that the PSYOPS aimed at the national will should have been more 
“cohesive” rather than “divisive” in context. Secondly, enemy commanders such 
as Mullah Omar, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and others are too 
radicalized for PSYOPS to have any worthwhile effect.  Thirdly, the PSYOPS on 
troops did have its specific situation-based impact, but the troops also need to be 
categorized into highly radicalized and moderately radicalized. This will enable 
better planning and effort utilization. Fourthly, the cultural conflict deals with the 
people of Afghanistan and this is by far the most important ingredient of the 
PSYOPS spectrum there. The ability of the people of Afghanistan to accept such 
a regime change, brought about again through external intervention, acceptance 
of the democratically elected government, and the belief that the people are 
central to the democratic process are values that need to be targeted over the 
long term and that can only be achieved through progressive and visible 
developments on the ground. There is therefore a need to pursue a strategy of 
information isolation with regard the national will, leaders, and troops, and focus 
more on the people of Afghanistan.  
Information isolation would imply refraining from targeting the terrorist 
leaders and troops through redundant PSYOPS efforts and thereby curbing the 
assistance that we provide to their publicity and propaganda campaigns. At the 
strategic level, this could involve a complete shift in focus from rhetorical 
speeches by world leaders against the terrorist leadership to addressing the 
general populace in Afghanistan, highlighting the efforts of the coalition forces, 
and encouragement of their adopted path of democracy. The “reactive 
syndrome” of acknowledging the messages of terrorist leadership needs to be 
curbed. This could be achieved by modulating the world media from highlighting 
such messages from terrorist leadership to more positive images and 
commentaries that emphasize nation building, coalition cooperation, and overall 
127 
world support. This approach needs to factor in the ‘independence of media’ and 
its associated repercussions that may be seen as unnecessary modulation or as 
interference in media activities. Information Isolation could also take the form of 
regulated and specifically created Information Deficiency that would assist in 
curbing the value of propaganda achieved through terrorist activities and 
propagated using the world media. 
 
5. Hacker Warfare, Cyber Warfare and Economic Information 
Warfare  
These three elements of information warfare, as highlighted by Libicki, 
hardly have any applicability in the context of OEF, and may be considered 
against a nation state adversary with an adequate index of development. Hacker 
warfare relates to attacks directed toward military computer systems, which are 
non-existent in the context of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. What could be 
undertaken is some Form of information terrorism and semantic attacks as part 
of hacker warfare, wherein isolated computer systems and laptops, being used 
by terrorists on the Internet may be identified, and surgical information gathering 
attacks, as well as corruption of data, could be undertaken. Another form of 
exploitation is financial transactions undertaken by the terrorists through the use 
of the Internet wherein the data flow could be corrupted or modified, although 
with transaction systems like Hawala, the success of such operations become 
debatable. Libicki’s Mosaic of Forms does not apply, in any of its categories to 
the context of OEF, and also does not include many other important facets of the 
information environment. For this reason, a broader approach of information 
operations needs to be considered in the context of the adversaries being 
terrorist organizations, and in particular, for the form of insurgency that is visible 
in Afghanistan.  
 
6. Civil Military Operations and Nation Building 
CMO is an important element of information operations that provides an 
avenue that affects the overall information environment. The necessity of 
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directing humanitarian assistance toward the people of Afghanistan was 
acknowledged before the launch of OEF when President Bush, during his 
address to the State Department employees on October 4, 2001, stated that  
….America will contribute an additional $320 million in humanitarian 
assistance for Afghans for more food, more medicine, to help the 
innocent people of Afghanistan deal with the coming winter.  This is 
our way of saying that while we firmly and strongly oppose the 
Taliban regime, we are friends of the Afghan people.264  
Such an announcement would clearly involve the active coordination of 
military forces as part of OEF, with various civilian infrastructures that existed on 
the ground, or which were planned for with the progression of OEF. The 
utilization of such operations was clearly understood by the United States and its 
allies during the preparatory stage of OEF, but the visualization of the 
magnanimity of the task was not foreseen, nor was the quantum of involvement 
of coalition forces in this activity. This is further validated when the leading 
elements of the of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB), after the initial 
reconnaissance in Pakistan in the second week of October 2001, recommended 
that there was no need to establish a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) for 
coordination of humanitarian assistance into Afghanistan, and in hindsight, 
requested a Civil Affairs Team that reached Pakistan by the end of October 
2001.265 The importance of Civil Affairs in the context of the global war on terror 
is also indicated by the fact that the United States has activated five reserve 
CABs and one Civil Affairs Brigade since 9/11.266  
Elements of 96th CAB were at the forefront for establishing a positive 
climate among the population of Afghanistan and a Coalition Humanitarian 
Liaison Cell (CHLC) was established in Mazar-e-Sharif on November 15, 2001. 
Shortly thereafter, a Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force 
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(CJCMOTF) was created to coordinate and manage the entire operation that 
sent a CAT team to Bagram to establish a CHLC. CMOC-North and CMOC-
South were also created at Karshi Karnabad, Uzbekistan, and Kabul 
respectively.267 The civil affairs personnel were involved in wide and varied 
tasks, from coordinating the relief effort between United Nations aid agencies, 
Non Government Organizations (NGOs), private charities, management and 
funding of civilian infrastructure projects, establishment of medical facilities, 
schools, and emergency civilian casualty evacuations, etc. The contribution of 
such activities toward moderating a hostile information environment is immense. 
After the initial objectives of OEF were met, the OEF entered the phase of 
stability operations. Important fallout of this phase was the announcement of the 
formation of Joint Regional Teams (JRTs), and the first public briefing was given 
at the U.S. embassy in Kabul on November 21, 2002.268 The concept of JRTs 
was introduced as consisting of mobile CATs, CMOCs, and a security force, with 
the role of coordinating the reconstruction process, identification of reconstruction 
projects, conducting village assessments, and liaising with regional commanders. 
The teams were proposed to be created in 10 Afghan cities. In due course, the 
JRTs were renamed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) with an 
assigned role to work with the central Afghan government and regional 
authorities, and with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) to assist in securing the conditions for economic, civic, and other 
programs. The teams are led by coalition forces and have a multi-national and 
inter-agency composition with personnel from the military, engineers, medical, 
State department, and USAID representatives working in close coordination with 
the Afghan government, UNAMA, NGOs, and other international agencies.269 
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The initial execution plan for the establishment of JRTs / PRTs was quite vague 
and there have been many apprehensions about the success of such an 
endeavor.270 With the subsequent formation of ISAF and its expanding role in 
Afghanistan, the PRTs have moved under the command of the ISAF and have 
taken a multi-national and multi-agency shape.271 Notwithstanding problems in 
the evolution of PRTs to what they are today, the idea does make sense, and 
with due emphasis and adequate priority could really shape the information 
environment in Afghanistan in a positive manner. A RAND Corporation study on 
the aid provided to Afghanistan mentions that “In this war unlike any other the 
United States has been engaged in, the potential for failure flows not only from 
poorly executed military plans, but also from an inability to see assistance as a 
part of the continuum from combat to post-conflict development and 
reconstruction.”272 Further expanding the role, charter, and composition of PRTs 
to include the macro task of nation-building is bound to provide the necessary 
robustness to this program and assist in winning the hearts and minds of the 
people of Afghanistan ― but surely it will test the patience as well as the 
resilience of the ISAF. 
 
B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE 
TALIBAN 
Afghanistan has been an incubator of terrorism for a long time now. The 
Mujahideen-led Jihad against the Soviet occupation was the time when religious 
Islamic fundamentalism took strong roots, and their final withdrawal from 
Afghanistan became the motivation and a positive example for other like-minded 
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terrorist organizations to emulate. It also gave a number of nation states the 
confidence to aggressively adopt the idea of covert sponsorship to a band of 
religious fanatics and utilize them as an additional force in its arsenal.273 The 
initial reaction to the success of the Taliban in Afghanistan was quite different 
from what it was in 2001; people of Afghanistan were enthusiastic about the 
emergence of the Taliban, as they assumed that it would be possible to get rid of 
the ‘warlordism,’ that the strict Sharia law would assist in rooting out corruption, 
and that finally there would be some sort of stability.274  
The situation prior to 9/11 was a little different; the Taliban was not able to 
live up to the aspirations of the people of Afghanistan, the country was as 
unstable as in the past, atrocities of the Taliban were more brutal, internationally 
the Taliban regime was isolated, Osama bin Laden was given shelter by the 
regime, and religious extremism increased in a big way. As an aftermath to 9/11, 
the Taliban regime knew of the retaliation that was forthcoming and had a 
consistent view of not handing Osama bin Laden to the United States without any 
proof.275 The overall information environment was negative from the perspective 
of Taliban and Al Qaeda; there was overwhelming support for the United States’ 
retaliation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime, including a military action in 
Afghanistan both domestically276 as well as internationally.  But in a span of six 
years there appears to be a turn around in the information environment, not 
because of Taliban and Al Qaeda emergence, but more due to the inability of the 
coalition forces in Afghanistan to successfully execute their strategies on the 
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ground. Nevertheless, Taliban and Al Qaeda have been able to consolidate their 
positions and have pushed Afghanistan into an uncertain future once again.  
 
1. Organizational Adaptation by the Taliban 
The initial resistance offered by the Taliban and Al Qaeda to the air 
campaign of the United States at the beginning of OEF was fairly successful. The 
Taliban had adopted some form of defensive positions that they could initially 
hold mainly due to the inability of the air strikes to successfully hit their positions 
or support the offensive of the anti-Taliban forces. In due course, with mapping of 
the Taliban frontline positions by the special operations teams, the air campaign 
began to cause heavy damage to these positions and gradually the rank and file 
of the Taliban began to disintegrate. In this phase the Taliban unwisely allowed 
the United States to apply an asymmetric advantage against its inferior army.277 
The organizational cohesiveness of the Taliban and Al Qaeda was completely 
fragmented by the end of December 2001, and thereafter a classical withdrawal 
strategy was executed. The initial emphasis of the Taliban to hold defensive 
positions along frontlines, holding cities and lines of supply was abandoned very 
quickly since this could have led to its total annihilation. The visible rout of the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters, their abandonment of major Afghan cities, and 
their melting away into Pakistan was due to the realization that the Taliban 
needed to adopt a more unconventional approach against an overwhelmingly 
superior force. This organizational adaptation is seen as the abandonment of a 
strategy that could have led to their destruction and instead allowed them to 
regroup and prepare themselves for the strategy of guerrilla warfare. 
From the point of view of moderating the information environment, too, the 
withdrawal strategy of the Taliban and Al Qaeda is worth pondering. In order to 
moderate, and to a large effect nullify, the informational advantage that the 
United States possessed immediately after 9/11 to undertake operations against 
Al Qaeda and the Taliban, there was a need to undertake an informational 
withdrawal, which would allow the adversary to gain an advantage in the physical                                             
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domain, but create an informational vacuum that, in due course, would be filled 
by adverse information content regarding the United States and its allies. This 
was mainly due to the correct assessment of Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership 
that firstly, the anti-Taliban forces are equally fragmented and diverse, and 
secondly, that such an opportunistic coalition between various anti-Taliban 
warlords and United States forces would surely cause divisive turbulence in 
Afghanistan. On the face of it, the sudden withdrawal of the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda appeared as a crushing defeat, but it enabled them to settle down for the 
long haul. The Frontline PBS video titled the “The Return of the Taliban,” which 
aired on October 3, 2006, gives a pointed reference to the manner in which the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda have established themselves in the semi-autonomous 
tribal lands of Bajaur, Momand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, and North and South 
Waziristan in Pakistan.278 The regrouping and resurgence that is visible today is 
amply clear from the increasing number of terrorist incidents in Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 7. Terrorist Incidents in Afghanistan: 2001-May 2007279 
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In spite of the official anti-Taliban posture adopted by Pakistan, most of 
the withdrawing members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda established themselves in 
the western part of Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pakistan 
provided an unassailable safe haven for the Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership, 
training, supplies, funding, and recruitment. The failure to deny a safe haven in 
Pakistan has led to the inability of the United States and its allies to translate 
their tactical victories in Afghanistan into strategic control.280 
The Taliban’s Quetta Shura (council) located in Quetta, Pakistan, the main 
center of Taliban strategic command and control in South Afghanistan, is more 
robust now. Another Shura directing the Taliban operations in East Afghanistan 
is based in the Pakistani tribal regions of North and South Waziristan.281 The 
command and control setup necessary to prosecute an insurgency through the 
tactics of guerrilla warfare appears to be in place. Along with the re-
establishment of the command and control structure, the number of Taliban units 
and the force strength within has also seen an increase and the initial nuisance 
tactics of using small groups of fighters is now giving way to attacks involving 
hundreds of fighters.282 Taliban forces are coming around full-circle, from 
number-heavy defensive positions, to small, dispersed attacking groups, to the 
present, which involve large groups of fighters that are equally adaptive. The only 
difference from 2001 to 2007 is that the Taliban now appears to be on the 
offensive and has grasped the initiative. 
 
2. Taliban Information Strategy and Tactics 
The Taliban has always had a symbiotic relationship with Al Qaeda and 
this relationship has defined the way it evolved its strategy and tactics after 9/11. 
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The influence of Al Qaeda on the Taliban was much greater than the other way 
around and, as Daniel Byman highlights the point; “Such a relationship is 
perhaps unique in the annals of terrorism, where almost invariably states are far 
more powerful than terrorists groups.”283 This unique relationship laid the 
foundation toward adopting, in a somewhat fragmented manner, the information 
strategy and tactics of Al Qaeda against the United States-led forces after 9/11. 
The embrace of a simple Islamic way of life by the Taliban during its initial 
evolving years, and the inward focus toward rebuilding and influencing its own 
society, gave way to a much broader cause that can clearly be attributed to the 
influence of Al Qaeda. But the focus on the Afghan populace by the Taliban still 
remains. 
The Taliban lacks the sophistication of Al Qaeda in exploiting the 
information environment through the use of media and other propaganda outlets, 
but are now seen as actively trying to utilize it for influencing the people of 
Afghanistan. Prior to 9/11, the Taliban ran the Voice of Sharia radio station from 
Kabul that broadcast religious discourses and official decrees. The radio station 
was one of the first to be targeted by the United States-led coalition forces.284 
The Taliban’s aversion to television as un-Islamic, the banning of video tapes, 
and the dislike of having a spokesman in front of a camera talking to media, 
hindered the acceptability of media as a propaganda tool. Since the beginning of 
2003, there appears to a concerted effort by the Taliban toward the 
establishment of a propaganda infrastructure emanating out of Pakistan. In 
February 2003, the Peshawar-based Afghan Islamic Press cited a fatwa signed 
by “Amir al-Mo’menin, the Servant of Islam, Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahed” 
addressed to the people of Afghanistan that stipulated that it was every Muslim’s 
duty to wage a Jihad, and it also warned that anyone helping the United States-
led coalition forces deserved death. From thereon, there has been a rise in the 
so called ‘official spokesman for the Taliban’ and the list includes names like 
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Mohammad Mokhtar Mojahed, Hamed Agha, Mullah Abdul Samad, Mufti 
Latifulllah Hakimi, Mullah Dadullah, and many others.285 The channel adopted by 
these spokesmen to convey their messages was the use of telephonic 
conversations and faxed statements to prominent international media outlets. 
Many of the so called spokesmen have been arrested in Pakistan, or killed, and 
that has actually decreased information on the flow of activities, from the Taliban 
perspective, in the public domain.286 Prominent amongst the spokesmen was 
Mullah Dadullah who emerged as an important leader as the Taliban re-emerged 
as a fighting force in 2005. He began to give interviews to selected journalists, 
including television interviews, and released propaganda videos vowing to send 
waves of suicide bombers and fighters into Afghanistan to overthrow the 
government. Mullah Dadullah was eventually killed in May 2007 and this was 
seen as a substantial blow to the Taliban re-emergence as well as to its 
propaganda machinery.287 The Taliban’s Voice of Sharia radio station is once 
again active, though intermittently, and could be heard in parts of four south-
eastern provinces: Paktika, Paktia, Khost, and Ghazni.288 The use of a mobile 
transmitter, to avoid being targeted by the coalition forces, appears to be an 
effective tactic and its increase in activity in the Southern and South-Eastern 
parts of Afghanistan may be equated to the re-emergence of the Taliban in that 
region. 
The Taliban focused its propaganda activities on two fronts: the first, 
aimed at discrediting the coalition forces, and the second, a more dominant 
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campaign against the people of Afghanistan. These activities were largely 
undertaken through the covert distribution of pamphlets in various cities of 
Afghanistan, as well as circulated amongst the refugees in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.289 The pamphlets or notes are known as “night letters,” as they are 
posted under the cover of darkness and are mainly directed against the people of 
Afghanistan supporting either the coalition forces or the government of 
Afghanistan in some way. The tactic is aimed at intimidating the populace and 
sowing the seeds of fear and doubt, with the ultimate goal of re-imposing the 
Taliban’s primeval control over parts of the country.290 Such intimidating notes, 
coupled with surgical attacks on Afghan people who support the government and 
coalition forces has led to an increase in disillusionment in the minds of the 
people of Afghanistan about their future under the Karzai government. The 
psychological impact of such a campaign could lead to the erosion of support for 
the established government in Afghanistan and provide a back door for the entry 
of the Taliban. This cost-effective tactic, that is till now limited to the areas in and 
around Kandahar, may be replicated in other parts of Afghanistan and is required 
to be effectively combated by an increase in the security infrastructure in 
Afghanistan.  
The present director of the CIA, during a statement to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, acknowledges the importance of security when he says, 
“The capacity of the government needs to be strengthened to deliver basic 
services to the population—especially security.”291 The exploitation of the 
inadequate security situation in the regions around Kandahar has led the Taliban 
to establish some kind of pseudo-government and to establish Taliban-style 
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Islamic courts that allow people to come to the Taliban to settle their disputes 
and to patrol the insecure society.292 This is yet another step that the Taliban has 
adopted toward establishing its authority. The Taliban’s accurate assessment of 
directing its propaganda effort toward targeting the populace and not attempting 
to disperse its efforts and resources in targeting the coalition forces as an initial 
part of its resurgence is noteworthy. 
The importance of modulating the information environment by actions in 
the physical domain has been quite well understood by the resurgent Taliban. 
There has been an increase in the number of kidnappings of foreign nationals in 
Afghanistan as well as attacks on Afghani people supporting the government and 
coalition forces. The latest example is that of the kidnapped Italian journalist 
Daniele Mastrogiacomo in March 2007 that raised a big turmoil on the Italian 
political scene and threatened the withdrawal of 1,950 Italian troops from the 
NATO coalition in Afghanistan. President Karzai brokered the release of the 
Italian journalist by trading five Taliban prisoners, but refused to negotiate for his 
Afghan translator, which eventually led to his beheading. Such an event has led 
to an increase in the number of kidnappings of foreign nationals in order to obtain 
similar concessions and has also led to ‘driving a wedge between Karzai and the 
Afghan public.’293 Mullah Dadullah, in an interview with an Al Jazeera 
correspondent in April 2007 remarked, “Karzai, you consider yourself a president 
elected by the Afghan people. Why do not you take care of the Afghan people, 
instead of taking care of the foreign hostage, and swap him with five Afghans? 
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You do not care about the Afghan people.”294 The targeting of an Italian journalist 
is quite noteworthy due to the fact that the Italian government, led by Prime 
Minister Romano Prodi, was in the midst of a vote in its Senate on the funding of 
the Italian military contingent in Afghanistan and that Romano Prodi had in 
February 2007 resigned on the Afghanistan issue before being reinstated.295 The 
understanding of such a complex relationship involving a weak political situation 
in a country that is part of the coalition forces, and the assessment of its impact 
both in that country and in Afghanistan by the Taliban, depicts the increasing 
strategic influence of Al Qaeda in its tactics and activities. The use of such tactics 
by the Taliban is bound to increase in order to extract similar responses as well 
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Figure 9. IED Attacks on Coalition Forces in Afghanistan: 
 2001–June 2007.297 
 
The activity in the physical domain has also undergone a change for the 
Taliban. There has been a considerable increase in the number of suicide and 
IED attacks in Afghanistan. These two tactics in particular have been adopted 
from Al Qaeda and support the ‘diffusion theory’ as elucidated in Chapter II. The 
information flow on tactics from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and from Iraq to 
Afghanistan is quite evident. In the larger context of terrorism worldwide, suicide 
attack has become a common tactic to inflict non-combatant causalities and for 
causing a big media event, while an IED attack is mainly directed toward inflicting 
combatant casualties in regions that have terrorists and government/coalition 
forces fighting for supremacy and control. The impact of suicide attacks that 
inflict greater numbers of civilian casualties may lead to a more hostile 
information environment toward the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. There 
fore, the suicide attacks taking place in Afghanistan are mainly directed toward 
‘hard targets’; this is quite different from the objectives of suicide attacks in 
Iraq.298   
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3. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
Al Qaeda may never again have the luxury of establishing the kind of 
infrastructure that it did in Afghanistan prior to 9/11, but at present it is seen more 
as a base-less organization and an informational warrior that has established 
itself as the vanguard of global Islamist terrorist networks and that has a 
substantial ideological influence on its numerous affiliates worldwide. There is an 
informational vacuum with regard to Osama bin Laden, and Ayman Zawahiri is 
appearing to be more in control and more visible. The Al Qaeda network is more 
dispersed and at present depends more on independent actions undertaken by 
its followers all around the world to keep it in the limelight. The remnant of Al 
Qaeda has found a safe haven in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area and this 
has allowed Al Qaeda to re-group both physically and psychologically, and it now 
has the necessary space needed to meet, train, expand its networks, and 
prepare for new attacks.299  
In May 2007, Al Qaeda named an Egyptian, Mustafa Ahmed Muhammad 
Uthman Abu al-Yazid, as the group's leader for activities in Afghanistan. Yazid 
has been a close aide of Osama bin Laden and served as his accountant during 
his exile in Sudan. The appointment of a man who has been an accountant to be 
a military leader of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan would imply that Al Qaeda may be 
playing a supporting role to the resurgent Taliban and assisting in  organizing the 
needed finances for the Taliban.300 Al Qaeda’s support for the Taliban is stronger 
than earlier and it has been able to persuade Taliban fighters to adopt its tactics, 
especially the beheadings and suicide attacks. Al Qaeda is likely to play a 
supportive role to the Taliban now that the ideological differences that existed 
between the two seem to have merged into the present scenario. 
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C. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THE 
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 
After the initial set-backs in Afghanistan, the Taliban has slowly and surely 
regained some of its lost ground. Some of the important aspects, in the complete 
spectrum of information operations in Afghanistan, along with the actions that 
define the information environment are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
 
1. Summary of Information Operations – Coalition Forces vs 
Taliban-Al Qaeda 
The coalition forces command and control structure became more 
hierarchical and cumbersome after the initial victory, the progression from loose 
control to tight control.  The initial offensive mode of operation turned more and 
more defensive and reactive, and there was an increase in ‘command at a 
distance syndrome.’ There were chinks that became visible in the NATO 
coalition, and there was no effort to integrate non-NATO nations not adequately 
integrated into the nation building effort. In the case of the Taliban-Al Qaeda 
combine, their forces became increasingly more networked and distributed and 
adopted tactics of guerrilla warfare after the initial set backs. The Taliban is 
dependent on radical, motivated and charismatic leaders in the field to lead the 
foot-soldiers, and hence the elimination of their leadership is bound to have a 
negative impact. The Taliban has evolved an organizationally stable system with 
most of the top leadership safely planning and directing missions from Pakistan. 
The coalition force was successful in applying intelligence obtained 
through their technological assets (like UAVs) applied effectively for targeting and 
shortening the decision cycle. The two negative points about the coalition 
intelligence process is the lack of effective human intelligence and the 
assessment regarding Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists is often under-stated. The 
Taliban-Al Qaeda intelligence is based more on humans and supporters within 
the population, and their use of Internet for surveillance, intelligence gathering 
and communication from safe havens in Pakistan cannot be ruled out. 
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EW in its classical form was never used by the coalition forces since there 
were no worthwhile targets and hence the airborne EW (SEAD) assets were not 
tested. The ground based EW systems are at the forefront for – identifying / 
locating Taliban communication transmitters using electronic support measures, 
or used in counter-IED role. The SIGINT is an important aspect in present day 
scenario. The Taliban-Al Qaeda forces had no EW assets but used innovative 
electronic emitters as triggers for remote controlled IEDs to target coalition 
military forces. 
Initially, the coalition forces PSYOP plan appeared uncoordinated, 
cumbersome and with a time-consuming approval process. Over a period of 
time, however, the emphasis on ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Afghan 
population has been well understood. There appeared to be a resource crunch in 
the field in terms of equipment and manpower, and there was too much reliance 
on out-of-area resources and out-of-area experts. The military / operational 
PSYOP needs greater coordination with strategic level effort including Public 
Affairs undertaken by channels other than military. Finally, the concepts of 
Information Isolation, Information Deficiency and Information Withdrawal are 
important ideas that need to be studied further from the perspective of coalition 
forces to effectively influence the Afghanistan battle space. On the other hand, 
the initial efforts of Taliban-Al Qaeda in PSYOP were not very successful. But 
now the PSYOP, coupled with surgical physical strikes are aimed for intimidating 
the local population and fragmentation of coalition. Taliban has succeeded in re-
establishing its Islamic courts in areas around Kandahar and creating a pseudo 
parallel state. 
Civil affairs and nation building are acknowledged as important issues but 
were neglected by the coalition forces after the initial victory, which has created 
holes in the victory. The use of PRTs is a good idea but requires greater 
emphasis and adequate priority. This is the category where the Taliban is lacking 
and needs to be exploited to win over the population as well as to undermine the 
Taliban. 
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The coalition forces were successful for launching physical attacks on the 
Taliban during the start of the operations, but over a period of time the physical 
attacks have become more reactive, and hence there is less control on their 
impact on the information environment. The increase in collateral damage also 
has an adverse impact on the information environment and needs to be 
minimized at all cost. The Taliban is able to plan specific physical attacks to 
magnify its informational objectives, with random attacks in cities to maintain a 
situation of chaos and lead to anarchy, and surgical strikes on coalition forces to 
exploit the fragile political consensus / situation in NATO member states. But 
again an increase in killing and injury to Afghan population due to the Taliban 
attacks will to their alienation from its support base. 
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Table 5.   Summary of Information Operations in Afghanistan – Coalition Forces vs 
Taliban- Al Qaeda. 
 
2. Actions Influencing the Information Environment in 
Afghanistan 
There are a number of actions at the macro level in the physical as well as 
in the informational domain that are likely to influence the overall information 
environment in Afghanistan in times to come, in either a positive manner or a 
145 
negative manner for the coalition forces. It is important that the coalition forces 
keep a focus on these aspects in developing their informational strategy and 
tactics so as to meet their objectives as well as to modulate the information 
environment that is created by such actions. 
 
Positive Actions Negative Actions 
Strengthening of coalition – increase in 
participation, greater cohesiveness, 
resilience, and commitment in the existing 
military alliance and involving non-
coalition partners to assist in nation 
building especially Russia, China, Iran 
and India. 
Creation of a separate economic, political, 
and diplomatic alliance to include greater 
participation of other international players. 
 
Fragmentation of the NATO coalition and 
increase in adverse reactions worldwide 
especially in the Muslim world. 
Increase in adverse public opinion in 
NATO-allied countries equating United 
States policies in Iraq with Afghanistan. 
Assist government in Afghanistan in 
providing basic necessities – electricity, 
water, roads and agriculture to the 
population including security. 
An increase in focus toward Afghanistan 
and balancing the war-time and 
reconstruction efforts vis-à-vis Iraq. 
Greater pressure on Pakistan to 
undertake cleansing of Taliban bases, 
sanctuaries and strong-holds from its 
tribal regions as well as from the cities like 
Quetta and Peshawar. 
Success of Taliban in exploiting ethnicity 
and tribal affinity within Afghanistan as 
well as in the Western part of Pakistan 
that will enable them to exert greater 
dominance in South and South East part 
of Afghanistan. 
Increase in disruptive actions of Taliban 
affecting the Afghan society – kidnapping, 
destruction of schools and civilian 
infrastructure, impediments in relief and 
reconstruction efforts. 
Increase in collateral damage including 
injury and death of Afghani people by 
actions of coalition forces. 
 
Steps to increase greater transparency 
and moral approach of the Afghan 
government to prevent the ideas of 
corruption, lawlessness and 
dissatisfaction amongst the population.  
 
Factionalism and infighting within the 
disparate entities as part of the Afghan 
polity. 
Increase in war-lordism and self-





Increase in troop presence in Taliban 
dominated region to neutralize the 
resurgent Taliban.  
Targeting of Taliban and Al Qaeda 
leadership both in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  
Consolidation of control by Taliban in 
regions in and around Kandahar. 
Ability of Taliban to facilitate poppy 
cultivation and drug trade in Afghanistan 
especially South and South East 
Afghanistan. 
Greater cooperation and coordination 
between Taliban and Al Qaeda, especially 
the financial support to Taliban. 
 
Increase in resources for the coalition 
military setup to include – ground based 
EW (SIGINT) systems, UAVs, satellite 
tasking for surveillance and 




Interagency coordination amongst the 
coalition forces (military), respective 
coalition country’s political setup and 
especially with the United States political 
apparatus for conducting information 
operations. Also, coordination does not 





Table 6.   Actions Influencing the Information Environment in Afghanistan. 
 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
Afghanistan is yet another blunt warning that it’s time that U.S. war 
planners begin to plan for true victory, not simply defeat of enemy 
military forces. The time – if it ever existed – when military planners 
needed to plan only for war is long over. In fact, it seems fair to say 
that war plans that do not include peace plans have always been 
signs of gross military incompetence.301 
— Anthony H. Cordesman 
                                            
301 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence and 
Force Transformation, Significant Issues Series, Vol. 24, Number 4, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2002, 55. 
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The decision of the United States to launch operations in Afghanistan as 
the first step in its Global War on Terror was ‘right on the mark.’ The region of 
Afghanistan, and now Pakistan, is the epicenter of Islamist terrorism and 
acceptance of this fact, coupled with the necessary focus and commitment by the 
United States and its allies is absolutely essential. The successful prosecution of 
OEF that must culminate with a stable and secure Afghanistan, and a terror-free 
Pakistan will lead to the ultimate suppression of Islamist terrorism in other parts 
of the world.  
 
It may be unpopular that most post-conflict peace involves some 
form of prolonged occupation, peace keeping, and nation building, 
but it is a fact that military action can have lasting benefits only if 
the military (and their political leaders) are willing to pay the 
necessary price. In war, more that in any other human activity, no 
country should begin what it is not prepared to finish … The political 
leader unwilling to face this reality is at best creating a recipe for 
military futility and at worst a recipe for disaster.302 
— Anthony H. Cordesman 
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V. BATTLE IN THE INFORMATION DOMAIN IN IRAQ 
The United States-led war in Iraq, as part of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT), began on 19 March 2003 with eight specific mission objectives that  
included: ending the regime of Saddam Hussein, eliminating Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), capturing or driving out terrorists, collecting the 
intelligence of terrorist networks, collecting the intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction activity, securing Iraq’s oilfields, delivering humanitarian relief 
and ending sanctions, and helping Iraq achieve representative self-government 
to ensure its territorial integrity.303 Less than 25 days into the campaign the 
Saddam Hussein regime was toppled, the oil fields were secured, a search for 
WMD was underway and the kind of terrorists envisaged by policy makers to be 
present in Iraq were not visible. Hence, from a purely military warfare 
perspective, the mission to end the regime of Saddam Hussein and defeat his 
conventional military force were successfully achieved in a surprisingly short 
time-frame, without any worthwhile resistance or casualties.  
However, after four years, looking back at the objectives of the Iraq war 
and where the coalition forces have reached so far, we see that: no WMD have 
been discovered in Iraq; terrorists from all over the Muslim world have moved 
into Iraq to fight the Jihad against the occupation force; the impact of the 
humanitarian relief, although flowing in, is not felt sufficiently by the Iraqi people; 
scores of thousands of innocent Iraqis are dead in this war; and the so-called 
representative government is seen as always on tenterhooks. The repercussions 
on the coalition forces during this period are worth pondering. The coalition force 
that hoped to be the liberators are now seen as occupiers and with each passing 
day, the coalition is getting further fragmented and almost every member of the 
coalition is trying to figure out a face-saving exit strategy. The rating of the United 
States’ commander in chief has gone down as never before, and the prime 
                                            
303 Jim Garamone, “Rumsfeld Lists Operation Iraqi Freedom Aims, Objectives,” American 
Forces Press Service [on-line], available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29253, accessed Jul 9, 2007. 
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minister of the closest ally of the United States, in this war, has resigned from his 
post as an aftermath of the war. Further, the reputation of the United States as 
the sole superpower is being threatened, Al Qaeda and Taliban are resurgent 
and gaining strength, and there is a greater sense of antipathy in the Muslim 
world toward the United States due to its policies in Iraq.  
From a purely military perspective, and keeping in view the achievements 
of the first month of the Iraq war, the plan to invade and topple the regime of 
Saddam Hussein was incredible. In his testimony to Congress on July 9, 2003, 
Donald Rumsfeld, the former Secretary of Defense stated, 
The plan they [United States military planners] developed for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was even more innovative and 
transformational [than OEF] – employing an unprecedented 
combination of speed, precision, surprise, and flexibility…. The Iraqi 
regime very likely expected the war to begin, as did the 1991 Gulf 
War, with a sustained bombing campaign. Instead, General Franks 
started the ground attack before the air campaign—sending a large 
force of Special Operators into Western Iraq, followed by thousands 
of coalition forces streaming across the Kuwaiti border. Instead of a 
long march through the South, with pitched battles for each city 
along the way, they drove through to reach the gates of Baghdad in 
a matter of weeks—liberating the Iraqi capital and toppling the 
regime in less than a month.304 
 
Although the initial battle was short and swift, the coalition forces were not 
able to anticipate the melting away mystery of the Iraqi military and a complete 
collapse of government-run institutions.305 This sudden collapse of the ‘rule of 
                                            
304 Donald Rumsfeld, testimony to Senate Armed Forces Committee, Jul 9, 2003 [on-line], 
available from http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/July/Rumsfeld.pdf, accessed Jul 
9, 2007. Also see the statement of General Tommy Franks, former commander of U.S. 
CENTCOM, to the Senate Armed Forces Committee on Jul 9, 2003, wherein he states that – 
“Our forces were able to achieve their operational objectives by integrating ground maneuver, 
special operations, precision lethal fires and non-lethal effects. We saw for the first time 
integration of forces rather than deconfliction of forces. This integration enabled conventional (air, 
ground, and sea) forces to leverage SOF capabilities to deal effectively with asymmetric threats 
and enable precision targeting simultaneously in the same battle space.” 
305 John Keegan, The Iraq War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 1-7. The author calls the 
war “A Mysterious War” since there was a mysterious approach to defensive operations by the 
Iraqi military (melting away mystery), then there was the mystery of the missing government and 
the Iraqi leaders in Baghdad, there was the mystery of the WMD that seemed to have 
disappeared from Iraq without a trace, and finally the author writes about the mystery in the 
indifferent attitude of the Iraqi people. 
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law,’ whatever form it was in, led to mass looting and a complete lawlessness in 
the country and especially in Baghdad. This situation was further compounded by 
the lack of any attempt by the coalition forces to stop such events and accept a 
responsibility to run the nation that they invaded. 
The following quotes have been taken from the book Squandered Victory 
by Larry Diamond, and very vividly depict the impact of the large-scale looting in 
Baghdad.306  
nothing else…So what else do you want us to think except that you 
want our oil? 
— Shiite Cleric in Iraq  
(After seeing that all the public institutions in 
Baghdad were gutted except for the one 
secular structure that the Americans defended 
— the oil ministry.) 
 I simply cannot understand how your soldiers could have stood 
and watched. Maybe they are too weak, too. Or maybe they are 
wicked. 
— Islamic cleric to a journalist in Baghdad 
Stuff happens…Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make 
mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. 
— Donald Rumsfeld, Former Secretary of Defense 
In retrospect, although the military operations proceeded too fast,307 it was 
the fact that the subsequent follow-up support of administrative echelons that 
included the political and diplomatic community, aid workers, nation-builders, 
                                            
306 Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to 
Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2005), 282. The comments of the former 
defense secretary are bewildering – there goes the information campaign at the strategic level. 
From a personal viewpoint the images of looting on the television were more of a spectacle that 
appeared to be authorized by the coalition forces for the rest of the world to see. 
307 As an afterthought the situation in Iraq would have been much different at present if the 
conventional battle was joined by Saddam Hussein’s military forces, as also in this case the 
timeline of conquering Iraq and the advance to Baghdad would have been more deliberate, and 
consciously delayed. Will this approach impact similar future action undertaken by United States 
or other militaries in similar situation? — is a point worth pondering over. Also, in the immediate 
stabilization phase, too, the United States wanted to achieve too many things too fast in 
Baghdad; in contrast the British troops in Basra took the pragmatic view and concentrated on 
establishing the law and order, and essential services in Basra. See, John Keegan, The Iraq War, 
209. 
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etc., were totally missing was and this were the very reason that fuelled the 
insurgency.308 Saddam Hussein anticipated that there was no likelihood of his 
military force standing-up against the coalition military might, and never wanted 
to fight a conventional battle with a greatly superior force. Saddam Hussein 
correctly assessed that some form of unregulated, uncontrolled, and 
uncoordinated guerrilla warfare would be his best bet against the coalition forces. 
This is highlighted by the fact that there was no worthwhile resistance by the Iraqi 
military force against the coalition invasion, no bridges were blown or even 
demolitions prepared, and the people went along in their daily routine with firing 
and bombing going on around them.  
Prior to the war, Saddam did carry out large-scale arming of Baathists and 
caches of ammunition and weapons were created both in cities and in the 
countryside.  He also released large numbers of criminals from prison and 
Fedayeen Saddam and Baathist militias were stationed in urban areas.309 The 
guerrilla war and the insurgency appear to have been well planned, though not 
under central control. The initial lawlessness in Iraq, after fall of the Saddam 
regime, helped shape and promote the ongoing insurgency in Iraq. The people of 
Iraq, who looked forward to getting rid of Saddam Hussein and his regime, 
became disillusioned in no time by the inability of the coalition forces to provide 
security, a basic civic infrastructure in the cities, and their early return to a normal 
way of life. The information environment changed from bad to worse. In this 
chapter, the idea is not to analyze the conventional battles but to concentrate 
purely on the battles in the information domain that took place or are now going 
on against the asymmetric threat from terrorists and insurgents in Iraq. 
                                            
308 Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 29; 103-121, 2006. The author mentions that the coalition forces lost an opportunity by 
failing to plan for a post-conflict stability operations, and anticipate the initial widespread civil 
disorder and looting. These factors fuelled the current insurgency situation in the country. The 
author also mentions about two studies undertaken by the RAND Corporation about past 
insurgencies that came out with similar conclusions that – “Late recognition of an insurgency, is 
costly, insofar as the insurgents have the opportunity to gain foothold before facing any organized 
opposition.” 
309 Stephen T. Hosmer, Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion was so Weak 
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 131-140. 
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A. INFORMATION CAMPAIGN OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS 
ALLIES IN IRAQ 
The initial part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was seen as a form of 
conventional campaign that has never been seen before with force and 
technology coordinated with precise maneuvers and timing. The information 
operations campaign in this phase of the operation were limited to only 
intelligence operations, electronic warfare (EW), and psychological operations 
(PSYOP), and although the entire spectrum of information operations was 
deliberated during the planning and execution of military operations, it failed to 
produce any dramatic results.310  
The United States-led coalition forces surely won this part of the campaign 
and exploited their conventional superiority to the fullest. But then the fall of 
Baghdad, the pulling down of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square in 
central Baghdad on April 9, 2003, and the declaration that “Major combat 
operations have ended in Iraq” by the president of the United States311 did not 
end the war for the coalition forces. It actually got worse, and hence the 
aftermath of this conventional blitzkrieg and the magnanimity of the ‘post-conflict 
conflict’312 was neither comprehended nor anticipated. The lack of the United 
States military’s ability to grasp the intricacies of stability operations and peace-
keeping stems from the fact that the United States’ military leaders and planners 
focused heavily on winning conventional wars against an almost equal enemy, 
                                            
310 Gregory Fontenot and et al., On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 419. The authors 
are of the view that  it was difficult to assess success in the information operations campaign in 
the initial phase, and only electronic warfare and intelligence operations could actually produce 
visible positive results and as stated by them – ‘…it is hard to make the case that US efforts in the 
broad category of IO produced any dramatic results’. 
311 George W. Bush, Jr., President of the United States of America, “President Bush 
Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,” May 1, 2003 [on-line], available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html, accessed Jul 9, 2007. 
312 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Lessons Learned (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2003), 233. 
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and not so much on either the rise of irregular warfare in the form of insurgency 
and terror, nor on peace-keeping and nation-building.313  
 
1. The Initial Loss in the Strategic Information Campaign 
The three major points that President Bush emphasized during his speech 
on October 7, 2002, prior to the launch of the operations in Iraq were: the 
Saddam Hussein regime’s threat to the American people, its support of Al Qaeda 
terrorists, and its continuing efforts toward acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction.314 These three issues and their justification have been debated by 
leaders, policy makers, academicians, journalists, and people all over the world. 
The information environment, generated by these principles for undertaking the 
second front in the GWOT, never saw the same enthusiasm and international 
support as compared to the operations in Afghanistan. In due course, after the 
launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the assumptions for undertaking the 
war were found to be flawed, unduly modulated by the Bush administration, and 
based on false premises. Even prior to the operations, polls conducted by the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) revealed that public support in 
the United States, on the decision to launch a unilateral attack on Iraq without the 
requisite authority of the United Nations, was minimal,315 Similar polls conducted 
in Britain, as part of a survey for BBC ONE's Iraq: Britain Decides program, 
                                            
313 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and 
Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, Strategic Studies Institute, United States 
Army Was College, Feb 2003. The author’s foresight and vision is greatly acknowledged, wherein 
they could accurately predict the present post-conflict scenario in Iraq even before the war 
actually began.  
314 George W. Bush, Jr., President of the United States of America, “President Outlines Iraqi 
Threat,” Cincinnati, Ohio, Oct 7, 2002 [on-line], available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html, accessed Jul 9, 2007. 
315 Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) Poll, “Americans on Iraq and the UN 
Inspections,” Jan 2003 [on-line], available from http://65.109.167.118/pipa/pdf/jan03/ 
IraqUNInsp1%20Jan03%20rpt.pdf, accessed Jul 9, 2007. According the polls, 63 percent of the 
population that was surveyed were against the decision to go to war with Iraq, but 60 percent 
indicated they would support the President, even though many of those disagreed with the 
decision. A poll conducted in July 2003 by the same organization found that the United States 
government was seen as “stretching the truth” when the government presented evidence of Iraq 
having weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein having links with Al Qaeda. Full report 
titled “Americans On Iraq: WMD Links To Al-Qaeda, Reconstruction” is available at 
http://65.109.167.118/pipa/pdf/jul03/IraqWMD%20Jul03%20rpt.pdf, accessed Jul 9, 2007. 
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provided a similar outlook: 45 percent of the sample felt that the UK should not 
take part in a war "with or without a fresh mandate from the United Nations," 75 
percent were of the opinion that a war against Iraq would damage relations with 
the Muslim community in Britain, 76 percent did not believe that conflict would 
deter terrorist groups from attacking the United States or Britain in the future, and 
64 percent did not think that war would deter other countries from developing 
weapons of mass destruction.316  
Tony Blair’s statement on February 12, 2003 painted a picture of the 
strategic level imbalances in the information environment when he said, “Before 
we take the decision to go to war, the morality of that should weigh heavily on our 
conscience because innocent people, as well as the guilty, die in a war.”317 A 
further blow to the Tony Blair-led government in the United Kingdom, 
immediately before the war, came when Robin Cook resigned as Leader of the 
House of Commons, and in the statement announcing his resignation he says, 
“The reality is that Britain is being asked to embark on a war without agreement 
in any of the international bodies of which we are a leading partner - not NATO, 
not the European Union and, now, not the Security Council.… Only a year ago, 
we and the United States were part of a coalition against terrorism that was wider 
and more diverse than I would ever have imagined possible. History will be 
astonished at the diplomatic miscalculations that led so quickly to the 
disintegration of that powerful coalition.”318 The verdict in the United Nations 
Security Council authorizing the war on Iraq was fragmented, and the United 
States’ approach of a “pre-emptive” war lacked comprehensive international 
                                            
316 BBC Online, “Britain and America have yet to Prove the Case Against Saddam, Suggests 
BBC Poll,” Feb 12, 2003 [on-line], available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2003/02_february/12/iraq_poll.shtml, accessed Jul 9, 2007. 
317 Tony Blair, Former Prime Minister of United Kingdom, speaking on the BBC's Iraq: Britain 
Decides program on Feb 12, 2003 [on-line], available from 
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318 BBC News, “Cook’s Resignation Speech,” Mar 18, 2003 [on-line], available from 
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support.319 The war in Iraq that was undertaken on the pretext of the GWOT 
lacked justification since it focused on attacking a nation and a regime, rather 
than focusing on the real terrorists and their networks. The people, the ultimate 
information arbiters, and the majority of the world community gave a thumbs-
down to the Iraq war even before it began. The strategic level information 
campaign in Iraq, therefore, began on a wrong footing. 
 
2. Intelligence Effort – From Strategic to Tactical Levels 
The United States had an overwhelming superiority in the intelligence 
domain regarding the Iraqi conventional forces and the physical environment in 
Iraq, mainly due to its experience in the first Gulf War and its involvement in the 
region thereafter, from undertaking extensive reconnaissance missions and 
enforcing ‘no-fly zones’ as part of Operation Southern Watch and Operation 
Northern Watch, to carrying out actual strikes in the region. The entire 
intelligence spectrum, at the tactical and operational level, was dominated by the 
United States with its use of high resolution satellite imagery, electronic, and 
signal intelligence infrastructure. The ability to fuse sensors to the operational 
and tactical decision making through the nearly real-time situational picture 
available at command centers was a demonstration of technological superiority 
that was, in any case, an accepted fact. The wide array of Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), systems that have been developed and 
integrated into the United States’ war-fighting machinery, through concepts like 
                                            
319 Walter J. Boyce, Colonel, USAF (Retd), Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, 
What Went Wrong, and Why (New York: Forge, Nov 2003), 36. The author mentions that the 
United States and Great Britain could never get the ratification from the United Nations and 
formed a “Coalition of Willing” nations to use force in Iraq against the Saddam Hussein regime. 
Also see Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, “France Vows to Block Resolution on Iraq War: U.S. 
Schedule Put at Risk by U.N. Debate,” Washington Post, Jan 21, 2003. United States led forces 
did never get sanction for undertaking the war in Iraq and most of the members sought further 
diplomatic deliberations. In 2004, the former Secretary General of the United Nations – Kofi Anan, 
when pressed to answer the legality of the war said – “Yes, if you wish. I have indicated it was not 
in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was 
illegal." (BBC News, “Iraq war illegal, says Annan,” Sep 16, 2004, available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm). The opposition to the war in Iraq was also 
observed in the academic community world-wide and the use of other tools based on diplomacy, 
economic sanctions, arms control, etc were propagated as preferable methods to rein in the 
Saddam Hussein regime.  
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the Revolution in Military Affairs and Network Centric Warfare, provided the allied 
military with an unprecedented advantage.  Sensors like the Predator and Global 
Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) allowed situational awareness and 
targeting at the operational and strategic levels, while the Hunter UAV and Long 
Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) gave tactical commanders 
an ability to acquire targets at a much greater range and with significantly better 
accuracy.  The new information systems, such as the Force XXI Battle Command 
Brigade and Below (FBCB2)  a high bandwidth interconnectivity through a host of 
beyond the line-of-sight communication systems, and extended connectivity 
through satellite communication radios, provided an unprecedented situational 
awareness in the battle space.320  
Although the V Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division of the United States 
were fully integrated and show-cased as the fore-runners of defining the network-
centric warfare concept, during actual operations in OIF, the 1st Marine Division 
provided a rather adverse picture of the overall battlefield intelligence, which 
included a lack of high-resolution imagery, lack of any worthwhile actionable 
intelligence from external intelligence agencies after crossing the Line of 
Departure (mainly due to high operational tempo), lack of tactical level 
intelligence collection platforms, and very little human intelligence to provide 
insight into the human dimension of the battlefield.321 Another aspect of the 
intelligence process that could be lacking in some sense is the ability to share 
intelligence with coalition partners; this has issues ranging from training to 
interoperability of systems and people.322 In the present counter-insurgency 
                                            
320 Dave Cammons et al., Network Centric Warfare Case Study: U.S. V Corps and 3rd 
Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations (March to 
April 2003) – Volume I: Operations, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 
2006, 23. 
321 GlobalSecurity.org Website, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Lessons Learnt – 1st Marine 
Division” [on-line], available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/1mardiv_oif_lessons_learned.doc, 
accessed on Jul 9, 2007. Also see Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and 
Lessons Learned, 185-190. 
322 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “Operations in Iraq: First Reflections” Jul 2003 [on-
line], available from http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/0A6289F6-898B-44C5-9C9D-
B8040274DC25/0/opsiniraq_first_reflections_dec03.pdf, accessed Jul 9, 2003. 
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phase of OIF, intelligence always has the problem of defining the enemy:  who is 
an enemy? ― identification of an insurgent or terrorist; how many are there? ― 
number of insurgents or terrorists; and where are they located? In this situation, 
there is a need to integrate technical intelligence assets more closely with human 
intelligence (HUMINT) assets to arrive at any definitive conclusion on these three 
basic questions about the enemy. The network of HUMINT operators supported 
by hi-tech intelligence assets is essential to obtain actionable intelligence against 
the insurgents and terrorists. 
Military-based intelligence, in the initial phase of operations, may be 
regarded at times as sufficient, and at times as extraordinary. The macro 
intelligence, that takes into account the intelligence organizations and 
establishments at the national and strategic levels, and their ability in terms of 
defining strategic intelligence to support a national level decision for undertaking 
a war in the first place, and linking it to the GWOT was a debacle. The 
intelligence community’s assessment of the ongoing development and presence 
of WMD in Iraq, establishment of definitive links between Saddam Hussein and 
Al Qaeda, and the miscalculation of the impact of the ‘liberation war’ on the 
people of Iraq, are some of the intelligence blunders that cannot be 
overlooked.323 In the after action report of  the United Kingdom, one of the sore 
points of intelligence that was raised was the inability of the coalition to anticipate 
the complete and immediate collapse of the Iraqi organized military, and a total 
shift in their strategy to move toward an unorganized and non-coherent guerrilla 
warfare.324 
 
3. The Psychological Operations Campaign 
The PSYOP campaign for the OIF was underway much before the 
commencement of actual military operations. Since the end of the 1991 Gulf 
War, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the United States and its 
                                            
323 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Lessons Learned, 405-407. 
324 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “Operations in Iraq: First Reflections”, 15. 
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allies to influence Iraq through strategic and tactical PSYOP.325 The strategic 
efforts included a long term plan to use media, international institutions, and 
tailored speeches by world leaders that addressed Saddam Hussein, his Baath 
Party, and the people of Iraq in particular. The tactical effort included radio 
broadcasts using airborne and land-based assets, as well as aircraft for dropping 
leaflets from time to time.  The radio broadcasts had been going on for a 
considerably long time through land-based assets in Kuwait, and in late 2002, 
EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft began transmitting PSYOP broadcasts into 
Iraq. During the time frame from the launch of Operation Southern Focus in mid 
2002 to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, more than 4.2 million leaflets 
were dropped. They targeted the Iraqi air defense operators warning them not to 
fire their weapons, threatened the Iraqi military regarding the armed Predators 
loitering in the space above Iraq, warned civilians and maintenance crews to stay 
away from fiber-optic vaults, and conditioned the Iraqi people to stay away from 
military installations.326 Another novel method was the use of a surreptitious e-
mail campaign inside Iraq targeting key Iraqi leaders that, ‘urge them to give up, 
to dissent and to defect. If they do not, the messages warn, the United States will 
go to war against them.’327 The email campaign was planned jointly by the 
United States intelligence agencies and the military, and although the impact of it 
is difficult to ascertain, this is the first time that such a method was used as part 
of PSYOP. The overall aim of the PSYOP campaign, close to the launch of 
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combat operations, was to establish an audience for radio broadcasts in Iraq, 
undermining the confidence of the Iraqi military and Iraqi security forces in 
Saddam Hussein’s regime, degrading Saddam Hussein’s confidence in his ability 
to control Iraq, and deterring the use of WMD.328 
During the initial phases of operation, the PSYOP campaign in the theater 
was directed by the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) located 
at Qatar. Although elements of the JPOTF were present with the combatant 
commanders on ground, a number of products were developed by the JPOTF 
that had a greater time-line for its dissemination. Although the radio broadcast 
facility was available in Iraq fairly quickly, the bulk of the leaflets were produced 
in either Kuwait or the United States.329 There was also a tedious chain of 
approval process that curtailed effective use of available PSYOP resources. The 
Tactical Psychological Operations Company (TPC) that was at the disposal of 
every United States division that crossed into Iraq had to get their PSYOP 
products approved by Commander CENTCOM even though they pertained to the 
division’s immediate combat role.330 Over a period of time, the JPOTF relocated 
to Iraq and hence out-of- area production and dissemination of PSYOP products 
were minimized. The overall PSYOP campaign, during the combat phase, is 
quite disappointing due to two major reasons; firstly, there was a lack of effective 
resource utilization due to out-of-area control and coordination, and secondly, 
there are no quantifiable measures of effectiveness to ascertain the impact of 
these operations. 
At present, the PSYOP campaign is in the stability phase with a 
demanding counter-insurgency role, and the focus of the PSYOP campaign has 
rightly shifted to being people centric and for winning the hearts and minds. The 
major themes of the PSYOP campaign are directed toward the general populace 
for maintaining law and order, obeying rules and regulations, the need for the 
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populace to be aware of mines and unexploded ordnance, to help eliminate 
threats to coalition forces, and to influence the civilian populace to come forward 
and provide the coalition forces with information and intelligence regarding key 
members of Saddam’s Baath Party.331 In the later time frame, as the Iraqi local 
government started taking shape, aided by the coalition forces, the dominating 
themes were directed toward the people for supporting the new government and 
the Multi National Forces: Iraq (MNF-I), support for resisting criminals, 
insurgents, terrorists and other violent groups, partnership between the MNF-I 
and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and threat reduction for Improvised Electronic 
Devices (IEDs).332 The resources used for dissemination of these themes range 
from magazines, compact disks (CDs), billboards and leaflets, and media outlets 
like radio and television. The impact of such themes will be greater when these 
are disseminated through personal contacts and face-to-face interactions.  
The other resources that the coalition utilized for their PSYOP campaign 
during this phase included producing a newspaper, The Times, for southern Iraq, 
and a British organized white PSYOP station, 'Two Rivers Radio' (Radio 
Nahrain), which was set up to serve the region around Basra. In fact, an 
extensive network of radio and television broadcasting services has now been 
established by the coalition forces, and in an effort to popularize them initially, 
there was a distribution of leaflets that gave out the frequencies of the radio 
station as well as radio sets to people in Iraq. Radio Tikrit is a good example of a 
“black propaganda” operation. It began broadcasting in early February 2003 and 
featured programs that depicted strong support for the Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein and his government; over the course of time, the programs began to 
change dramatically and adopted a more anti-Saddam stand.333 There are other 
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examples of the Al Iraqiya network and the Middle Eastern Television Network 
(METN) that have now grown to be quite acceptable in Iraq and the neighboring 
Middle East countries.334 The establishment of such networks is bound to 
provide major gains, in the long term, to the coalition forces as well as the 
Government of Iraq, and may play an important part in moving the Iraqi people 
toward stability and peace.  
The other important activity during this phase was hiring media and public 
relations companies from the United States such as SYColeman Inc., Lincoln 
Group, and SAIC to develop materials for PSYOP in Iraq and elsewhere. The 
United States has now taken an initiative to promote its views to the rest of the 
Middle East community by a government funded channel,  Al-Hurra, and 
recently, a Washington-based non-profit organization, Layalina Productions, has 
started producing programs in Arabic-language that are broadcast on the Saudi-
owned Middle East Broadcasting Center, which is the most-watched television 
channel in 22 Arab countries.335 Even the former prime minister of Britain, Tony 
Blair, planned to set up a “joint information unit” based in the Cabinet Office or 
the Home Office that will seek to counter disinformation issued by Islamic 
terrorists and help sway Muslim hearts and minds in the battle with Al-Qaeda.336 
Britain has also come out recently with the Defense Communications Strategy 
that highlights the focus of the government to demonstrate real progress in 
Afghanistan and Iraq through all available media outlets in order to influence 
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local as well as global audiences.337 This highlights the importance of PSYOP in 
a campaign that has global ramifications as part of the overall effort in the GWOT 
as well as a lack of expert resources in the coalition forces to undertake such a 
task.338 The, outsourcing of such tasks to out-of-area experts may be a good 
idea, but again, hiring a few media companies from Middle East countries to 
undertake such a task could provide a higher pay-off. 
There have also been major setbacks in the PSYOP campaign, mainly 
due to a lack of cultural understanding of the people in the region as well as the 
over-exuberance of personnel in the coalition forces.339 Although the major 
adverse impact on the PSYOP campaign of winning the hearts and minds is 
mainly due to negative actions in the physical domain, the three prominent 
examples are the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the massacre of 
innocent Iraqi people at Haditha, and the fiasco during the hanging of Saddam 
Hussein. Such events are lapped up by the media networks worldwide and not 
only cause a negative impact in Iraq, but also affect people all over the world.  
There are also a number of minor physical actions undertaken by the coalition 
forces that do not make it to the news channels but have their own fallout locally. 
These include the daily killing of innocent people in Iraq, day-to-day hostile 
encounters of Iraqi people at coalition forces manned check posts,  military 
patrols walking into people praying on the streets, kicking and storming into the 
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home of Iraqi civilians, harassment of Iraqi women by coalition forces, etc.340 It is 
important that coalition troops are sensitized to the impact of such small events in 
the physical domain that create an enormous undesirable impact in the 
information domain, as that is where the true battle of hearts and minds actually 
lies.  
We have broken down doors, run them off roads, swiveled our guns 
at them, shouted profanities at them, and disrespect their women – 
all this hundreds and thousands of time every day. We have 
dishonored them publicly, and within a society that places public 
honor above itself. These are the roots of the fight we are in.341 
 
There are a few things that can be highlighted from the experience of the 
Indian military in counter-insurgency scenarios and some of the basic tenets that 
we follow are: we treat every soldier as a PSYOP warrior, we use a humane and 
just approach toward the local population in every day dealings, we deploy 
companies and battalions in insurgency-prone areas to adopt villages and carry 
out localized, small-scale and pragmatic, societal infrastructure building tasks, 
and we encourage local community participation. The overall approach that 
guides the Indian Army in such an operational scenario is ‘Iron Fist and Velvet 
Glove.’342 
 
4. Public Affairs Campaign – Engaging the Fourth Estate  
During OIF more than 600 journalists were deployed alongside the 
coalition forces as part of the “embedded media” concept. This large scale 
presence of journalists in the war zone was a strategy that was planned well in 
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advance of the conflict.343 This strategy of a public affairs (PA) campaign was 
directed more toward the population of the coalition forces back home rather than 
in Iraq, and had both its positive and negative outcomes. For the journalist 
community, it was a matter of pride to see and report a war “live” through their 
networks to a worldwide audience. There was a formal contract signed by the 
journalist, prior to their being embedded, that gave out the regulations that the 
journalists needed to conform to. In the initial phase of operations, the reporting 
from these embedded journalists was just what the coalition forces desired, but 
during the later phase, the objectivity and the ‘questioning all’ syndrome returned 
in the reports of the journalists was not taken in good spirits by the military 
commanders. There was a continuous conflict between the reporting of these 
embedded journalists and other journalists of the Al Jazeera network, where the 
embedded journalists covered aspects more from the perspective of the coalition 
forces. Al Jazeera, on the other hand, focused on the destruction and occupation 
of Iraq and the problems of the Iraqi people due to the conflict and that was what 
was seen and heard by a majority of the people in the Middle East. 
A major aspect that was neglected by the think-tank that evolved the idea 
of embedded media was the fact that there was absolutely no representation of 
Arabic or regional journalists embedded with the coalition forces. This, in 
hindsight, would have had a greater impact on the regional population.  Overall, 
the effort of the embedded media was on expected lines and these journalists 
modulated the information environment in a favorable manner during the initial 
phase of OIF.344 The other aspect of the coalition public relations campaign, 
which had a negative impact in the recent past, was the planting of stories in Iraqi 
newspapers.345  
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These actions, though undertaken without any mala-fide intentions,  caused 
repercussions that ruined the information environment as well as  losing its 
desired impact. 
 
5. Civil Affairs and Nation-Building 
The problems in civil affairs (CA) and nation-building in Iraq are a 
consequence of the initial response of the coalition forces toward the previous 
regime in Iraq. The decision to disband the Iraqi army and police, banish the 
former Baath party members from any of the post-government activities, along 
with the removal of civil servants from the Saddam era affected almost 500,000 
Iraqis.346 This created a vacuum in the civic infrastructure that coalition forces 
are finding hard to fill today. The CA units, as part of the coalition forces, are 
tasked with rebuilding the societal infrastructure necessary for the people of Iraq, 
and are supported by various contractors and civilian aid agencies. The duties in 
many cases are quite minor like repairing schoolhouses, restoring drinking water, 
building shelters for the homeless, delivering fertilizer, vaccinating livestock, 
offering suggestions on how to better irrigate crops, advice on how to run a stock 
market, and shelter from an abusive spouse, etc., still have a profound impact on 
the people. During the 2005 elections in Iraq, CA soldiers had worked in the 
background for weeks, ensuring that Iraqi security could handle any violence and 
collect and count the ballots; this resulted in more than 80 percent of the 
population turning out for the country's first democratic vote in 50 years.347 The 
CA units are comprised of soldiers who are 90 percent reservists and come with 
a wealth of experience in civil affairs, but in situations like this there may be a 
case for increasing the active duty force strength of the CA units, as similar 
situations may arise in the near future as part of the GWOT. Another option 
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would include a greater focus on CA, PA, and the impact of physical events on 
the information environment during training periods for all active duty units of the 
military.  
As part of the larger nation-building process, Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) have been set up in Iraq to support civic affairs actions in different 
regions of the country. The PRT initiative is a civil-military effort that is becoming 
the primary interface between the United States, coalition partners, and 
provincial governments throughout Iraq The PRTs are helping provincial 
governments by developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, 
promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political and economic 
development, and providing a provincial administration necessary to meet the 
basic needs of the population.”348 This initiative began as a consequence of 
similar structures that have been created in Afghanistan, and the first PRT was 
set up in Ninewa on November 14, 2005.349  
Another initiative began on January 25, 2004, with the formation of Gulf 
Region Division (GRD). The GRD consists of members of the initial task force 
teams who specialize in oil and electricity, as well as forward engineering support 
teams operating throughout the theater to assess projects, develop courses of 
action, and initiate contracts during the early days of the reconstruction effort in 
Iraq. It is comprised of both military and civilian staff. The purpose of GRD is to 
provide quality, responsive engineering services in the Iraq combat theater to 
MNF-I and the Interim Iraqi Government with planning, design, and construction 
management support for military and civil infrastructure construction. The GRD 
looks after the major reconstruction projects like hospital renovation and 
construction, primary healthcare facilities, municipal buildings and schools, water 
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and wastewater treatment facilities, police stations and border forts, electrical 
power generation and distribution, roads, sea, and airports.350 
The coalition forces’ efforts in CA and nation-building will definitely benefit 
the people of Iraq and will impact the overall information environment in a 
positive manner, but again, these reconstruction efforts and their perceived 
impact takes time and will test the resilience of the overall coalition effort in Iraq. 
The overall achievements of these efforts for many Iraqis are either too little or 
too late or both, and have created cynicism, animosity, enmity, and worse.351 
 
6. The Other Elements of Information Operations   
EW as an element of information operations was utilized by the coalition 
forces during the initial phase of the operation in a more conventional role: 
suppression of enemy air defenses, and jamming of communication systems, 
radio and television stations. It also did a favorable job of shaping the battlefield 
during that time. In the present context, EW airborne assets are being used to try 
to counter the IEDs threats from terrorists and insurgents, but it is not an effective 
method since it has a secondary impact on own systems operating in the 
common spectrum band. There is, therefore, a definite requirement for having 
ground-based assets in this scenario to provide close tactical support. The 
United States Army is in the process of scaling up its efforts in the field of EW 
and the Iraq War has proved to be the mother of invention for U.S. Army EW.352 
The United States Army’s new approach to EW represents a bit of a turnaround. 
Whereas this area was completely neglected a few years back, now the United 
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States Army has dedicated EW as a core competency. The importance of a 
robust EW infrastructure that supports operations by troops in a counter-
insurgency scenario has now been acknowledged, from its use in anti-IEDs 
operations to carrying out surgical jamming and monitoring of insurgent radio 
communications. Another operation wherein EW can be utilized in the present 
scenario is for Electronic Intruder Operations, wherein insurgent communication 
networks can be intruded through electronic means to undertake tactical and 
operational level misinformation and deception campaigns. 
Cyber Warfare during OIF was apparently limited in use, although prior to 
the commencement of combat operations in Iraq, there were news reports of the 
launch of a fierce cyber war by the United States.353 An active email campaign 
was definitely used during OIF, but the same cannot be termed a constituent of 
classic cyber warfare, and can be regarded more as part of PSYOP, unless the 
emails contained a Trojan to provide a back-door access, or any other software 
capable of destroying the data on Iraqi information systems. There has been a 
report that the United States did consider launching cyber attacks for disabling 
the banking and finance system in Iraq, but the idea was eventually negated due 
to its likely impact on other financial systems around the world.354 There was also 
mention of United States cyber warriors hacking into Iraq's Kari and Tiger Song 
air defense networks, but whether that took place is not known in the public 
domain.  
Another aspect that could be exploited in the cyber domain is the conduct 
of Cyber Intruder Operations, which are similar to Electronic Intruder Operations. 
This is due to the fact that large numbers of terrorists and insurgents in Iraq, and 
elsewhere in the world, actively use the Internet for communication and 
collaboration. Cyber Intruder Operations would imply a planned surgical 
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operation to infiltrate the cyber world of these terrorists for information gathering 
and apprehension of such elements, and could also include designing tailor-
made honey-pots and honey-nets to attract the Jihadi elements. 
 
B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ANTI-
COALITION FORCES IN IRAQ 
The initial resistance to the United States coalition forces by the Iraqi 
military under the Saddam Hussein regime was almost non-existent. This was 
mainly due to the fact that the Iraqi military, since 1991, was continuously 
degraded by the United States and British air forces, coupled with the effects of 
sanctions and no worthwhile air force capability.355 Suffice it to say that the 
conventional challenge to the coalition forces, in any aspect of warfare, was 
neither demonstrated by the Iraqi leadership nor its military. After the launch of 
combat operations, Iraq's information minister, Muhammad Said al-Sahaf, 
conducted his daily briefings in Baghdad to inform the Iraqi people about the 
success of the Iraqi military and the failures of the coalition forces; but then there 
was no visible impact on the information environment due to the speed of the 
coalition forces reaching Baghdad. Saddam Hussein created three militia 
organizations: the Saddam Fidayeen, the al Quds Army, and the Baath Party 
militia and these organizations consisted of motivated Iraqi Sunnis. Although 
created with a view to protect Iraq from invasion, these militias could do very little 
in the conventional spectrum of the conflict, but adapted themselves by 
dispersing into the population and led Iraq toward the path of insurgency and 
violence that exists today. The other opposing force that has emerged in Iraq is 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Although there has been a growing debate over the 
linkages between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda prior to the United States-led 
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invasion, it was one of the premises for undertaking the war, and in the present 
context, the presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq has become an important factor.356 
 
1. Information Operations Campaign by Insurgents and Al Qaeda 
in Iraq  
The insurgency in Iraq began because of the vacuum that was created by 
the total collapse of domestic political authority and the large scale looting seen 
in Baghdad. The actual insurgency that began in the later part of 2003 occurred 
for three major reasons. Firstly, Saddam Hussein planned to fight this way. 
Secondly, the general population of Iraq resented the United States-led forces 
and always saw them as occupiers. Thirdly, Al Qaeda saw this as an opportunity 
to engage and bleed the United States, which was well aligned with their 
strategic goals. Soon the insurgency became more violent with a Shia-Sunni 
backdrop, and is now comprised of a large number of Islamist terrorists who hold 
some form of allegiance to Al Qaeda. The situation in Iraq, therefore, is 
comprised of loosely networked insurgent operators acting more or less 
independently without any proper command and control or coordination, but 
capable of causing grave damage to the surrounding environment through use of 
the asymmetric tactics of suicide bombing, roadside IEDs, car bombings, or 
remotely triggered explosions in public places. As Brian Michael Jenkins said, 
“The Iraqi insurgency today comprises a shifting host of as many as 70 disparate 
groups that increasingly have coordinated their attacks. It is made up of diehard 
supporters of the old regime reassembled, joined by growing numbers of Iraqi 
and foreign fighters who see Iraq as a new front for holy war against America and 
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other “infidel” nations.357” The present insurgency in Iraq, as highlighted by Bruce 
Hoffman is a manifestation yet of netwar,358 the concept as promulgated by 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, which involves “small groups who communicate, 
coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an Internetted manner, without any 
precise central command.”359 And to tackle such a manifestation, there is a 
requirement for using small teams that are equally nimble and mobile, backed up 
by precise technological assets and a network of HUMINT operators to hunt 
down and neutralize these insurgents. 
The information campaign of the insurgents and the Al Qaeda terrorists in 
Iraq consists mainly of terrorizing people, highlighting the inadequacy of the 
coalition forces, and carrying out attacks on coalition troops through suicide and 
roadside IEDs. These activities are coupled with a mass media campaign that 
includes recording of these events and then distributing the media package over 
the Internet and Middle East television networks to a worldwide audience. 















Suicide Attack 25 66 285 191 108
Bombing 51 276 762 1485 519
Kidnapping 1 142 199 267 82
Assasination 11 39 128 64 12
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Figure 10. Insurgent/Terrorist Tactics in Iraq: 2003 to 30 July 2007.360 
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Figure 11. Total Coalition Forces Casualties by Province: 2003–June 2007.361 
 
Figure 10 indicates the dominant tactics used by insurgents/terrorists in 
Iraq. Bombing in this case includes IED attacks as well as truck/car bombing. 
The assassination tactics were high during the year 2005 as this was a time of 
intense political activity in Iraq that included: the conduct of elections in January, 
appointment of the president and the vice presidents, and the drafting and  
acceptance of the new Iraqi constitution. The insurgents and terrorists 
understood  modulation of the information environment in the context of the 
political activity, which was evident by their targeting of government officials and 
people involved with the government machinery. Consequently, the 
assassination attempts have declined and emphasis is now on bombing and 
suicide attacks with the aim of ensuring chaos and instability. Figure 11 clearly 
highlights that Anabar and Baghdad are the most active regions in Iraq in terms 
of insurgent and terrorist activity. Hence, the future casualty figures in these two 
regions may be set as benchmarks for evaluating the situation in Iraq. 
                                            
361 The figure has been taken from the casualties database of coalition forces maintained by 




Figure 12. United States Casualties Trend in Iraq: 2003–June 2007.362 
 
At the strategic level, Al Qaeda utilizes video recordings and audio 
messages from Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri to influence operations 
within Iraq as well as acting as a source of inspiration for other Islamist terrorists 
around the world. The chaos in Iraq, lack of security, and the increase in day-to-
day problems for the Iraqi people due to the United States’ invasion are major 
themes used by the Al Qaeda leadership. The larger Al Qaeda goal of trying to 
depict the presence of coalition forces in Iraq as a Crusader-Zionist coalition 
against the Islamic nation363  is also a major theme that is utilized.  
 
                                            
362 The figure has been taken from the casualties database of coalition forces maintained by 
the website – www.icasualties.org [on-line], available from http://icasualties.org/oef/, accessed Jul 
2, 2007. The website highlights that the Current Cycle of High Fatality Rates is coming to a close, 
with the Fatality Trend Line below 20 for the first time since Mar 2007. The website further 
predicts that incase the trend line continues its downward trend then the “surge in troops” may be 
taken as a successful strategy.  
363 Statement of Osama bin Laden, Dec 27, 2004 published by MEMRI Special Dispatch 
Series – No. 837 [on-line], available from 
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP83704, accessed Jul 16, 2007. 
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What is the difference between the massacre by the tyrant 
Saddam[Hussein] at Halabja and the massacre by Bush at 
Fallujah? If Saddam killed there [at Halabja] a few thousand of our 
Kurdish brothers in the name of the odious nationalism, the 
pharaoh of this era [i.e. Bush] killed only at Fallujah a few thousand, 
and wounded and crippled twice as many, in addition to expelling 
and terrifying hundreds of thousands – and all this in the name of 
the bloodthirsty Zionist Crusade.364 
— Osama bin Laden, 2004 
At the beginning of the insurgency in Iraq, the insurgents and Al Qaeda 
affiliates used the local Middle East television network of Al Jazeera and Al 
Arabiya to broadcast their messages. This was facilitated by video and audio 
tapes sent covertly to these agencies, or by an interview given to the reporters 
affiliated with these agencies. In due course, there was a considerable amount of 
pressure on the two news networks, and over a period of time, the content 
disseminated has been modulated. The insurgents and Al Qaeda affiliates now 
resort to their own independent and covert media production agencies that are 
capable of producing sophisticated videos and audio messages that are then 
disseminated over the Internet. The recent report by Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty titled “The Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas,”365 
highlight four important issues. Firstly, the Sunni insurgents in Iraq and their 
supporters worldwide are exploiting the Internet to pursue a massive and far-
reaching media campaign that is forming perceptions of the war in Iraq among 
the best-educated and most influential segment of the Arab population. 
Secondly, the Iraqi insurgent media network is a boon to the global jihadist media 
as it can use the same material to reinforce its message. Thirdly, the insurgent 
propaganda network does not have a headquarters, bureaucracy, or a brick-and-
mortar structure; rather, it is decentralized, fast-moving, and technologically 
adaptive. Fourthly, there is little to counter this torrent of daily press releases, 
                                            
364 Statement of Osama bin Laden, Dec 27, 2004.  
365 Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, “Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and 
Ideas,” Radio Free Europe/Radio LIberty [on-line], available from 
http://realaudio.rferl.org/online/OLPDFfiles/insurgent.pdf, accessed Jul 16, 2007. This is an 
excellent report that contains in depth analysis of the use of media and the Internet by Sunni 
insurgent organizations in Iraq.  
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weekly and monthly magazines, books, video clips, full-length films, and even 
television channels. The report also points out two vulnerabilities, a lack of 
central coordination with a resulting lack of message control, and a widening rift 
between homegrown nationalist groups and Al Qaeda-affiliated global Jihadists. 
In order to counter this strategy, there is a need to exploit the Internet, provide 
technology that will either prevent or deny the use of the Internet for such 
activities, and use technologically adaptive and decentralized organizations that 
are geographically independent to undertake a counter campaign of this 
magnitude. 
The following figures, 13 and 14, depict the types of statements issued by 
various insurgent groups in Iraq in March 2007. The two figures indicate that Al 
Qaeda is not “the” dominant group in Iraq and that the majority of the statements 
are being directed more toward the Iraqis than the coalition forces. 
 
 
Figure 13. Statements Issued by Iraqi Insurgent Groups in March 2007.366 
                                            




Figure 14. Insurgent Statements Claiming a “Single Operation.”367 
 
The Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq have also quite vividly understood the 
impact of their attacks in Iraq on the public and polities in the United States; with 
each attack and each death of a coalition force member in Iraq there appears to 
be a growing debate in the United States about the efficacy of the war in Iraq. As 
Jim Saxton, a Republican writing in the Washington Times highlights, “Finally, 
what American family looks forward to the daily news of the results of another 
IED attack, the downing of an American helicopter, or a truck bombing at a U.S. 
military post? None do. Each of these acts carried out by an inferior enemy are 
intended to send a message to every home -- and political leader -- in the United 
States.”368 Al Qaeda has correctly identified the center of gravity of the coalition 
forces in Iraq as public opinion in the United States, which they believe will assist 
them in succeeding in their war against the Crusaders. 
 
C. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 
The initial blitzkrieg of the coalition force in Iraq bowled over the shaky 
Iraqi military, but thereafter the invaders became embroiled in a sharp 
insurgency. This pattern provides a contrasting dimension to the spectrum of 
                                            
367 Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, “Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and 
Ideas,” 9. 
368 Jim Saxton, “Al Qaeda’s Weapon of Mass Influence,” Washington Times, Feb 26, 2007. 
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information operations between the two different enemies and the coalition 
forces. Some of the important aspects in the domain of information operations in 
Iraq are summarized in the following paragraphs. There is also a need to focus 
on public opinion regarding the Iraq war, since the people are the actual 
information arbiters and their views and perceptions do shape the overall 
information environment. 
 
1. Summary of Information Operations – Coalition Forces vs Anti 
Coalition Forces in Iraq 
The following Table (Table 7) summarizes the initial phase of the 
operation between the coalition forces and the Iraqi military up until the capture 
of Baghdad. The organizational adaptation of the coalition forces, in terms of 
using conventional resources and integrating it with superior technology was an 
advantage, but on the other hand, the melting away of the Iraqi military in the 
face of a superior conventional force, and planning and executing a guerrilla war, 
was a much more powerful move. In this phase, the coalition forces were at a 
much greater advantage in terms of intelligence, EW, PSYOP, and carrying out 
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Table 7.   Comparative Analysis in Information Operations – Coalition Forces and 
Iraqi Military. 
 
The situation dramatically changes in the context of the ongoing 
insurgency (Table 8). The Iraqi insurgents, organizationally, are seen to be with 
the initiative and are seen as constantly adapting and networking, whereas the 
coalition forces have become more hierarchical and take a longer time to adapt 
to the insurgent tactics, mainly due to the forces being bulky. In the case of 
intelligence, the coalition forces and their activities are totally visible to the 
insurgents with the insurgents using an adhoc HUMINT network. The ability to 
identify and locate an insurgent will always remain a problem for the coalition 
forces in this scenario. The battle in the EW domain is ongoing in the fields of 
using electronic signals to detonate an IED by the insurgent, and for the coalition 
forces to deny this ability to them. The adaptive nature of IED attacks in Iraq, by 
the insurgents, is quite remarkable: cell phones, garage door openers, a child’s 
radio-controlled toy, or a vehicle-based IED, are just some of the methods used 
as electronic signal based triggering devices. On the other hand, the coalition 
forces’ use of counter measures include: electronic jammers, radars, X-ray 
equipment, robotic explosive ordnance disposal equipment, physical security 
180 
equipment, and armor for vehicles and personnel.369 The other aspect of EW is 
the ability of coalition forces to identify, monitor, and locate insurgent radio 
transmissions that lead to greater actionable intelligence at the tactical level. 
Insurgents appear to be at an advantage in the domain of PSYOP and physical 
attacks. The physical attacks by the insurgents, though they appear quite 
random, over a period of time, they appear to have a motive. The attacks relate 
to the current situation in Iraq (e.g., assassination of government officials during 
2005) and contribute toward the degradation of the security environment in Iraq. 
CA and nation-building are the only aspects where coalition forces are at an 
advantage. The overall information environment at present seems to be more 
favorable toward the insurgents.  
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369 Clay Wilson, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and 
Countermeasures,” CRS Report to Congress, Order Code RS22330, Sep 25, 2006 [on-line], 
available from http://research.fit.edu/fip/documents/SecNews1.pdf, accessed Jul 28, 2007. 
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2. Information Environment and the Public Opinion – Is the 
United States Concerned? 
The Information environment as previously discussed in Chapter II is ‘The 
aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, 
disseminate, or act on information.’ Authors Jacod Shamir and Michal Shamir in 
their book The Anatomy of Public Opinion, opine that public opinion consists of 
the information environment and that it does not indicate only the numbers and 
the associated quantitative values, but also the information environment in which 
it is found, and that the dynamic nature of public opinion is influenced by the 
surrounding and ever-changing information environment.370 For this reason, the 
value of public opinion to define the information environment and vice versa is 
immense. 
The polls conducted in Iraq for WorldPublicOpinion.org by the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) in September 2006 suggests that the United 
States’ presence in Iraq is seen as a negative, that there is a growing confidence 
towards the ISF, and that 61% of respondents overall approve of attacks on the 
United States-led forces (see Figure 15).   
 
 
Figure 15. Polls in Iraq in 2006.371 
                                            
370 Jacob Shamir and Michal Shamir, The Anatomy of Public Opinion (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2000). 
371 Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) Poll for WorldPublicOpinion.org, “Most 
Iraqis Want U.S. Troops Out Within a Year,” Sep 27, 2006 [on-line], available from 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/250.php?nid=&id=&pnt=250
&lb=btis, accessed Jul 30, 2007. Full report is available from 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep06/Iraq_Sep06_rpt.pdf.  
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The comparison of polls conducted in Iraq by a different organization, 
Oxford Research International, in  February 2004 and November 2005 (see 
Figure 16), on the question of supporting the coalition forces in Iraq, showed the 
number of supporters going down over a period of 18 months. 
 
Figure 16. Polls in Iraq in 2004 and 2005.372 
 
The global opinion of the operations in Iraq and its implications on the 
GWOT, as well as on the global security environment, is highlighted by a recent 
poll conducted by PIPA, wherein the people of 33 out of a total of 35 countries 
surveyed feel that the Iraq war has increased the likelihood of terrorist attacks 
around the world (see Figure 17).  
 
                                            
372 The data has been taken from the polls conducted by Oxford Research International in 
Iraq in Feb 2004 and Nov 2005. The reports are available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_03_04_iraqsurvey.pdf and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_12_05_iraq_data.pdf, accessed Jul 30, 2007.  
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Figure 17. World Opinion on the Iraq War and GWOT.373 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In all the information strategies adopted by the coalition forces to 
moderate and modulate the information environment at the strategic level, the 
focus on diplomacy and a vigorous campaign for greater international 
engagement is not visible. The recent talks between the United States 
Ambassador in Iraq and his Iranian counter-part, and the initiative of the former 
prime minister of Britain nominated as the emissary to the Middle East are  
 
 
                                            
373 The poll of 41,856 people was conducted for the BBC World Service by the international 
polling firm GlobeScan together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the 
University of Maryland. The 35-nation fieldwork was coordinated by GlobeScan and completed 
between October 2005 and January 2006.Article is available from 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/172.php?nid=&id=&pnt=172&lb=hmp
g1, accessed Jul 31, 2007. 
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important steps. Though delayed, they will definitely assist in moderating the 
information environment at the strategic level, and if successfully prosecuted will 
have its impact on the GWOT.  
The other aspect is that due to the war in Iraq, there is a possibility of 
losing focus on the GWOT. The efforts and resources of the coalition forces in 
respect to the information operations are needed equally at other places. Iraq 
should not become a conflict that allows Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists to 
hone their strategy, improve their skills, re-establish themselves, and move 






VI. INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN PURSUIT OF TERRORISTS 
It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will 
not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your 
enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you 
do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in 
every single battle. 
— Sun Tzu374 
It is imperative, in this asymmetric battle against terrorists, that their 
strategy and tactics be studied in terms of vulnerabilities and strengths so that we 
can formulate an approach to counter them. From the previous discussions, it is 
clear that terrorists are using the elements of information operations, duly tailored 
to their specific requirements, to perpetrate their ideology, carry out grave 
physical damage, and, in fact, hold the entire world at risk. The situation has 
become quite complex as the doctrines and concepts of our militaries are rooted 
with “conventional” armies in mind as the enemy, which limits our abilities to fight 
an amorphous and adaptive enemy. The impact of the activities of terrorists in 
the information domain is significant as even a small physical event can cause an 
upheaval in the strategic level information environment. 
The entire spectrum of information operations has in some sense become 
everything and nothing at the same time. At the strategic level, political leaders 
and military commanders are grappling with the idea of integrating the entire 
spectrum of information operations into the domain of military force,, and at the 
tactical level, soldiers are often unaware of specific elements of information 
operations that need to be focused on in their area of combat. The main effort in 
this chapter is to simplify a few things about information operations in general, 
provide key elements that need to be kept in mind while battling against an 
asymmetric foe, and propose a strategy that may modulate the present-day 
information environment against the terrorists. 
                                            
374 Wikiquote Website, “Sun Tzu Quotes” [on-line], available from 
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Sun_Tzu, accessed Jul 27, 2007. 
186 
A. COMPARING INFORMATION OPERATIONS – THE AFGHANISTAN 
AND IRAQ WARS 
1. Libicki’s Mosaic of Forms and Global War on Terrorism 
Martin Libicki, in his paper on information warfare, categorized the 
elements based on their utilization in four forms of warfare: Real, Arguable, 
Potential and Unlikely;375 the idea was to define which elements fall into the 
domain of warfare with respect to their impact at the time. The Libicki approach 
to information warfare was in fact state-centric and in the context of the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT), the constructs appear to vary. The idea behind the 
analysis is to identify focus areas within the domain of information operations that 
are likely to have a greater impact in the GWOT so that there is a better use of 
effort. 
In the context of the GWOT, Command and Control Warfare (C2W)   
consists of anti-Head and anti-Neck operations. The anti-head operations can be 
equated to the search for Osama Bin Laden and the other top leadership of Al 
Qaeda, and the anti-neck operations would include the capability to sever the 
communication linkages between the terrorists and their organizations.  In this 
case, however, communication linkages such as the Internet, commercial cellular 
and telephone networks, are not explicitly defined, and in any case, cannot be 
crippled due to an unacceptable level of collateral damage. C2W, as visualized 
by Libicki, may not be successful against a networked terrorist organization and 
will have diminishing returns. This is mainly because the command structures of 
networked terrorist organizations are constantly adaptive in nature. The rise of 
networked organizations has undermined C2W. For this reason, in the case of 
C2W, only anti-Head may fall into the category of Real war with respect to the 
GWOT.  
Intelligence Based Warfare (IBW) forms a large part of the GWOT. 
Although Offensive IBW makes sense, Defensive IBW has no meaning since 
terrorist organizations have no capability to spoof the sophisticated sensors 
                                            
375 Martin Libicki, “What is Information Warfare?” 
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through commensurate technical means. On the other hand, the terrorists do use 
non-technical means of camouflage and deception to outwit the sensors.  
Electronic Warfare (EW) categories as highlighted by Libicki, anti-radar, 
and cryptography, do not see any use from the coalition forces’ perspective, but 
anti-communication is definitely a part of the GWOT. Anti-communication needs 
to be seen from the entire spectrum of the EW process―identify, monitor, locate 
and jam; and this aspect of communication EW had been previously neglected 
by the coalition forces. EW will also be used for anti-Improvised Electronic 
Devices (IED) operations that can be based on different platforms to provide 
appropriate coverage and depth. The terrorists too are integrating publicly 
available forms of crypto techniques to mask and hide their message content 
over commercial communication channels like the Internet and voice telephony 
networks. 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP), directed toward the commander, has 
little use since the terrorist leadership is too well motivated to be swayed from its 
cause. PSYOP directed toward the foot soldiers may not be too effective due to 
their level of commitment and motivation. But PSYOP against the national will 
and culture are two important things that could effectively be used to moderate 
the environment where some form of terrorism has found a base; this could help 
uproot the terrorists from their support structures. Hence, in the strictest sense, 
national will may be an incorrect term to use, and it could be called local or 
regional will. Counter-terror PSYOP should have a greater focus on cohesive 
strategy. 
Since there are no dedicated information systems with the terrorists, and 
as they tend to use more personal information resources such as laptops, 
desktops, facsimile machines, etc., offensive hacker warfare on the scale that 
Libicki describes, cannot be undertaken as part of the GWOT. Nevertheless, 
there is a need to focus on specific surgical operations in this domain in order to 
intercept and monitor terrorist communications, command and control directives, 
financial transactions, front organizations and their dealings, etc. Also, offensive 
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hacker warfare can be targeted toward state sponsoring, sheltering, or providing 
a base for terrorist organizations with the aim of profiling and monitoring their 
activities. Defensive hacker warfare is important since it is foreseen that in the 
future, terrorists may acquire the capability to cause damage to developed world 
information systems. 
Libicki’s notion of economic information warfare, in terms of information 
blockade and information imperialism, may not apply directly to the terrorists and 
their organizations, but would apply to a state that is sponsoring terrorism or 
sheltering terrorists. This is still entirely situation-specific, and will form part of the 
unlikely war. Also, in today’s interconnected world, with different networks 
interacting in physical, social, business, and media-based domains, true 
economic information warfare as elucidated by Libicki may not be possible. In 
addition, an information blockade is likely to have a greater unacceptable 
collateral damage. 
Lastly, Libicki’s seventh form of information warfare, which is a broad 
category that includes information terrorism, semantic attacks, simula warfare 
and Gibson warfare, is clearly the least tractable. Information terrorism and 
semantic attacks may be defined as part of arguable war since exploitation of 
specific information systems that are used by terrorists can be targeted after 
intensive data mining efforts and the corruption of their websites and the data 
therein is possible, but its impact and benefits cannot be clearly visualized. 
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Libicki also defined the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the United States 
against a prototypical sophisticated foe of the future: a middle income country 
with access to global markets for electronic equipment and engineering talent 
that is Powerful, Powerful but Vulnerable, and Vulnerable for each of the 
elements.376 In the case of C2W, its efficacy against a networked terrorist 
organization appears diminished. Terrorist organizations are inherently more 
invisible and undertake explicit actions to hide from the efforts of intelligence 
agencies by relying on non-technical methods. Although, Simula Warfare and 
Gibson warfare may be categorized as Powerful, they could more explicitly be 
put in a new category of Powerful but Unexplored. The summary of the 
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2. Applicability of Information Operations in the Timeline of 
Afghanistan and Iraq Wars  
 There are a number of elements not included by Libicki as part of his 
seminal paper that form part of the information operations doctrine of the United 
States like deception and the supporting and related capabilities of information 
operations. These additional elements find their use in the operations conducted 
against terrorists and their networked organizations. Analyzing their impact and 
potential over the timeline of conflict for both Afghanistan and Iraq enables us to 
determine what form has a greater potential in which phase of operations. Again, 
the idea behind this analysis is that it will provide clarity and focus to the polity 
and military commanders, as well as the soldiers, enabling them to concentrate 
their efforts during the different phases of operations so as to favorably exploit 
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Figure 18.  Applicability of Information Operations in the Timeline of 




In these types of conflicts, where the GWOT involves attacking a state that 
is sponsoring or abetting terrorism, and thereafter providing stability to that state 
to prevent the resurgence of terrorists, we see that C2W (Anti-Head), PSYOP – 
targeting population and cultural conflict, EW – ES and EA, Physical Security, 
Counter Intelligence and PA, are the common elements during all phases of 
operations.  Therefore,, these are the forms of information operations on which  
militaries need to focus during force application requirements and in the training 
of troops who are going to be involved in such wars. The context in this type of 
war is as important as the conduct of war and there needs to be a greater focus 
on integrating the various components of information warfare so that each one 
provides a complementing effort to the overall infosphere. 
 
B. A STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN PURSUIT OF 
TERRORISTS 
 
…Terrorism exploits the technologies spawned by globalization, 
recruits its foot soldiers on ideologies of bigotry and hatred, and 
directly targets democracies. And yet, it is a sad reality that 
international networks of terror appear to cooperate more 
effectively among themselves than the democratic nations that they 
target. We speak about cooperation, but we often seem hesitant to 
commit ourselves to a truly global offensive to root out terrorism 
with the pooling of resources, the exchanging of information, the 
sharing of intelligence and the unambiguous unity of purpose that is 
required. That must change. We do have a global coalition against 
terrorism; we must now give it substance and credibility, avoiding 
selective approaches and political expediency..377 
— Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India 
After September the 11th, I made a commitment to the American 
people that the United States of America will not wait to be attacked 
again. We will take the fight to the enemy, and we will defend our 
freedom……. To win this war on terror, we will use all elements of 
national power. We will use our military…….We'll use our 
diplomatic corps. In other words, we're working with friends and 
                                            
377 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India. UN General Assembly, New York, Sep 23, 2004 
[on-line], available from 
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allies……We're beefing up our intelligence here in America…..it's a 
different kind of war.378 
— President George W. Bush, USA 
The Prime Minister of India and the President of the United States, in their 
above quotes, have elucidated their strategic directives to fight terrorism quite 
clearly. The acceptance of terrorism as a global phenomenon and the 
participation by many nations in the GWOT is a testimony to that fact. There is a 
need now to build around these efforts and to raise the GWOT to the next level 
with total commitment and unbiased ruthlessness sans cesse. These efforts must 
aim to translate the macro directives into perceptible tactical victories against 
terrorists round the globe so as to make a significant dent in today’s networked 
Jihad. There is a need to adopt a “multi-pronged, multi-dimensional, multi-
agency, multi-jurisdictional, and multi-national model to combat terrorism and 
extremism.”379 The ideological linkages to Al Qaeda aims and objectives are 
visible across the spectrum of regional Islamic terrorist organizations in addition 
to their local agenda. The global terrorism phenomenon is an Islamic 
fundamentalist ideological network that needs to be paralyzed by a more efficient 
anti-terrorism network established between a disparate comity of nations that is 
equally adaptive and innovative and in tune with today’s Information Age. 
The foundation of global Jihad that has been laid by Al Qaeda entails the 
corruption of moderately inclined local Islamic groups to take the form of 
belligerent fundamentalist organizations having deep-rooted local agendas with 
global Jihadi linkages. The exploitation of the Globalization Phenomena and the 
Information Age paradigms for the sustenance of the ideology and perpetration of 
violence is the theme. The ability of networked Jihadi movements in the 
Information Age to focus on adaptive organizations, doctrine, strategy, and 
technology, will remain the major catalyst for their evolution and sustenance. 
                                            
378 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses Second Term Accomplishments and 
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There is no simplistic prescription for countering, preventing or eradicating 
terrorism related to Islamic fundamentalism as also a part of the globe  remain 
unaffected by this phenomenon. What is required is a balanced approach that 
involves short-term tangible and visible targets and long-term persistent efforts 
that, on the face of it, may not appear too relevant or may require a shift from the 
current myopic outlook, but will definitely reshape the international environment 
toward peace and prosperity. 
The strategy for pursuing terrorists must flow from the identified or 
perceived vulnerabilities of the terrorists followed by defining the imperatives for 
the war on terror, and all this then be integrated into a information strategy. 
      
1. Exploiting the Vulnerabilities of Islamist Terrorists through 
Information Operations 
The following paragraphs highlight the vulnerabilities of Islamist terrorist 
organizations and elucidate the components of information operations that are 
likely to have the greatest effect on exploiting them. 
 
a. Leadership 
Most of the Islamist terrorist groups have a dynamic leadership with 
leaders becoming cult figures that are able to provide religious-based guidance 
for undertaking terrorist activities. As in any organization, the terrorist groups also 
have differences amongst the top leadership that need to be exploited. In the 
realm of operations against the leadership, an attack could be restricted only in 
the informational domain, with little physical resources dissipated for hunting it 
down. The capture of the top leadership may not be possible and hence an 
active informational campaign should be enough to restrict their active 
involvement and participation. In any case, the efficacy of leaders of Al Qaeda, 
like Osama bin Laden or Ayman Al Zawahiri, in actively controlling and 
coordinating the network of Al Qaeda is actually quite minimal. The physical 
resources could effectively be used in breaking the second, third and fourth tier 
leadership who are considered important nodes in the terror networks; such 
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objectives are considered achievable.  The importance of Osama bin Laden and 
Ayman Al Zawahiri is lesser at the operational level, while their greater 
importance is at the strategic and symbolic levels. Hence, the targeting of Osama 
bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri need to be pursued in the infosphere without 
diverting important physical resources for their man-hunt. 
 
b. Increased Networking with Disparate Groups 
Islamist terrorist organizations worldwide, and in particular Al 
Qaeda, have forged relationships with many organizations that are 
geographically and ideologically distant. There are two aspects of the enlarged 
network.  Firstly, it signifies growth in the organizations, increased capabilities, 
and increased resources. Secondly, it merges organizations that have distinct 
ideologies and local obligations. The first aspect may be considered positive to 
the terrorist organizations, but the second aspect highlights increased dissension 
targets as well as the imbalance in nodes and links as potential targets, and 
allows an increase of focus on the local counter-terrorist security agencies.  
 
c. Need for a Haven 
Islamic terrorist organizations need a place of refuge in the Islamic 
world in order to establish or re-establish and plan and coordinate their activities. 
In the case of Al Qaeda, the progression from Somalia to Afghanistan and now  
Pakistan confirms this aspect. They may have their independent cells around the 
world, but they still need a base in some Islamic country or a community in a 
non-Islamic country. This mainly depends on the local support that is available in 
places of refuge as well as the inept attitude of the local government authority. 
The present places of refuge for Al Qaeda and the Taliban have been identified 
as the areas in Pakistan. Similar places that are vulnerable to the acceptance of  
Islamist terrorist organizations need to be identified, and a pre-emptive approach 




d. Financial Network and Fundraising Activities 
Islamist terrorist organizations depend on finances to undertake 
their activities. They obtain their money through various means including large 
donations by individuals, front business organizations, and fund raising in the 
Muslim world as well as throughout the expatriate community. The routing of 
money is done through Hawala-like transactions using criminal organizations, 
and through seemingly legitimate transfers within the global financial network. 
Financial assets are needed by the terrorist organizations for the purchase of 
weapons and other related equipment, planning a strike, payments to terrorists 
and their family members, etc. This entire chain has many possible chinks and 
can be exploited through information means by targeting high profile donors, the 
entire fund-raising process, and the distribution and transfer network especially 
those using legitimate financial institutions. 
 
e. Channels of Communication and Coordination 
The channels of communication that the Islamist terrorist 
organizations use are diverse: loudspeakers in mosques, the Internet, cell phone 
and landline telephone networks, audio and visual media networks, and of 
course, human courier service. Denying these channels of communication to the 
terrorists is a difficult proposition, but modulating it is achievable. The media 
outlets can be surgically flooded with content adverse to terrorist organizations, 
and there could be a greater interaction and engagement with Middle East media 
channels for modulating the media content. There is also a need to increase the 
intelligence and surveillance activity over the global communications network. 
The Internet is now the major carrier of Jihadi activities as well as command and 
control interactions. The over-dependence on the Internet may lead to it being a 
critical vulnerability, and for this reason, any technological capability to deny, 
partially deny,or selectively deny Internet availability, or to actively exploit it to 




f. Voice of Moderate Islamic Clerics and Religious Figures 
 
Muslims cannot be defeated by others. We Muslims are not 
defeated by our enemies, but instead, we are defeated by our own 
selves. 
— Abdullah Azzam 
 
Islamist terrorists use religion to profess their ideology and gain 
sympathy and support from persons of similar religious backgrounds. Hence, if 
the Islamist terrorist leaders can modulate the pitch of their movement by 
resorting to religious misinterpretation, then in a similar way, the Islamic clerics 
and religious figures, with moderate interpretations of Islam, can just as easily 
influence the Muslim population in an exactly opposite manner. Efforts in this 
direction to create or promote moderate Islamic religious figures as powerful as 
Osama bin Laden, and other proponents of violent Islamic Jihad, may assist in 
keeping a check on the growing number of Muslims who accept the violent form 
of Jihad. 
 
g. Finding New Jihadists 
There are two categories of Islamist terrorists. The first category 
consists of the foot-soldiers who are indoctrinated due to their environment, 
society, and access to hard-line Islamic education. The other category consists of 
educated and professional Muslim youths who are disillusioned by the societies 
in which they live and who then move on to accept the violent form of Islam to  
highlight their grievances, then in due course, are manipulated to accept the 
greater cause of the Islamist terrorist group that they join. The global Jihad 
propagated by Al Qaeda can only be sustained if there is a steady flow of recruits 
who accept its ideology and pursue its goals. This flow of recruits can be seen as 
a vulnerability and there may be a number of avenues, both long term and short 




h. People Power and Internationalization 
 
I object to violence because when it appears to do good, the good 
is only temporary; the evil it does is permanent. 
— Mahatma Gandhi 
The Islamist Jihadists are a tiny minority group amongst the Muslim 
population. The majority of the people in the Muslim world, as well as people 
from other religious backgrounds, do not support violence as a means to project 
their grievances. This is amply clear from various polls conducted by several 
different organizations. The following figure (Figure 19) depicts the results of 
polls conducted by Pew Global Attitudes Project in different regions of the world 
in 2005. The poll results clearly show that the majority of the people do not 
subscribe to the ideas of Osama bin Laden nor do they support the violent 
means used by today’s Islamist terrorists. Similar polls conducted by World 
Public Opinion, Terror Free Tomorrow, and a host of other organizations, paint 
the same picture. There is a need to leverage such results and use them to 




Figure 19.  Pew Polls Conducted in 2005.380 
 
                                            
380 Pew Global Attitude Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and 
Western Publics,” Jul 14, 2005 [on-line], available from 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248, accessed Jul 31, 2007.  
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Figure 20.  Pew Polls and World Public Opinion Poll Conducted in 2006.381 
 
The other related vulnerability is of internationalization, in terms of 
an increase in discussions on the subject amongst people of the world, and the 
such discussions leading to undermining the Islamist terrorist agenda that 
perpetrates violence against humanity. Internationalization also implies greater 
focus on the menace of terrorism, and greater cooperation and coordination. In 
order to exploit this vulnerability, it is necessary to consolidate the efforts of 






                                            
381 World Public Opinion Website, “Large and Growing Numbers of Muslims Reject 
Terrorism, Bin Laden,” and “Iranians Overwhelmingly Reject Bin Laden,” Jun 30, 2006 and Jan 
30, 2007 [on-line], available from 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/international_security_bt/221.php?nid=&id=&pnt=
221, and http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/ 
313.php?nid=&id=&pnt=313&lb=btis, accessed Jul 31, 2007.  
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2. Imperatives of the War on Terror 
The magnitude of the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism necessitates the 
acceptance of the imperatives mentioned below prior to defining the strategy. 
• The Terror War is essentially a political and social war that requires 
military support. 
• International cooperation and an international framework is a 
prerequisite. 
• The campaign against terrorism will be protracted. 
• The aim of moderating the Islamic fundamentalist ideology through 
the subtle use of Information Age paradigms and by exploiting the 
mechanisms of globalization is fundamental. 
• A focus on the terrorists’ support structures and sanctuaries is 
important, without distinction, along with a robust reconstitution and  
reconstruction policy. 
• Networking in the larger space between countries, as well as 
internally between militaries, intelligence, and polity is essential. 
• Organizational adaptability to exploit the power of network and 
information is essential. 
• Military force will remain as the entry point to tackle a regional 
terrorist center, with reliance on small and agile but potent combat teams.  
• Defensive measures against terrorist actions will never be fool-
proof, but must have a deterrent and preventive value. 
 
3. Strategic Level Guidance for Information Operations in Pursuit 
of Terrorists 
The Islamist terrorism that is visible today is a complex web of local 
organizations that form part of a transnational network due mainly to the 
globalization of information. The causes of localized Islamist terrorist 
organizations have strong political and societal dimensions, but on the macro 
level, there is a definite need to focus on the root causes of terrorism to define a 
long-term policy. The following paragraphs highlight the macro level guidance 
necessary to give impetus to the current war on terror.382 
 
                                            
382 The vulnerabilities of Islamist terrorist organizations (covered earlier), although not 
explicitly addressed in the following paragraphs, but an integrated information operations strategy 
to exploit those would provide rich dividends. 
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a. Global War on Terror Necessitates Global Effort  
Terrorism, in the form of an Islamic fundamentalist movement, is 
active around the globe; an incident in one part of the world has its links and 
effects in the other parts. The Islamist terrorist organizations have been able to 
successfully integrate their local goals with the larger goals as propagated by Al 
Qaeda. The United States and its coalition partners are fighting a GWOT, but 
increasingly it is perceived as a war of the United States. Many other countries 
need to be actively integrated into this battle. A war against terror requires a 
comprehensive, cooperative, and global approach. The United Nations’ High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,383 that consisted of 16 eminent 
persons from around the world with a wide range of experience and expertise, 
has in its report suggested a Comprehensive Strategy that acknowledges the fact 
that “the right to life is the most fundamental of human right.”  
The comprehensive strategy includes first dissuasion; by reversing 
the causes of terrorism through promoting social and political rights, encouraging 
the rule of law and democratic reform, reducing poverty and unemployment, and 
stopping state collapse. Secondly, efforts must be made to counter extremism 
and intolerance through education. Thirdly, develop better instruments for global 
counter-terrorism cooperation within a legal framework, including financial 
control, and resorting to denial and interdiction where necessary. Fourthly, build 
up state capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations. Such a 
Comprehensive Strategy necessitates the formation of global alliances and a 
global coalition. A strategic undertaking by all peace-loving nations who respect 
human life and basic societal values is thus a mandatory step toward fighting and 
eradicating the menace of terrorism.  
Constant pressure, in terms of policy and direction, from a world 
body like the UN, and its significant follow-up by all countries, either due to their 
global obligation or through coercive means, will then be perceived as 
acceptable. There is still a deficiency in the United Nations in terms of the  
                                            
383 United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of High Level 
Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, United Nations General Assembly, Dec 1, 2004 [on-
line], available from http://www.un.org/secureworld/ 
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achievement of a collective outlook and approach toward terrorism.  World War I 
gave us the League of Nations,  World War II the United Nations; the Cold War 
gave us NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Will the Global War on Terror lead to some 
other independent alliance for exclusive focus?  As Victor Hugo said, “Nothing in 
the world is so powerful as an idea whose time has come.” The impact of the 
information environment on such an alliance, partnership, and cooperation will be 
immense. 
 
b. From a Global War on Terror to Localized Wars on 
Terror on the Global Front 
Even though an exclusive alliance to counter Islamist terrorism may 
not be achievable in the short term, or may not be sustainable over a longer 
period of time, there is a definitely a need to provide a limiting value, and some 
boundary conditions need to be imposed on the GWOT to make it more 
manageable. There may be a need to shift the outlook of GWOT from a global 
front against Islamist terrorism to Localized Wars on Terror that are 
geographically dispersed and involve different parties and militaries but under the 
same umbrella of the global alliance. The benefits would, firstly, entail, the 
availability of a greater number of resources, and secondly, engage the 
adversary in all regions and hence deny a localized base and the time necessary 
for Islamist terrorist organizations to re-build their infrastructure. The information 
campaign that has persuaded the government of Pakistan to undertake decisive 
actions against Islamic extremists that have successfully established a base in 
the Waziristan area is a case in point. This would enable collective and 
simultaneous action in dispersed geographical regions, currently reeling under 
the menace of terrorism, and also provide “substance and credibility” to the 
GWOT. 
 
c. Re-shift the Focus on Al Qaeda and Affiliates 
Each passing day, the United States-led war in Iraq is perceived 
more and more as an aberration with respect to the GWOT. The Muslim world is 
divided on its response to this occupation.  They are worried about the intentions 
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of the United States with regard to the Middle East, and this has led to a more 
sympathetic response to the propaganda perpetrated by Islamist terrorists from 
the Muslim community, toward Islamist terrorism, as an avenue for war against 
the United States. The effort and resources to contain the insurgency in Iraq is 
eating into significant resources and policy imperatives that need to be focused 
more directly on Al Qaeda and its affiliates as adversaries in the GWOT. In order 
to focus on areas and regions wherein Al Qaeda and its affiliates are undertaking 
a proactive campaign to re-establish themselves, a re-assessment of the United 
States involvement in Iraq is seen as essential. The complete withdrawal of 
United States-led forces from Iraq may not be possible due to such a re-
assessment, but certainly it would imply a drastic reduction of forces, 
establishment of small operating bases within Iraq to conduct surgical operations, 
and an integrated truly global force to provide relief and reconstruction 
assistance to Iraq. The impact of such a reduction may be motivating for Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates, but its impact in the information front on the large 
number of moderately inclined Muslim populations of the world would be 
immensely positive. Discussions going on at the United Nations toward 
increasing its involvement in Iraq are a step in the right direction. This approach 
will also enable a more focused view toward threats emanating from Al Qaeda, 
especially in Afghanistan and the Western regions of Pakistan. Similarly, it is 
necessary to increase cooperation in the information domain with countries that 
are being influenced either by Al Qaeda or through its affiliates. A common 
information perspective needs to be defined and proactive sharing of information 
is required.   
 
d. Divide and Conquer in the Infosphere – Countering the 
Ideology 
David Frum and Richard Perle in their bestselling book, An End to 
Evil remark, “The war against extremist Islam is as much an ideological war as 
the Cold War ever was….Terrorists, in other words, are motivated by ideology. 
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Discredit the ideology and you defeat the terrorists.”384 The domain of 
information operations provides us with the necessary tools to formulate a 
cohesive ideological response that must include: 
 
• Ways and means to prevent the dissemination of Al-Qaeda’s 
message by obstructing its covert and overt channels of 
transmission (Libicki’s information blockade). 
 
• Legal curbs including punitive measures on Islamic radicals 
for their marginalization and for promoting the ideological 
tenets of traditional Islam by strengthening the bonds 
between Muslim communities and the State, and through 
interaction at the intellectual level between modern Muslim 
states and western societies. 
 
• A global information campaign, based on truth, to highlight 
the fallacy of extremist Islam philosophy and expose the 
righteous virtues of Islam. 
 
• The war against ideology needs to be a community effort 
and as the authors Frum and Perle suggest, “The future of 
extremist Islam will be decided by Muslims themselves, by 
reference to their own values and their own interests.” 
 
The campaign in the infosphere needs to be modulated to 
divide the Islamist terrorists from the audiences they seek and the influence they 
aim to have on fence-sitters, as well as the moderately inclined Muslim 
population. The focus of this policy must be to divide terrorists from the general 
population, to divide terrorists from their overt or covert sponsors, and to divide 
the terrorists internally. The strategy for countering ideology can easily be 
integrated by using divisive information operations aimed at segregating the 
Islamist terrorist groups through manipulation, modulation, denial, over-load of 




                                            
384 David Frum and Richard Perle, An End To Evil (New York: Ballantine Books, 2004), 125 
and 201. 
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e. Intelligence and Information Sharing 
Intelligence is by far the single most important resource in the war 
against Islamist terrorism. The intelligence infrastructure has been built over the 
years with a state-centric approach based on the fact that each nation has 
another nation-state as its potential adversary. The present day’s Islamist 
terrorism, that is prevalent in some form in every corner of the world, 
necessitates that the overall intelligence apparatus undergoes a transformation. 
The transformation should acknowledge the dynamic and constantly changing 
nature of terrorist organizations, and hence the intelligence organizations need to 
be equally adaptive and agile. The transformation should also be in terms of 
policies and regulations for sharing information with the agencies of other 
countries, and vice versa. Technological superiority in intelligence gathering 
mechanisms may be a big advantage, but it is not a condition sufficient to 
achieve the required actionable intelligence. Links with human intelligence 
operators across regions and open channels of communications need to be 
integrated with technical capability. The security in the global information age will 
not be achieved by only building strong defenses, but also by building an 
inter/intra agency counter-terror network for the sharing of information and 
intelligence.385 
 
f. Influence Campaigns Against Islamist Terrorists 
The information age, its related technologies and the networked 
channels of communications, have changed understanding and perspective 
toward the levels of warfare. The distinction between a tactical and a strategic 
event is fast eroding; a seemingly docile tactical activity can catapult itself to an 
event with strategic repercussions in no time, and without any intrinsic effort. The 
influence campaigns planned through the components of information operations 
need to factor this changed scenario while facilitating the influence campaign 
against Islamist terrorists. Further, the channels for information dissemination 
                                            
385 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime 
and Militancy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001) [on-line], available from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/index.html, accessed Aug 3, 2007. 
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have also become enlarged, which leads to two inferences. Firstly, there will 
always be some confusion in trying to determine correct information from the vast 
majority of inaccurate information, and secondly, the channel or medium of 
transmission becomes an important factor when validating the authenticity of the 
information. The first inference must be used to counter the propaganda of the 
Islamist terrorists, and the second inference must be used for conducting our 
own influence campaign. The influence campaign needs to integrate all the 
aspects of PSYOP, PA, Counter-Intelligence, OPSEC and deception to fight the 
“war of words” and the “battle of hearts and minds.” The themes for the influence 
campaign must aim at decreasing the appeal and legitimacy of the ideology of 
Islamist terrorists, differentiate terrorism and Islam, support the legitimacy of 
elected representatives, uphold and publicize the views of moderate Islamic 
political and religious leaders, and launch a campaign to address the grievances 
raised by Muslim populations against the United States. The impact of these 
operations is only sustainable if there are commensurate visible impacts in the 
physical domain.    
 
g. Severing the Networked Terrorist Linkages 
The networked structure of Islamist terrorist organizations 
essentially points us in the direction of building our own networks to fight the 
global terrorism menace. There is a need to focus on the Islamist terrorist 
network in the broader sense and to break up its linkages with continued 
offensive actions. These networked actions may not always involve the military 
force as the facilitator, but may go beyond, and include: diplomatic coercion to 
influence a state to prevent its geographical boundary being used as a sanctuary 
and training ground for the terrorist, obstructing the flow of funds and weapons to 
the terrorist through stricter (but focused) financial and trade regulations, isolation 
of the terrorist organization both geographically and socially, and by an invisible 




propaganda activity. This will ensure a split in the terrorist network resulting in 
loss of their power and accessibility and denying them time, space, and 
resources.   
 
h. Military Transformation – Towards an Irregular 
Approach 
The military dimension to the Terror War will involve defensive, 
offensive, and punitive operations. Although the military dimension will be over-
shadowed by political and diplomatic overtures, without the military component 
this war cannot be won.386 
The battlegrounds in Afghanistan and Iraq have pushed the 
military into an unconventional, irregular form of warfare that requires 
modifications to existing doctrine, principles, organization, and support 
measures. The force needs to be networked, adaptable, and innovative. These 
necessitate the use of Special Forces’ teams that are technologically superior, 
and organizationally small, but potent. The application of massed military forces 
may or may not be required initially to gain an entry point, destroy sanctuaries 
and bases, and localize the terrorist, but military operations must consider the 
enduring nature of such conflicts and the social, political, military, and geographic 
context in which the force is to be applied. Information operations at the macro 
level could be applied consistently over a period of time to prevent application of 
a large military force to fight the war on terror. The application of force must 
reflect the particular character of the social system being engaged. The duration 
of the conflict will require mass-military force to deal, on a greater level, with 
“winning the hearts and minds” and for providing a deterrence value and mass-
impact, as was done in Iraq with specialized offensive actions against the 
terrorist left for the small Special Forces’ teams387. The integration of 
                                            
386 Barry R. Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics,” 
International Security, Vol. 26, No 3, Winter 2001/2002, 39-55.  
387 The conventional elements have had a hard time in relating to the whole notion of the 
“hearts and minds” campaign. Although, a drastic reorganization in military forces is not 
foreseeable in the near future but there is need to validate the efficacy of small well organized, 
and appropriately resourced troops to undertake the “hearts and minds” campaign at a much 
larger scale.  
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organizations other than military, to work and deploy with the specific aim of 
social and cultural reconstruction that will cause the isolation of terrorists from 
their support structure, is considered absolutely essential. Further, relying on 
specialized information operations units is necessary, but there needs to be a 




The campaign to suppress international terrorism seems foreordained to 
be a long one, with periods of optimism dispelled by new attacks and ensuing 
despair. Defeating international terrorism will require intense and sustained 
political attention, not the least of which would be to build adaptable and 
innovative networks across a number of agencies to coordinate internally and 
collaborate internationally. We must aspire to build a global counter-terrorist 
network that is more comprehensive, more intense, and more adaptable than 
anything the terrorists can build.  
The Islamist terrorists worldwide and Al Qaeda in particular, have adapted 
to the nuances of the Information Age and are exploiting information age 
technologies to fight a war against vastly superior forces. The present 
Information Age has greatly removed the barriers to waging and sustaining a 
successful campaign between two diverse adversaries. Information Operations 
and its various components provide us with an opportunity to formulate a 
cohesive and comprehensive strategy that can limit physical involvement to a 
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